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Abstract
This dissertation explores the ways in which sovereignty and nationalism are
expressed within four small island nations of Oceania. These four nations represent
significant variation in the level of sovereignty and types of nationalism. Hawaiʻi, though the
largest of the four, remains a part of the United States following the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. An active nationalist movement continues to fight for the end of U.S.
occupation. Fiji, whilst legally fully independent, has seen considerable nationalist activity
including four coups. Niue and the Cook Islands are in free association with New Zealand.
Though independent nations, they have elected to outsource several government functions
including foreign affairs and defence to New Zealand. They also maintain a close
relationship wherein Niueans and Cook Islanders hold New Zealand citizenship. This
unusual relationship tests the bounds of typical models of sovereignty and nationalism.
Despite their small size, nationalism is present in all four nations.
Contrary to expectations given the contested status of the three nations and the
ethnonationalist struggles Fiji has faced, the fiery and intense version of nationalism known
as hot nationalism is mostly historical for these nations. Rather, we see nationalism expressed
through taken for granted components of daily life. This phenomenon known as everyday or
banal nationalism can be seen across areas that would not typically be considered as
nationalist such as food, music, language and sport. Even extremely banal areas such as road
naming, airport organisation, and mailing procedures, can serve to remind people of their
place in the nation and create or reinforce a national identity.
Sovereignty has been the focus for activists across many modern movements. Though
traditionally nationalists have often utilised folk definitions of sovereignty, international law
i

and the legal definitions of sovereignty have become paramount to many modern
movements. Nationalists are increasingly using legal theory and academia as tools to gain
legitimacy and support for their causes. How nationalism and sovereignty are expressed and
contested have changed considerably over the past few decades necessitating the fresh look
at nationalism in small island states provided by this study.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction
This dissertation looks at the variety of ways in which nationalism is expressed in

four small island nations of Oceania1. It explores this issue across a range of
independence and sovereignty statuses, from legally fully independent Fiji to Hawaii’s2
ongoing occupation and status as a US state. Niue and the Cook Islands’ statuses are

1

Oceania has been defined in a variety of ways. This dissertation uses a definition that is common

in the region where it includes all of the islands of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia except New
Guinea. Australia is not typically included in this definition, though it is within the geopolitical definition
of Oceania. New Zealand can, depending upon the model employed, be considered to be part of Polynesia
or Australasia. For comparative utility, New Zealand is often excluded from regional definitions and in this
dissertation is not presented as part of Oceania.

2

This dissertation uses the spelling Hawaiʻi (with the ʻokina) rather than Hawaii. This form best

represents modern Hawaiian orthography and is the form favoured by the National and State Parks services
and the University of Hawaiʻi. Hawaii is used when referring specifically to the State of Hawaii
government, as the official state name does not include the ʻokina. The ʻokina is not included in the word
Hawaiian, nor in the possessive form (Hawaii's), as they are using English word endings, causing them to
be considered non-Hawaiian words.
The term Hawaiian, when referring to people, is used here as a synonym for Native Hawaiian to
describe peoples who consider their ancestry to trace back to the original Polynesian settlers of Hawaiʻi. A
partial exception to this is when referring to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Most groups within the
movement do not consider it to be a racial issue, but rather one affecting all people of Hawai'i. Though
there is frequently an implied racial element in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, the usage of
“Hawaiian” here should not be considered an indicator that a group or the movement as a whole considered
themselves to solely represent native peoples.

2

ambiguously positioned somewhere in between. These nations provide for an ideal
exploration of the ways in which nationalism can be manifested in ways that are different
from that which is typically studied. Though all four nations have experienced colonial
domination in some form, their colonial experience is dramatically different from that of
most other former colonies, resulting in very different approaches to sovereignty and
nationalism. These nations are also much smaller than typically studied in nationalism
research and in contrast to many other postcolonial states’ versions of nationalism, none
of these nations has had significant violent or armed nationalistic movements.3
The way in which a nation gained its independence (or failed to gain
independence) and its current expression of sovereignty appear to be the most significant
factor in the ways in which nationalism can be observed. The Cook Islands and Niue
have full legal independence and sovereignty, though they have entered into a compact of
free association under which many of the rights of a sovereign state have been
surrendered to New Zealand, their former colonial power. Fiji remains a largely
independent state since its release from colonialism in 1970, but still frequently feels
pressures from the more powerful countries of the region, namely Australia and New
Zealand. Fiji also faces a complex postcolonial legacy of ethnic division and political
instability. Following the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 by the U.S.,
Hawaiʻi has remained under the control of the United States. Though generally accepted
as a state of the United States of America, many advocates of the sovereignty movement

3

Whilst Fiji has experienced four coups since independence, and Hawaiʻi has had some historical

armed skirmishes (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on hot nationalism), actual violence was fairly
minimal, especially when compared with movements in other nations.

3

argue that Hawaiʻi is an independent nation under U.S. occupation. These varying levels
of independence and sovereignty have dramatic effects upon the character of these
nations.
Nationalism, in its most visible fiery form, appears to be displayed most strongly
in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, whilst outward displays of this type of nationalism are relatively rare
in the Cook Islands and Niue. Banal or everyday nationalism, however, seems everpresent in all four nations. In contrast to the extreme form of nationalism known as hot
nationalism, everyday nationalism represents the taken-for-granted ways in which
nationalism is integrated into our daily lives. In both Hawaiʻi and Fiji, the nations can be
considered under threat, with a resulting need for building a national identity in response.
In the case of Hawaii, the threat to the nation is in the form of continued U.S. occupation.
For Fiji, it is a combination of a threat from internal division and outside interference
from neighbouring countries. Fiji has had a particularly turbulent history with four coups
since independence in 1970. Since the 2006 coup, the government has oriented itself
towards building a unified Fiji free of outside influence. In both cases, traditional
nationalism is often internally divisive, and its reception mixed and thus whilst present, it
has proved problematic for these nations.
Along with the backdrop of very active traditionally nationalistic displays are the
under-considered presentations of everyday nationalism that appear in many ways to be
more effective at defining that nation. Niue and the Cook Islands seem largely content
with their political and legal statuses. Although there are occasional stirrings for change,
there has been a considerable evolution in their statuses since the free association
agreement with New Zealand was signed allowing their sovereignty to grow within the

4

framework of the agreement. Ending the compact with New Zealand in favour of full
independence has often been a reoccurring issue for a handful of Cook Island politicians
but has never gained much traction amongst the general voting public. In Niue
reabsorption into New Zealand has been proposed a few times, such as following a
devastating hurricane, but likewise fails to gain real support. Given the lack of any
significant movement toward full independence, there appear to be only minimal attempts
to make use of traditional nationalistic displays in the islands. Banal nationalism, on the
other hand, is in heavy use in these nations. In Fiji and Hawaiʻi, similar displays of
everyday nationalism are paired with often poorly received traditional hot nationalistic
symbols and displays.
Though reasonably stable democracies at present, three of the four nations have
had meaningful political turmoil in their recent pasts. Fiji has had four coups in a handful
of decades. The Cook Islands saw a sitting prime minister removed by the courts for
election irregularities and also experienced a recent coup attempt. Hawaiʻi has a very
active sovereignty movement, whose supporters consider Hawaiʻi to be under foreign
occupation since the forceful overtaking of the country 124 years ago. Niue, though on
the whole politically stable, is currently facing rapid depopulation and an increasingly
overextended government, which now employs nearly the entire labour force. Many of
these concerns, however, are kept out of the world's attention because of these nations'
dependence on foreign tourism. Foreign tourism is often harmed by impressions of
political upheaval or other imagery that hurts the impression of the islands as a
“paradise”.

5

The four nations of this paper were selected because they represent atypical
versions of the nation. Niue is one of the smallest countries in the world and has an
unusual legal status. The Cook Islands is also extremely small and shares the legal status
of Niue. Fiji whilst larger than its neighbours is still a small nation by global standards. It
has also been one of the most politically turbulent countries in the region, as well as the
most developed independent state. Hawaiʻi is interesting, as it is one of the most racially
diverse places in the world and features an exceptionally low-key, but highly active,
sovereignty movement.

1.1

Purpose

This dissertation aims to expand our understanding of the relationship between
banal nationalism and sovereignty within small states. Nationalism, contrary to
assumptions, is very present even amongst the smallest of nations. Though it may be less
visible than in nations undergoing major political upheaval (a favourite for traditional
nationalism studies), or the long-established large western nation (the recent area of
interest in the field), it seems to be a critically important feature of the nation. Everyday
nationalism can be argued to be a powerful, but under-explored tool in the battle towards
independence and sovereignty.
The typical context for everyday nationalism research has been urban
environments within large well-established nations. There has been a severe lack of
research within small nations and particularly, small island nations. Similarly, most of the
studies have focused on nations with traditional governance models and well-recognised
sovereignty. By exploring nationalism in understudied environments with less typical

6

legal statuses, we can see how well the theories of nationalism hold up under more
diverse examples.
In Hawaiʻi, armed movements against U.S. occupation are both politically
unworkable and practically impossible, given the clear superiority of military resources
of the U.S. government. Likewise, the promotion of traditional pro-sovereignty
nationalism through the use of the sovereignty flag and protests are met with general
disdain or disinterest from the public. In contrast, tools of everyday nationalism such as
food, language, sports and music have done more to bring the idea of a sovereign
Hawaiian nation into the public’s mind, and with it, acceptance of a theoretically
sovereign Hawaiʻi, than traditional nationalism could ever do.
In Niue and the Cook Islands, everyday nationalism is effectively establishing
stronger sentiments of independence and full sovereignty than political movements have
been able to. In many ways, their arrangements of free association are so beneficial to the
islands that eliminating them is unlikely ever to gain meaningful public support.
Nevertheless, like most peoples globally, they feel the universal calls for sovereignty and
independence. Again, banal nationalism seems to fill a gap that would otherwise be
highly problematic.
Fiji has seen conscious efforts by the government to shape everyday nationalism
in ways that fit its model of a unified, independent country. Fiji’s political climate, in the
face of ethnic and religious division, is such that most outwardly nationalistic attempts
are poorly received by large sectors of the nation, given their traditional relationship to
ethnic division. Everyday nationalism allows the government of Fiji to establish a unified
national identity in a way that is not harmful to the nation.

7

Everyday nationalism has played a clear, but somewhat unique, role in each
nation’s pathway to independence and its postcolonial aftermath. Strangely, though,
given this role, there has not yet been much academic attention paid to its effects. This
dissertation seeks to provide a starting point to this apparent gap in the nationalism and
sovereignty literature.
I will also explore how nationalism can function within very small nations.
Benedict Anderson famously defined a nation as an imagined community. The nation is
imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of
their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion”.4 Owing to Niue’s small geographic size and tiny population,
it is not only possible, but reasonable for members of the Niuean nation to know, or at
least know of, effectively all of their fellow members. The Cook Islands, though larger, is
still small enough that many of its members will have some connection beyond that of the
imagined community. In the larger nations of Fiji and Hawaii, knowing large percentages
of their fellow members is not practical. However, attempts at finding non-nation
connections between people are deeply ingrained in the local culture. Family ties (which
are themselves often imagined) are a key element of South Pacific cultures, but their
effects on nationalism have been underexplored. Despite their comparatively larger
sizes, Fiji and Hawaii too remain dwarfed by most other nations, particularly those
Anderson was writing about. This dissertation will argue that nationalism is still possible

4

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

(New York City: Verso, 2006), 6.

8

and present in nations significantly below the size generally considered, but that this
nationalism may take a somewhat different form, particularly manifesting as banal
nationalism.

1.2

Conceptual Framework

1.2.1 The Nation
The concept of “nation” has proved to be quite tricky to define precisely.
Definitions often suggest that a nation is a group of people with common characteristics,
such as language, ethnicity, history and/or religion. Will Kymlicka, for example,
proposes that “'nation' means a historical community, more or less institutionally
complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and
culture”.5 Otto Bauer and others have chosen to focus more upon the commonality of
national character, noting that the people of a nation are “united by a common fate …
[which] is primarily a common history; the common national character involves almost
necessarily a uniformity of language”.6 These definitions seem, though, to overemphasise
actual commonalities, ignoring the flexibility that is exercised by nations in defining
themselves.
Whilst there is a great diversity in ways of defining the nation, Benedict
Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined political community seems most

5

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Wotton-under-

Edge, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11.
6

John Hoffman and Paul Graham, Introduction to Political Theory (Harlow, UK: Pearson

Longman, 2006), 260.

9

useful for this dissertation. His 1983 work Imagined Communities has become one of the
most frequently cited works on nationalism. However, within the study of nationalism, it
is generally only a small portion of his first chapter that is utilised, with frequent
disagreement over the applicability of the remaining chapters. In this first chapter, he
proposes that a nation is “an imagined political community” which is “imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign”.7 He argues that nations are imagined in the sense that,
in even the smallest nation, the members will “never know most of their fellow members,
meet them, or even hear of them”; however, they hold an “image of their communion”.8
Despite an absence of actual bonds, members consider themselves connected through the
bonds of their shared nation.9 There is a general shared affinity for each other, even when
commonalities beyond nationality do not exist.
Nations are generally defined as limited, in that they have physical, finite
boundaries.10 A nation cannot usefully include all peoples of the world, nor do nations
imagine themselves as doing so. The boundaries of the nation are supposedly finite, and
other similarly bounded nations are seen as existing beyond the boundaries of each
nation.
Sovereignty is also presented as a requirement for defining a nation. The nation
must imagine itself as sovereign in order to exist. Nations do not need to actually be able

7

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.

8

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1-9.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

10

to express sovereignty, but rather "nations dream of being free”.11 Thus, a nation can
exist as an imagined community, even when its members lack sovereignty, so long as
they share in the belief that their community “should” be sovereign. Finally, the nation is
a community in that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.12 A member
of the nation is presented as having a meaningful connection to fellow members, even
when this connection might not exist in any practical form.
Anderson’s definition of a nation, whilst generally very useful, is somewhat
problematic when looking at the nations in this paper. He suggests that it is not possible
for all members of a nation to interact with or even know of each other. This
impossibility of non-imagined bonds creates the need for the nation to establish a shared
affinity. Without the nation, the peoples of that space would otherwise not generally be
able to hold an “image of their communion” with their fellow members.
When looking at a nation such as Niue with a population around 2,000, the notion
that it is not possible to interact with all fellow members of a nation no longer holds true.
With only one primary and secondary school, one supermarket, a single hospital and only
a handful of restaurants in the 260-square-kilometre island, the idea that any person living
in the nation would be a complete stranger is highly unlikely. Any two members of the
Niuean nation are likely to have been born at the same hospital, gone to the same school,
attended the same church, and shared a host of social events. Should the person somehow

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

11

have avoided having a personal connection with another member of the nation, it is a
virtual certainty that a close relation of the person would. Even in the somewhat larger
Cook Islands, the population of around 10,000 suggests that whilst close bonds with all
fellow members are probably not possible, most people will have more connections than
just the imagined bonds of nationhood. Although it is statistically impossible to calculate
with any real accuracy how many people someone will meet in a lifetime, many rough
estimates describe numbers as high as 100,000 people.13 This suggests, then, a possibility
of actually meeting around ten per cent of the population of even the larger nations of Fiji
and Hawaiʻi. When we start to consider connections beyond just direct contact, such as
the connections of family and friends, it remains plausible that some sort of connection
other than nationality can be found amongst most members of a nation. This dissertation
will show that Anderson's apparent requirement of a large population is not necessary for
the development of nationalism and that the bonds of the nation can continue to exist
despite lacking the need for the imagined bonds of nationhood which a larger nation
would require.
Anderson’s definition of the nation still remains useful in this dissertation.
However, as noted above, it is necessary to redefine somewhat the “imagined”
component of the nation. Whilst Anderson sees the imaginedness to be required as a

13

These estimates are typically based upon a thought experiment by travel writer William Least Heat

Moon and are generated by multiplying the number of people a person will meet daily by average life
expectancy (currently 71.0). The estimate of 100,000 people is reached by assuming a person will meet an
average of four new people a day. Though this number will clearly vary based upon a variety of social and
geographic factors and how “meet” is defined, it seems accurate to believe that most people will meet
extremely large numbers of people in their lifetime.

12

replacement for other bonds, it appears that the “image of their communion” as a nation
is still present even when other bonds exist amongst the members of the nation. These
feelings of being connected by nationhood do not seem to be any stronger or weaker as a
result of other bonds, but rather exist as an altogether different type of connection.
Further, small nations still exist within a world of other nations. Even if the imagined
community is unnecessary to connect a small nation together, its people are still going to
be continuously exposed to others within the imagined communities of foreign nations.
Given how deeply embedded the nation is within our daily lives, exposure to the idea of
nationhood is unavoidable, and it is unsurprising that people within nations wherein the
imagined component of nationhood may be unnecessary would still find themselves
utilising it.
In recognition of the role of self-determination, the term nation in this dissertation
is used to refer to any set of peoples that defines themselves as a nation, whilst still
observing the other components of Anderson’s definition (“limited and sovereign” with
at least a “dream” of sovereignty).

1.2.2 The Nation-State
Though nation is often used as a synonym for state or country, they are not the
same. Nations in Anderson’s argument are closely related, but not necessarily the same as
the states within which they exist. Nation-states exist when there is a convergence
between the sovereign geopolitical entity which is the state and the cultural entity which
is the nation.14 Nation-states “come in all shapes and sizes”. There is a common

14

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1-9.

13

assumption that nations are built upon objective variables such as language, religion or
geography, on which the boundaries of the state can be established. Despite this
assumption, no nations fully meet this standard.
Of the four nations this dissertation explores, none can be considered to be
entirely nation-states. The Cook Islands and Niue, though having no trouble meeting
general definitions of a nation, have unclear political sovereignty. Fiji, in contrast, whilst
clearly politically sovereign, does not have the unity or homogeneity to be
unambiguously a nation. Hawaiʻi fails both parts. Its political sovereignty is
unrecognised, and it lacks the cultural or social cohesiveness to form a nation (at least
one that corresponds to its geopolitical bounds).

1.2.3 Nationalism
Nationalism, in the popular imagination, is most commonly associated with a
fight for independence or extreme right-wing politics. It is also generally envisioned as
something that occurs elsewhere, with established nations seen as not having nationalism.
Though this is clearly not the case, instances of nationalism in established nations are
often presented as being an exception or a fringe movement, so as to allow the
mainstream society to maintain the illusion that they are not a part of the nationalism that
they fear. Nationalism is perceived as a dangerous or exotic force, being the result of
“overheated reaction”. For established nations, nationalism is presented as a function of
the periphery; it is a tool of separatists and other extremists, not a part of normal activity.
Michael Billig challenges this notion. He argues that, rather than an exotic part of the
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periphery, nationalism is deeply embedded in the normal activity of the nation.15 The
nation is continuously reproduced throughout its daily life.16 The term “banal
nationalism” is proposed to cover the ways in which these established nations' habits
serve to reproduce the nation.17 Within established nations, there is a continual “flagging”
or reminding of nationhood.18 This nationhood provides “a continual background for …
political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers”.19
In small, often subtle, ways the people of the nation are reminded of their place in a
“world of nations”.20 This reminding, however, is so commonplace and constant that it is
not generally consciously recognised.
It is commonly assumed that, within the daily life of most established nations, the
nation’s identity emerged essentially spontaneously and organically based on a shared
sense of the nation’s values. Billig strongly rejects this idea of a natural national identity.
Instead, he suggests that the establishment of the nation, particularly the violence of the
nation's establishment, is forgotten and the continuing of the national identity comes
through largely unconscious reminders. Billig uses the concept of the waved and
unwaved flag to illustrate this. The flag is said within nationalist thought to represent “the
sacred character of the nation”. The flag is “revered by loyal citizens and ritually defiled
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by those who wish to make a protest”.21 Despite this symbolism, however, the vast
majority of the times in which citizens see their national flag, it is not conveying a
particular message.22 Though there are instances in which it will be “consciously waved
and saluted”, most times in which the flag is viewed it will be “unwaved and
unsaluted”.23 It will be passed by without conscious analysis of the symbolism. It is a part
of the landscape of government buildings, patches on uniforms, and other unnoticed uses.
Though serving as seemingly mindless symbols, flags do perform a function. They
provide a daily reminder of nationhood. Other symbols such as money and postage
provide a similar function.
Billig also challenges the notion that nationalism is an inherently harmful force,
as well as the notion that it must ultimately be associated with violence.24 He does note,
however, that banal nationalism should not be assumed to be harmless, as it provides a
way of priming populations for nationalistic clashes.25
Billig uses the term “hot nationalism”26 to distinguish banal nationalism from the
form of nationalism that is routinely discussed. Hot nationalism is the “force which
creates nation-states or threatens the stability of existing states”.27 He suggests it is found
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in a time of exception when there is “social disruption” and struggle. Hot nationalism is
generally assumed to eventually fade away after the new nation is established. Though
many other authors present this fade-away as having nothing replacing it, Billig sees
banal nationalism as often the ultimate result.
Although his work is extremely useful, Billig assumes that there is a necessary
difference between nationalism in established nations and nationalism in nations fighting
for recognition. This assumption seems problematic, as it presupposes that all facets of a
nation's struggle will be hot nationalism. Though in young or especially violent struggles
this might be the case, many instances reveal banal reproductions of the struggling nation
rather than violent expressions of nationalism. Across the world, as many independence
movements are now decades old, earlier symbols of hot nationalism have become
uncontroversial and unnoticed. In Hawaiʻi, the struggle for sovereignty has been going on
since shortly after the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi in 1893. Though there have
been isolated flare-ups, there does not appear to be a meaningful continuation of hot
nationalism in the form that Billig describes. Whilst the notion is not incompatible with
his work, he seems to largely ignore the possibility that banal nationalism is a
replacement for hot nationalism in long-running sovereignty struggles, not just in cases
where the sovereignty struggle has succeeded in producing a new state.
Jones and Merriman argue that Billig's separation of banal and hot nationalism
may not adequately describe the way in which nationalism is commonly expressed. They
note that banal nationalism can often be examples of hot nationalism expressed through

17

the everyday.28 Hot nationalist movements will often focus their energies around banal
topics because engaging in aggressively nationalistic campaigns would likely cause the
marginalisation of their movement.29 Using the example of bilingual road signs in Wales,
they show how this banal symbol became a rallying point for Welsh hot nationalism.30
English-only road signs were described by the movement as “symbols of oppression” and
were defaced and destroyed by nationalist activists.31 Even within the debate over
bilingual road signs, though their symbolic value was of great importance to the parties,
much of the debate was framed around banal issues such as typefaces, colour and their
effects on road safety.32
Rhys Jones and Peter Merriman advocate “a focus on the everyday contexts
within which nationalism is reproduced” rather than treating banal nationalism as a
“categorically different form of nationalism from ‘hotter’ varieties”.33 Billig does note
that banal nationalism can be used to prepare a country for hot nationalism and should
not be seen as discrete categories of nationalism. This common oversimplification of
Billig’s argument has led, unfortunately, to the majority of work on banal nationalism
focusing solely on everyday and mundane expressions. It often ignores the hot
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nationalism underlying the expression.34 Though Billig suggests a fluidity to the
everyday, this fluidity seems largely ignored.35
Jones and Merriman advocate the use of the term “everyday” in the place of
“banal”, as everyday “in addition to being a place of banal and mundane processes, may
also incorporate a variety of hotter differences and conflicts that affect people's lives on a
habitual basis”.36 This sort of everyday nationalism seems to be common in Hawai‘i.
Given the predictable lack of success hot nationalism has in Hawai‘i, many of the targets
of Hawaiian nationalism have been banal areas of life, particularly in issues relating to
the Hawaiian language. For example, activists were successful in gaining the passage of a
Honolulu City law requiring that many streets be given Hawaiian names.
In a proposal similar to Billig's, Brian McVeigh suggests a dichotomy of “hard”
and “soft” nationalism in looking at Japan.37 In this model, strongly nationalist instances
such as “politicians in denial about Japan's wartime atrocities, right-wing organizations,
and official visitors to Yasukuni Shrine” are contrasted with the “taken-for-granted
notions about the national state and its political and economic machinery”.38 Soft
nationalism forms the “hegemonic practices embedded in the education system, in state
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ideology, and in culture and social life”.39 Like Billig, McVeigh rejects the notion that
nationalism is found only in “other” countries as part of violent conflict.40 McVeigh,
however, also shows that hard nationalism can be found in a nonviolent form in a more
developed country. This soft form of nationalism can be argued to be more dangerous
and pervasive than hard nationalism.41
McVeigh's case study of Japan describes four general types of soft nationalism:
economic, educational, cultural, and peace nationalism. Economic, educational and
cultural nationalism seem applicable to most nations. However, his form of peace
nationalism is so closely tied to Japan's post-war history that it has almost no
generalisability.
Economic nationalism exists where there is a strong preference for domestically
produced goods and is generally supported by quotas and tariffs. In Japan, it is
manifested as a widespread concern about the safety and suitability of imported foods.42
“Buy local” campaigns or import substitution industrialisation programmes appear to be
the most common way in which this form of economic nationalism is supported.43 The
replacement of foreign imports with domestic products is encouraged.44 This type of
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nationalism is one of the most significant current focuses of the governments in this
paper.
Educational nationalism is displayed in the ways by which their school systems
reproduce and support national values.45 It provides a way for nationalism to spread
beyond state structures and into everyday life with long-lasting effects.46 Especially in
Hawai‘i and Fiji, educational nationalism is prevalent. The educational system has been a
prime battleground in these nations for nationalist and counter-nationalist movements.
Cultural nationalism can be seen in the notion that a nation possesses cultural
uniqueness and that this “unique” culture is a defining feature of the nation.47 Cultural
features, including material culture and vague cultural ideology, are presented as being
responsible for establishing the nation in a special cultural space.48 In doing so, the
boundaries between the nation-state and other nation-states are reinforced.49 This form of
nationalism can be harmful to the stability of the state because it can “bolster ethnic
exclusivism, heightened ethnocultural self-consciousness, [and] racialised notions of
identity” through explanations of supposed uniqueness and presentation as a cultural
function.50 This style of nationalism can be seen frequently in Hawai‘i and Fiji. Each

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid.

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid.

21

nation's uniqueness is useful both for typical nationalist functions and for tourism
purposes.

1.2.4 Patriotism and Nationalism
It is often argued that patriotism and nationalism should be considered as distinct
concepts. Alter suggests that patriotism should be seen as a "love of one's homeland",
whereas nationalism is a new, more nefarious, force. Patriotism and nationalism have
also been presented as both being along the same continuum with intensity serving as a
key distinguishing factor. Patriotism is an affection for one's country, whereas
nationalism introduces a xenophobic and aggressive hatred of others. The primordial
versus modern debate on nationalism is often indirectly invoked by authors like Peter
Alter. They suggest that patriotism is the older concept, representing the attachment to
the homeland, whereas nationalism is newer and built around the rise of nation-states.51
Others such as Charles Taylor have argued that the difference between the two is that
nationalism focuses upon “ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious identity”, whereas
patriotism is about identification with a territory.52
Some have cynically decried the difference between the two as patriotism is what
we have; nationalism is what they have. Steven Grosby’s work can be seen as an example
of this application.53 This form presents a value-laden version of nationalism as violent
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and built around difference, whereas patriotism is the positive loyalty to a territorial
community. This definition is problematic both in its blatant bias and in its analytical
uselessness. Even history's most horrific nationalistic expressions have been exercised by
people who claim they are acting out of a love for their country rather than a hatred of
others.
Though attempts at defining the difference between nationalism and patriotism
are often unsatisfactory, there does appear to be a useful, though perhaps blurry,
distinction. Many of the definitions frame patriotism in terms of attitude, whereas
nationalism is framed in terms of action and consequences. This distinction may prove
useful in exploring the apparently contradictory situation in Hawaiʻi, where patriotism
(toward the U.S.) and support for Hawaiian nationalism do not appear to be mutually
exclusive. A distinction between the two concepts also seems appropriate for explaining
the divide between the love for one's country and the minimal representations of
nationalism in Niue and, to a lesser extent, in the Cook Islands.

1.3

Methodology

Everyday nationalism produces a number of unique methodological challenges.
By its very nature, most of its expressions are relatively unconscious and rarely selfexamined. It can be challenging to study because most inhabitants are unaware of how
nationalism operates or affects their lives. I have adopted a multimethod approach in
order to capture the effects of nationalism from several perspectives.
I spent nine weeks conducting fieldwork over the summer of 2013. My time was
split, with approximately two weeks in Niue; two weeks in Suva, Fiji; one week in Coral
Coast, Fiji; one week in Aitutaki, Cook Islands; and two weeks in Rarotonga, Cook
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Islands. I grew up on the island of Hawaiʻi (the Big Island) and have also lived on the
islands of Molokai and Oahu for several years. As a young teenager, I lived in Fiji as
well. Data for Hawaiʻi are built upon both my experiences living in Hawaiʻi and more
systematic study across the past few years.
For this dissertation, I interviewed a number of government officials in each
nation. Their official roles involve them in developing areas of everyday nationalism,
including health/nutrition, cultural promotion, tourism marketing, and foreign trade.
These semi-structured interviews provide insight into how everyday nationalism can
develop within official contexts, even when the official may not be fully aware of this
effect. These interviews were supplemented by mostly unstructured interviews with
chefs, hotel owners and others working in hospitality, as well as those working in
education, to see how they saw national identity presented in practice.
Interviews were primarily exploratory. As nationalism can be a fairly sensitive
topic for many, questions were relatively broad and focused primarily on expressions of
everyday nationalism. Given that sampling for this project was not representative, the
interviews were mainly used to identify areas on which I should focus, to find general
trends, and for information about specific topics, rather than to measure levels or types of
nationalism. The interviews were conducted at the place of the interviewee’s choosing.
Most were done at their place of work or a nearby café. Approximately 50 people were
interviewed.
I also observed shoppers in grocery stores and markets, as well as attendees at
sporting events and festivals across the research sites, to see how items of interest
(signage, product marketing, etc.) were presented and how they were received. Though
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opportunities were limited, I sought out and observed displays of hot nationalism in Fiji
and Hawaiʻi, including protests and presentations by sovereignty activists in Hawaiʻi.
I observed how local culture and history were presented to tourists (and,
secondarily, to locals) at museums, visitor centres, and exhibits at historical or culturally
significant sites. When possible, I also interviewed those responsible for creating these
presentations to learn more about their motivations in each particular presentation.
This dissertation is also built upon research conducted for my MA thesis. I spent
seven weeks in Fiji over the summer of 2009 at three sites split between the cities of
Lautoka and Suva and villages on Koro Island. I observed customers in grocery stores,
eateries and hotel restaurants. I also conducted semi-structured and unstructured
interviews with approximately thirty people. These interviews focused on a range of
topics relating to nationalism and national identity. Because of the political situation at
the time (the constitution had recently been dissolved, and several academics had been
recently deported), questions that were directly nationalistic were avoided to focus
primarily upon everyday nationalism.
Primary sources were used heavily to inform this dissertation. I collected a
significant number of publications by government agencies (particularly by the Ministry
of Health/Health Department in each nation); tourist promotional materials; cookbooks;
and general audience publications that expressed everyday nationalism, both during my
fieldwork and archivally at libraries in Rarotonga, Suva, Honolulu and Auckland. These
sources were supplemented by an analysis of approximately twenty issues of each
nation’s newspapers for references to both hot and everyday nationalism.
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In selecting nations for this project, I sought places that had unusual legal statuses
or other aspects that were atypical within nationalism studies. Niue and the Cook Islands
were selected because of their small size and highly unusual legal statuses. As two of
only five states in the World with a free association agreement, they provide a previously
unexplored position within nationalism research. The Marshall Islands, Federated States
of Micronesia and Palau (associated with the United States under a Compact of Free
Association) were also considered. However, these states, whilst undoubtedly likely to
produce valuable data, have concerns so profoundly interwoven with climate change, the
fulfilment of the Compact, and broader American nationalism that executing this project
would be challenging and would reduce generalisability. Tokelau (a dependent territory
of New Zealand), Rapa Nui (a special territory of Chile) and New Caledonia (a special
collectivity of France) were also considered, but were eliminated for logistical reasons.
Fiji was selected as it has had very active ethnonationalist and civic-nationalist
movements in recent years, resulting in four coups. The low level of violence within the
coups and the ways in which the nationalist message is accepted is unusual. Despite
relatively fiery nationalist messaging (now mostly historical), popular support for
nationalist movements have been muted. I choose to look at Hawaiʻi, as it provides one
of the few examples in the region of nations that have sought sovereignty but have been
unable to achieve it. Across nations with contested sovereignty, it is also interesting to
study because widespread support for independence and a lack of counter-sovereignty
activism exist without a viable path to sovereignty. Like Fiji, Hawaiʻi has also seen a
reasonable amount written about nationalism in the islands, but virtually nothing looking
at the role of everyday nationalism.
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1.4

Significance of the Study

This dissertation is one of the only works on everyday nationalism in these
nations. It provides a look at a previously unstudied area, testing several assumptions of
nationalism research. It also aims to expand our understanding of the various ways in
which nationalism can function in small nations in general. This dissertation pushes the
limits of where nationalism has been previously thought to function by looking at
extremely small nations.

1.5

Limitations of the Study

The most significant limitation is the result of it being a comparative overview of
nationalism in these nations. Time and space limitations necessitated only relatively brief
coverage of many topics. Unfortunately, many of these have not been meaningfully
studied previously. Consequently, there is a multitude of further research that could and
should be conducted to explore these topics in further detail.
It also becomes apparent in several sections of this dissertation that there is an
imbalance in nationalistic activity amongst the nations. Whilst in some cases this could
be interpreted as a lack of nationalistic feeling, it remains impossible to separate from
functional resources limitation issues relating to their small sizes. In a small nation, there
are very real practical limitations to any person’s ability to implement nationalistic
agendas; lower priority causes will lack the dedicated supporters required to make them
happen. In a larger nation, any idea is bound to have at least a few supporters who can to
raise some resources to support it, by merely having a large enough population.
At the government level, a nationalistic agenda can be challenging to implement
in small nations, again not necessarily because of lack of desire, but rather owing to a
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lack of people to carry it out. Many government ministries in Niue and the Cook Islands
are so small that they consist of only a handful of people. Even in Fiji and Hawaiʻi,
although much larger, they will still often be short in specialised resources. Though they
may wish to implement particular policies or practices, they often do not actually have
the personnel to do so. In a larger nation, it might not be a problem to allocate resources
to lower priority goals, but for a small nation, few have the personnel to spare for
anything other than top priority items.
Conversely, with small populations, it does not take many people to skew data
radically. For example, Niue alternates between having the world's highest and lowest
traffic fatality rates: a single fatality is measured as equivalent to the death of a tenth of a
per cent of the nation. Similarly, the difference between the nation having an initiative or
policy can often be a matter of only one person working it. The level of direct influence
any member can have on his or her nation is radically magnified in these low-population
nations.

1.6

Organization of the Study

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on Oceania and nationalism in
small states. Oceania remains an exceptionally poorly studied region with several of the
countries highlighted in this dissertation being amongst the least studied. Whilst banal
nationalism, in general, has been reasonably well explored, there remains a significant
lack of studies in small nations.
The history of the four nations is explored in Chapter 3. Each of them has had a
unique colonial and postcolonial experience that has meaningfully shaped the nations of
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today. Information about key areas such as demographics, geography, race and land laws
are also provided.
The question of sovereignty and independence is presented in the fourth chapter.
As a concept closely related to nationalism, sovereignty has been the focus for activists
across many modern movements. Whilst historically, folk definitions of sovereignty or
conceptions primarily defined by de facto status were typical, increasingly however many
modern nationalist movements are extremely focused on international law and the legal
definitions of sovereignty.
Chapter 5 looks at hot nationalism. Hot nationalism is the form of nationalism that
provides the most iconic representation for the public imagination. It is the fiery and
intense struggle. This chapter looks at the organised and semi-organised nationalist
movements occurring within the four nations. Though none of the nations has meaningful
traditional style hot nationalism today, each still has a noticeable version of hot
nationalism.
Banal or everyday nationalism is overwhelmingly the form of nationalism that we
see today in most nations and is explored in Chapter 6. It represents the ways in which
the nation is presented and reproduced through everyday life. It is present in each of the
four nations, but is relatively different across, representing the unique character of each
nation.
Across these chapters, it becomes clear that the four nations represent an
expression of the nation and nationalism that differs considerably from what is often seen
as the typical post-colonial nationalistic experience. The transition into colonialism was
relatively smooth for each and with the exception of Hawaiʻi, they all shifted into
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independent nations without struggle. For the three currently independent states, they
gained their autonomy through reasoned negotiation, rather than a protracted
independence struggle. Even for Hawaiʻi, its post-colonial experience is unusual in its
absorption into the larger state, rather than maintaining a separate status. The four nations
are also much smaller than typically studied, as well as being a part of a region that has
received little scholarly attention. As such, they present an ideal set through which to
explore nationalism in a new way.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Review
Oceania has often been called one of the least studied regions of the world. Topics

that are fairly common starting points for the social sciences, such as race54, language55,
and even the basic physical environment remain vastly understudied. The smaller nations
in the region receive virtually no academic attention, and thus, many topics in these
nations remain completely undocumented. As such, literature is extremely scarce on most
topics in Niue and the Cook Islands, and rather limited for Hawaiʻi and Fiji.
In the last ten years, there have been three books (academic or popular) published
about Niue; two histories, and a children's book.56 Over the same time period, nine books
were published about the Cook Islands.57 These included two travel guides, a children's
book, a history, and five special subject non-fiction works. In contrast, Fiji had over a
hundred books published about it in 2016 across several genres; and Hawaiʻi often can
have more than 50 books published regarding it within a month.
Publications in academic journals have also been scarce for Niue and the Cook
Islands. There were under a hundred journal articles published about Niue in the last ten
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years.58 The majority of these are looking at public health, economic development,
natural sciences and migration patterns. The Cook Islands sees slightly more results, but
still less than 250 articles published in the last ten years.59 Again, public health and the
natural sciences dominate the topics of research. Fiji had about ten times as many articles
published in the same period, and Hawaiʻi had over five thousand across the last ten
years.

2.1

Banal Nationalism

Though banal nationalism is a relatively young approach, it has been well
embraced. Its flexibility allows, with minor adjustments, for it to be used to explain a
wide range of nationalistic behaviours, including many that are subconscious. This work
has included a variety of subjects, such as print media, sport, music, food, and several
other less commonly explored topics of nationalist interest.
Often building upon Anderson’s work on print capitalism, as well as Billig’s
examples, many writers have applied the concept of banal nationalism to the press. For
example, Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli mirrored Billig in finding a number of
nationalist positions that the Turkish media (and the consumers of these media) accept as
natural.60 Similarly, Alex Law adapted Billig’s version of banal nationalism to look at the

58

Based on a search of Google Scholar, Proquest, JSTOR and MUSE for articles with Niue or Niuan

in the title.
59

Using the same technique as for Niuan articles.

60

Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli, “Reproducing the Nation:Banal Nationalism’in the Turkish

Press,” Media, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2000): 787–804.

32

media in the context of Scottish nationhood.61 Sport has also been common areas for the
application of banal nationalism. In this context, research has been done on many nations,
including articles looking at soccer in Cameroon62, soccer and skiing in Austria63, the
Olympics in South Korea64 and the popular approach to sport in Nordic countries65. Food
has likewise been increasingly gaining attention in the banal nationalism literature. As
one of the most relatable and approachable topics, it has provided a rich area of study
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across Japan66, Australia67, Equatorial Guinea68, the United States69, as well as several
other large nations.
Banal nationalism has provided a framework for many topics that would
otherwise be disregarded despite having significant effects on nationalism. Scholars have
looked at commonly encountered symbols of the nation in architecture70, banknotes71,
licence plates72, and road signs73. Though there are still many areas in which the effect of
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banal nationalism is underexplored, which invites future research, the largest gap in the
literature, seems to be in applying banal nationalism to small nations.

2.2

Nationalism in Small Nations

There has been extremely little published about banal or everyday nationalism in
small nations. Though the limited studies available do suggest that everyday nationalism
is fully possible within small nations, there is little information available about the ways
in which it differs from larger nations. Across the 83 nations that have populations of less
than a million, there have only been a few dozen publications on how everyday
nationalism operates there. Considering the wide variety of small nations, this represents
a fairly significant and concerning gap in the literature. Furthermore, in many small
nations, banal nationalism actually more accurately represents the displays of nationalism
that are seen. Exhibitions of hot nationalism are much rarer yet have long been the focus
of nationalism studies.

2.2.1 Theories of the Nation
Hot nationalism, for a variety of reasons, does not seem to gain much of lasting
foothold in small nations. Nevertheless, there is clearly the sense of nation and national
identity in these nations which mirrors what scholars have written extensively about in
larger nations. Everyday nationalism is often useful to explain the nationalistic situation
in small nations where traditional approaches to nationalism are inapplicable.
Malta represents one of the small nations where theories of hot nationalism seem
largely inapplicable. Godfrey Baldacchino argues that, though having a common
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language and lacking significant division, it is without a unified national identity.74 Malta
had a long colonial period, but there was minimal desire for independence, particularly in
light of the financial benefits of remaining a colony.75 In contrast to the typically
expected decolonisation model, Malta strongly fought the end of British colonial
presence. The island saw pro-colonial riots and political turmoil during the time when the
British were intending to pull out.76 Baldacchino describes this as “upside-down
decolonisation” in which the colonial power wishes to remove themselves, contrary to the
desire of the colonised people.77 It appears, however, that, despite a long period of
minimal public nationalism, the increasing number of undocumented migrants to Malta
has caused great concern. Baldacchino argues that this has been responded to through a
rise in symbols of national identity as expressed in banal methods such as currency. 78 The
Baldacchino model of banal nationalism representations emerging when the national
identity is challenged in otherwise minimally nationalistic nations seems reasonable. It
fails, however, to explain the situation in the Cook Islands or Puerto Rico where, like
Malta, there was a strong financial benefit to continuing colonialism and an “upsidedown decolonisation” model. They also in many ways have fewer negatives to
colonisation than for Malta. Nevertheless, they have developed very visible examples not
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only of banal nationalism but also of hot nationalism (particularly for Puerto Rico)
without significant external threat.
Denmark is often ignored as a colonial power, but it did once have numerous
colonies scattered across the world. Of these, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are the
only remaining. Both have had home-rule for several decades and, as of 2009, Greenland
has had self-rule. In looking at this transition, Naja Graugaard provides a detailed
depiction of Greenlandic identity in the context of colonialism and modernity,
particularly the dichotomies between Greenlandic and Danish identities.79 She argues that
that Greenlandic identity has become synonymous with indigenousness and the “old”
traditions.80 As such she suggests that it seems difficult to be both Greenlandic and
modern, as well as it being seen as impossible for newcomers to become a Greenlander.81
These dichotomies and conflicts of identity seem extremely common across small postcolonial nations, particularly ones that did not have an especially contentious
independence process. Niue and to a lesser extent the Cook Islands face these challenges.
Many feel considerable pressure to embrace the New Zealand identity and the benefits
that go with it, but they still wish to maintain their island culture.
Among the nations outside of Oceania, the Isle of Man provides one of the most
analogous nations to those of this dissertation. Though a crown dependency, it is selfgoverning. Whilst Niue and the Cook Islands are independent in free association, rather
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than being dependencies, many of the challenges of defining the nation are shared, as are
their unusually close ties to another nation. Paul Cottier takes a social psychological
approach to the question of national identity.82 He elects to look at what people mean by
the concept of the “nation” and the consequences of such meaning within the Isle of
Man.83 It provides an interesting secondary approach to the study of nationalism, though
given the dearth of research on banal nationalism in small states, a more traditional
approach seems justified to build a framework first.

2.2.2 Newspapers
Researching newspapers has been one of the classic ways in which to study banal
nationalism, as it provides writers with a highly influential but often little-noticed method
to shape the feelings of the nation. In this vein, Linda Kenix looked at the way in which
national identity was constructed within Samoa’s main newspaper the Samoa Observer
and in New Zealand and Australian papers where they wrote about Samoa and
Samoans.84 In using a quantitative approach (which is uncommon for studying banal
nationalism in newspapers), he looked at the frequency of personal pronouns and
symbols that evoke an emotive response.85 Contrary to many media studies in other
nations, Kenix concludes that the creation of national identity does not require the
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exclusion of others within a nation’s news media.86 What remains untested is whether
these results are a function of Samoan uniqueness in how they express everyday
nationalism or the result of the application of a quantitative model to a subject that has
largely been only explored qualitatively. Future studies are needed, as it seems very
possible that other nations of Oceania could provide similar results.
In one of the only other studies looking at newspapers in small nations, John
Richardson, Stephen Huckerby and Mike Williams explored the conflict between
Corsican identity and French identity in Corsica (a Mediterranean territorial collectivity
of France).87 In an environment of hot nationalism, they argue that the main newspaper of
Corsica has adopted a form of Corsican identity that is depoliticised, regional, and
folkloric.88 This style apparently fits well within the popular notions of Corsican identity,
allowing it to be enforced in a way like that which Billig describes.

2.2.3 Food
Though several large nations have seen theories of everyday nationalism
expanded to include food, notably Japan and France, it remains poorly studied in smaller
nations. An MA thesis by Gina Butrico provides one of a small number of cases in which
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banal nationalism has been applied to food in small nations.89 In looking at Iceland, she
notes an active effort to support Icelandic nationalism through the purchase and
consumption of emblematic foods.90 Products visibly and proudly bear Icelandic
branding, and their consumption provides a sense of
camaraderie and shared national pride.91 This model seems to differ considerably from
that which is seen in my four nations, where imported foods are preferred. Many nations
have ongoing efforts to promote locally produced foods. As such, it is likely that in the
future more nations will mirror what Gina Butrico saw in Iceland. A similar study
focusing on Gibraltar was done as an MSc dissertation by Amy Nuñez.92 She finds that
food acts as a national repository showing the ways in which a number of cultures have
influenced nationhood with food as the medium.93 In contrast to the incorporation seen
within Gibraltar (and the nations of my dissertation), Igor Cusack’s work in Equatorial
Guinea found little blending of cuisines.94 Further, he suggests that national cuisine there
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has existed as part of the colonisers’ attempts to assimilate the population with other
locally driven initiatives only just starting to emerge.95

2.2.3 Sports
Sport has often been a popular area for studies of banal nationalism. It is a unique
area in which the energies of classic hot nationalism can be seen, but without the political
significance we associate with this type of nationalism.96 Like other areas of banal
nationalism, sport remains poorly studied in the small nation context. Simon Vaukins’
work on the Isle of Man and Clément’s look at Samoan rugby are the most significant.
The Isle of Man Tourist Trophy motorcycle races have been suggested by
Vaukins to be a significant identity marker to the people of the Isle of Man (the Manx).97
As one of the best known Manx features, he suggests that they are highly significant to
the Manx identity.98 The prominence of daily reminders of the race allows it to be
embedded within the Manx sense of self.99 Unfortunately, the mechanism by which these
reminders are to become part of the identity is to occur is absent from his article, limiting
its utility.
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Julien Clément, in his article on rugby in Samoa, presents three ways in which
rugby is a part of the Samoan national identity.100 In looking at the Samoan national
team, he emphasises the three parties that support the formation of their national identity
through rugby. The first party is the Samoan community (both in Samoa and overseas);
the second is the Samoan Government; the third is the International Rugby Board (known
as World Rugby). Clément, unlike many others writing on nationalism (and particularly
banal nationalism), explores the role groups outside of the nation can play in shaping
national identity and nationalism. This is an extremely useful extra dimension that has not
previously received significant attention. We shall see that each of the nations in this
dissertation has clearly had its national identities influenced by outside actors.

2.3

Nationalism and Sovereignty in Fiji

The literature on nationalism in Fiji has largely been centred around the coups. As
one of the most visible depictions of hot nationalism in Fiji, the four coups provide
numerous examples of Fijian ethnonationalism. Stephanie Lawson has written
extensively on what she describes as “indigenous nationalism”.101 This form of
nationalism emerges from the ethnonationalist notion that a nation is built upon the
common descent of peoples in a homeland, with a natural right to control this
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homeland.102 Key to this narrative is a foundational myth that their people have been in
that place since “time immemorial”.103 Building from colonial-era policy, which
paternalistically protected iTaukei land rights and allowed the continuance of many
traditional power structures, this narrative of indigenous nationalism has been pervasive
in Fijian politics.104 Three of the four coups since independence have been orchestrated
with a stated purpose of protecting indigenous rights and an apparent goal of establishing
an “ethnic democracy” to protect the “paramountcy” iTaukei established in the colonial
system.105 The post-2006 coup reforms saw much of the expressions of hot nationalism,
including indigenous nationalism, fade. The government actively discouraged (both
through policy reforms and oppressive restrictions on free speech and assembly) any
form of nationalism that harmed the message of a unified nation. Indigenous nationalism,
however, can still be seen in much subtler ways. Within the wider global conversation
about Native rights, many iTaukei nationalists have found a framework that allows their
message to be presented within a context of cultural protection and promotion.
John Kelly and Martha Kaplan provide one of the more comprehensive looks at
the formation of the Fijian nation.106 During the colonial period, British authorities
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established a system in which the racial groups were kept separate, and iTaukei were
favoured.107 It also redefined all Indo-Fijians under a single label, where previously they
had defined themselves by region of origin, religion, caste and other group identifiers.108
Along with several other arguments on the ways in which feelings of rivalry were
established (most of which seem to have faded from popular discourse and are no longer
relevant to nationalism in Fiji today), they argue that Indo-Fijians historic decision not to
join the armed forces during World War II (largely due to their insistence upon equal
treatment) resulted in a long-lasting feeling that Indo-Fijians were not a part of the Fijian
nation.109 They did not “shed blood” for their nation.110 Though the actual decision not to
participate seems to now be accepted, effects of it remain. Indo-Fijian politicians are
often stereotyped by nationalists as cowards who are not willing to sacrifice for Fiji.
Though I argue that banal nationalism is actually more present in and significant
for Fiji, hot nationalism (particularly surrounding the coups) has received most of the
attention, leaving only a few works looking at banal nationalism. Daniel Guinness and
Niko Besnier, look at the contradiction created by the fact that the best Fijian rugby
players play for and thus represent other nations, but are nevertheless heroes in Fiji.111
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Fijian nationalism remains produced and reproduced through rugby, despite the players
officially representing another nation.112 They suggest that this duality challenges
Anderson’s conception of territorial boundedness.113 Rather than being bounded by the
nation, the sense of connection shifts to being linked through identity politics.114 Though
problematic for a strict reading of Anderson, it could be argued that this phenomenon
actually reinforces his core message. The imagined component of the nation here
seemingly survives a difference in physical territory.
In a rather unusual application of banal nationalism, John Connell looks at the
ways in which the “good citizen” is constructed within the Fiji Times.115 He focuses upon
a feature in the paper called “People” wherein the paper highlights everyday Fijians who
have “made it”.116 It provides for the continual reproduction of ideas of the nation and
modernity by focusing on values that are consistent with their ideology.117
As a more general application of banal nationalism, my MA thesis applied
Billig’s notion of banal nationalism to Fiji’s national cuisine.118 I argued that food
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provided a point of similarity within a national narrative full of differences.119 Rather
than simply serving as a banal daily part of life, food allowed for the development of a
unified national identity in a way that was unexpected.120 This provides a focused piece
of a larger question of nationalism in small nations that this dissertation aims to explore
further.
Given that Fiji is generally recognised as a sovereign nation, unsurprisingly, little
has been written about sovereignty there. The threat of external forces (namely Australia)
to Fijian sovereignty received considerable attention in the news media but largely failed
to make the jump to academic literature. Vijay Naidu provides an extremely brief
regional analysis of external threats to sovereignty (colonialism, nuclear weapons testing,
“adventurers”, calls for democracy).121 Most of these threats, though still a serious
concern for the region, are largely historic for the well-established Fiji. Donald Horowitz
similarly in his comparison of the constitutional change process in Fiji and Indonesia
makes a compelling argument for a loss of sovereignty caused by external pressures in
the process.122 These threats, however, represent relatively minimal impact upon Fijian
sovereignty. Other threats, such as that to economic sovereignty caused by economic
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dependence, though slowly starting to gain regional attention, remain understudied in
Fiji.

2.4

Nationalism and Sovereignty in Niue

There has been virtually no work on nationalism of any variety in Niue. The only
significant academic reference to nationalism in Niue is a single paragraph by Jon Barnett
in a larger work on the effects of climate change. In his chapter on the effects of
depopulation on Niue, he argues that national pride is rare in Niue, and Niue lacks any of
the “powerful icons of nationalism associated with most modern nation-states”.123 He
then briefly describes the challenges of identity within the context of New Zealand
citizenship.124 This provides a very basic starting point for exploring nationalism in Niue.
Though Niuean nationalism does not have the intensity of many other nations, to describe
it as lacking the icons of nationalism seems to be inaccurate. As he notes, New Zealand
citizenship and the relationship with New Zealand, in general, do represent one of the
biggest challenges for conceptualising Niuean nationalism.
Sovereignty has been only marginally better covered. There are a handful of
articles that briefly mention Niue’s special status in regard to sovereignty, such as Firth’s
work on independence in the Pacific125, but these largely fail to go beyond a basic legal
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analysis. Barry Bartmann in exploring para-diplomacy in sub-national island jurisdictions
briefly discuss Niue and the Cook Islands concluding that they are “far beyond what is
understood to be the various practices of para-diplomacy”.126 However, given his broad
focus, he elects to not devote much discussion to it, asking that within the scope of these
arrangements, “ what is possibly left to meet the full international legal personality of
sovereignty?”.127 There has also been some limited work on the commercialisation of
sovereignty in Niue as it relates to the Niue domain extension (.nu)128, postage stamps,
and tax haven status.129 These, however, are of limited usefulness as they completely
ignore the socio-cultural effects of this commercialisation of sovereignty.

2.5

Nationalism and Sovereignty in the Cook Islands

The literature on nationalism in the Cook Islands has been very limited. The most
substantial of this work is Jeffery Sissons book on national identity. It provides a detailed
look at the ways in which the Cook Islands’ national identity was shaped in support of the
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tourist industry.130 Unfortunately, it has been almost two decades since the book’s
publication. Beyond some passing mentions in larger works, modern nationalism there
remains largely unstudied. Through this dissertation, I aim to expand the scholarly
knowledge of modern nationalism in the Cook Islands and particularly how everyday
nationalism can function within a small island nation.
Many of the general articles on sovereignty cover both the Cook Islands and Niue,
such as Stewart Firth’s independence in the Pacific131 or Stephen Levine’s brief coverage
of the two nations in his work on sovereignty in the Pacific.132 As a relatively unique
example of a type of sovereignty (free association), the Cook Islands receives a cursory
mention in dozens of larger works on sovereignty. These, however, typically fail to go
beyond more than a few sentences on the Cook Islands’ or Niue’s status. There are also
some purely legal analyses of issues related to Cook Islands sovereignty, such as Alex
Frame’s look at defence obligations133 or Stephen Smith’s analysis of the possibility of UN
Membership134. Like with Niue, there remains a significant gap in the literature.
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Kevin Sobel-Read’s dissertation explored sovereignty and globalisation in the
Cook Islands and its diasporic communities.135 He provides a detailed ethnography that
does an excellent job of describing the lived reality of life in the Cook Islands. He rejects
the notion that sovereignty is the same as nationalism (or sub-component of it) and
proposes a new framework of emotional sovereignty to cover the portions that he feels
are not well captured by existing theories.136 Many of the concerns he has with existing
theories of nationalism are addressed at least in part by the work on everyday nationalism
or the common expansion of Anderson’s work on imagined community. His definition of
sovereignty is greatly expanded beyond that which academia and the legal community
have generally considered being within its scope. This expansion whilst intentionally
aiming to broaden the utility of the concept is of limited analytical use for us given a lack
of scholarly consensus on the topic. It proposes a mechanism by which the vagueness of
other models can be overcome but remains far from a proven model. It is also highly
problematic to use the unusual case of the Cook Islands to try and build a new
comprehensive theory of sovereignty. The Cook Islands is undeniably in a unique
sovereignty space, however, existing theories do largely apply to it. Nations with similar
diasporic communities such as Fiji would have provided a much better test case, in that it

135

Kevin B. Sobel-Read, “Sovereignty, Law, and Capital in the Age of Globalization” (Duke

University, 2012),
https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5403/SobelRead_duke_0066D_11241.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y.
136

Ibid.

50

would allow a separation of the expanded sovereignty phenomenon that he describes
from the unique legal position the Cook Islands holds.

2.6

Nationalism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi

Whilst nationalism in Hawaiʻi has been written about fairly extensively, banal
nationalism has not been meaningfully explored. Even when framed within the context of
hot nationalism, the classic areas of banal nationalism (music, sport, media, etc.) have
largely been ignored. As the site of an active sovereignty movement, efforts towards
sovereignty have attracted reasonable scholarly attention. This focus has largely centred
on specific historical, legal or political questions, such as those taken up by Norman
Meller and Anne Lee, who looks to trace the history of the movement and its desired
outcomes,137 or by NoelleKahanu and Jon Van Dyke, who explore the legal foundations
for various nation-within-a-nation models.138 Unfortunately, there has been only limited
attention to the social effects of nationalism and sovereignty.
Music is one of the classic areas for research into banal nationalism. It has long
played an important role in the formation of protest and resistance movements. George
Lewis explores this use of music in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement.139 He elects to
focus upon the context of the songs rather than the lyrics, for a genre he labels “Da Kine”
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music.140 Since many of the most influential songs have been in Hawaiian, much of the
audience will typically lack an ability to understand the lyrics.141 As such, the way in
which the song is used becomes more important for analysis.142 The first way he sees the
music as functioning is in serving to connect people to their roots in response to a trend
of bastardising and co-opting versions of Hawaiian music and dance to serve tourist
desires.143 He notes a second theme of protest and opposition to the misuse of Hawaiian
land.144 In a style that reflects protests elsewhere, several songs have been written as part
of larger social movements in response to incidents such as the US Navy's use of one of
the islands as a bombing range and evictions due to development needs.145 Music is used
in this way to attempt to build a social consciousness of resistance.146 The third theme is
one of preservation of the Hawaiian culture and people.147 Lewis identifies many trends
that had not been previously studied. However, in the decades since his 1984 article, it
appears that the areas covered by his first and third themes have changed significantly.
Both seem to have faded as distinct styles. The touristy pseudo-Hawaiian style that had
previously dominated has declined as more traditional music and dance styles regain

140

Ibid.

141

Ibid.

142

Ibid.

143

Ibid.

144

Ibid.

145

Ibid.

146

Ibid.

147

Ibid.

52

favour. The theme of resistance has since grown much stronger with expansions in
popularity and genre. It can also be seen as increasingly expanded in scope to respond to
more general wrongs, as well as nation-building. Beyond music, areas of banal
nationalism have received little attention.
Questions of identity in relationship to the sovereignty movement have been
explored across a handful of articles. The US Supreme Court case Rice v. Cayetano
brought considerable attention, both socially and legally, to the question of who is
actually Hawaiian and consequently, who can “legitimately” participate in the Hawaiian
nation.148 The case challenged the policy of allowing only Native Hawaiians (using a
blood quantum criteria) to vote for Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees.149 The court
found this policy to be in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment to the US Constitution,
which forbids race-based voting limitations.150 As Kehaulani Kauanui notes, US policy
has both encouraged and created the blood quantum criterion, as well as imposed patterns
of assimilation. As a result, it works to reduce access to entitlements and recognition of
Hawaiian sovereignty.151 Robert Statham suggests that this ruling could have significant
effects for ethnic national self-determination.152 Given that Hawaiians are not recognised
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as a tribe153 and that the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that ancestry was not a
proxy for race, it is unlikely that the US will accept any policy that treats Hawaiians as
separate from others in affording them any meaningful special rights or privileges.154 As
such, he rejects any possibility for self-determination within the US other than through a
universal appeal or an establishment of tribal status.155
Hawaiian sovereignty is often connected to the colonial experience that faced
many other native groups. Haunani-Kay Trask’s essay collection From a Native
Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi remains one of the most influential
and controversial works on Hawaiian sovereignty in this space. Written from a highly
radical Native rights perspective, it details the oppression and mistreatment Hawaiians
have suffered since Cook’s first visit to Hawaiʻi.156 It captures the anger and frustration
that had largely been ignored within work on the sovereignty movement and still remains
neglected. She does not shy away from making her feelings known in critiquing popular
thought on Hawaiian sovereignty. In doing so, she provided a centring point for a part of
the movement that had not been well heard and reminded people that the injustice of the
overthrow is not over. The book (and her other work) has also been extremely
controversial. It has been critiqued as hate-mongering, racist and advocating violence.
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The book is highly problematic from a scholarly perspective as well. It largely ignores
the work of other sovereignty activists and non-supporting research. Though presented as
an academic work, it fails to meet many of the standards for such work.
There have been a number of master’s theses and doctoral dissertations that have
attempted to analyse the sovereignty movement in Hawaiʻi and address the validity of its
claims. This seems to represent the bulk of modern scholarship on Hawaiian sovereignty.
Unfortunately, many of these are almost entirely focused on historical or legal analysis
with the ways in which the sovereignty movement has affected social life in Hawaiʻi
largely ignored. There is also a noticeable lack of critical analysis or objectivity in many
of these works. Whilst the core fact that the Kingdom was unjustly and illegally
overthrown is typically acknowledged (even amongst those opposed to modern
sovereignty), little since can really be said to have universal acceptance. Many of the
arguments in these dissertations are spurious or logically contradictory, adopting poorly
supported minority views of legal or political theory. Furthermore, many of the
dissertations are written by people who are otherwise active in the sovereignty movement
with clear biases despite claiming to present objective facts. Many directly reject any
nuance in the arguments on sovereignty, preferring to claim that what they present on
issues of history and law are clear and unambiguous.
One of the clearest examples of this is David Keanu Sai’s doctoral dissertation in
which he presents his argument for why Hawaiʻi should be considered “an internationally
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recognised sovereign, but occupied State”.157 Sai has been one of the most politically and
legally active sovereignty activists in Hawaiʻi. His arguments have gained a reasonable
following, but no legal success and one of his approaches earning him a Class B
felony.158 Though extremely fascinating, his dissertation obfuscates his arguments and
presents an analysis of international law that lacks any wider consensus.
Willy Daniel Kaipo Kauai provides a clearer and more reasoned version of the
illegal occupation narrative and explores its theoretical effects on citizenship.159 Though
mostly well-reasoned and thorough, much of its analysis of international law is poorly
grounded, relying upon fringe interpretations.
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Another well-known sovereignty activist, Lynette Hiʻilani Cruz, in her
dissertation, shares a narrative that has become quite common within the movement.160 It
tells of sovereignty activists leading normal lives until for whatever reason they became
interested in history and started researching the topic, leading them to conclude that
Hawaiʻi is illegally occupied and having learned the truth, they started to take action.161
In one of the more objective, though still supportive, analysis of the movement,
Anthony Castanha attempted to catalogue the players and models within the sovereignty
movement.162 As a result of this effort, it becomes evident that whilst there are a number
of areas of agreement among activists, there are also widely varying views on what is the
desired outcome for the movement.163 Unfortunately, this thesis was written almost 20
years ago. The players and the tactics have changed significantly since then, though the
desired outcomes and the lack of agreement remain consistent. Similarly, Norman Meller
and Anne Feder Lee article attempted to divide the movement into “Hawaiian Nation
Separatists”, “Nation-within-a-Nation supporters” and those seeking status-quo with
redress. Published around the same time as Castanha work, the article, though well done,
is very dated. The players and tactics of the movement have changed considerably over
time limiting the utility of the article.
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In contrast to the legal/historic focuses of much of the other work on Hawaiian
sovereignty and identity, an article by David Baker does explore the ways in which
Hawaiian culture and national identity are constructed. He is highly critical of the version
of Hawaiʻi presented to tourists. He suggests that “the knowledge of Hawai'i circulating
off-islands is mass produced by a coalition of information organizations” where
“profitable images are promoted, others obscured”, constructing “a virtual Hawai'i”. His
article however largely ignores the ways in which the sovereignty movement itself
constructs images of Hawaiʻi, Hawaiian history and the sovereignty movement. Using
near straw man examples, it argues that any positions contrary to his are examples of
ignorance. The article also shares a fixation upon blood-based definitions of Hawaiian
status that remains problematic amongst a segment of activists (discussed in chapter 5).
Judith Schachter and Albrecht Funk look at how “Hawaiians identify themselves
and understand themselves as being Hawaiian”.164 Rather than focus on the political
activists, they spoke with “ordinary people” to capture the lived experiences of Native
Hawaiians.165 They found Native Hawaiians to have distinct experience than Native
American, and they recognised themselves as such.166 They also saw a rejection of a
blood quantum for Native Hawaiian identity and a separation of ideas of sovereignty
from ethnic identity.167 Their work provides a much needed ethnographic look at
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everyday conceptions of sovereignty and identity in Hawaiʻi. Though brief, it reflects the
ways in which most people outside of sovereignty activists seem actually to feel.
While there has been a reasonable amount written on nationalism and sovereignty
in Hawaiʻi, little work has been beyond the legal or historical spheres. Furthermore, much
of the work that does look beyond these spaces are written by people so immersed in the
movement that their objectivism is often compromised by their frustration at the injustice
of the overthrow. There has been little work looking at the movement itself. In many
ways, the ways in which the Hawaiian sovereignty movement has adapted their tactics
over time and embraced new techniques are unique. This dissertation aims to go beyond
just an exploration of the challenges of Hawaiian sovereignty and take a look the
movement itself and its effects on forming the Hawaiian nation.

2.7

Nationalism in the Region

Oceania is composed of small island nations with a variety of governance
approaches. Self-governance and full independence for many nations have been much
more recent and limited than in most other regions. With the exception of Western
Sahara, all of the remaining non-self-governing territories are small island nations and
over a third of them are in the Pacific168. Even within the independent nations, many face
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a variety of challenges in defining their national identity, often as a result of their colonial
legacy.
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna remain French overseas collectivities,
whilst New Caledonia has special status as part of a 20-year transition process under the
Nouméa Accord. The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau are
independent in free association with the United States. Guam and the now uninhabited
Wake Island are US territories and the Northern Mariana Islands, whilst technically a
commonwealth is administered as a US territory. Tokelau remains a territory of New
Zealand. As noted earlier, the Cook Islands and Niue are in free association with New
Zealand. Rapa Nui (Easter Island) is considered part of insular Chile. The Pitcairn Islands
are a British Overseas Territory. Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru,
Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu are fully independent states.
Between Samoa achieving independence in 1962 and Palau finally ending US
administration in 1994, most of the region gained self-governance or full independence.
Stephen Levine suggest that there exists a common perception that it is now “‘settled’
matter, with no ongoing legacy of bitterness or discontent remaining to be resolved, and
with no further island communities denied opportunities for self-determination”.169
Though most of the region has now received at least some form of self-governance, he
argues that for many of these nations, “the experience of sovereignty and independence
has been something of a disappointment, with ongoing dependence and limited room for

169

Stephen Levine, “The Experience of Sovereignty in the Pacific: Island States and Political

Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 50, no. 4 (2012): 439–55,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.729729.

60

manoeuvre a more accurate rendering”.170 Further, the world's response to further
independence efforts have varied between “immobilised indifference” to outright
hostility.171
The path to independence for most Pacific Island countries was fairly smooth with
little conflict. Levine suggests that this came “not through struggle so much as imperial
exhaustion”.172 The utility of empire faded, and the colonies became an embarrassing
burden on the colonial administrators. In many of the nations, independence was hastily
imposed with little care towards the tensions between “democratic values and traditional
patterns of rule and outlook” or demographic changes.173 The models adopted have been
problematic for many of the nations. Further, many of the nations have only what Levine
characterises as ‘semi-sovereignty’.174 The continued presence of the external powers
limits sovereignty in many of the island nations.175 He likewise suggests that
practicalities of dependency “mock the trappings of sovereignty, self-rule and
independence”. As Levine describes, sovereignty in the region is much more complex
than popular opinion assumes. Though many of the nations have self-governance that
they achieved with minimal struggle, a number of them do not, in practice, have the
ability to express their sovereignty as other nations can, despite their desire to do so.
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There are also clashes with the anti-colonial movement in nations like Tokelau and the
Pitcairn Islands, who have made it very clear that they would like to remain colonies.
Not all of the nations have however had a completely smooth transition from
colonialism. David Robie has described the violent events in New Caledonia, Palau,
Vanuatu and Fiji as the result of “liberation movements” as part of “a quest for national
sovereignty that takes into account the legacy of more than two centuries of
colonialism”.176 He conjures up images of global struggles for liberation from oppressors.
Similarly, Graham Hassall in a 1991 article suggests that independence for several of the
Pacific Island states has been marked by ethnic identity & conflict with much of its
origins in the decolonisation process.177 He notes that “whereas most Pacific peoples
have obtained political independence, or achieved political decolonisation, the processes
of adaptation are not necessarily complete, and have themselves become hidden catalysts
to conflicts manifesting themselves in the political sphere”.178 He, however, does notes
that not all of the modern conflicts are the result of colonialism with some of the conflicts
caused by “rivalries of ancient origin” and that “not all ethnic conflict derives from
nationalist aspiration”179
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Though this model of decolonisation is commonly applied, Terence WesleySmith has questioned the continual utility of this conceptual framework.180 He notes that
there is an “absence of an ‘obvious colonial villain’”.181 Whilst it can be applied to the
French territories, it fails when used for nations like Fiji whose struggles are postcolonial
where neither side is representable as a villain.182 A similar problem exists in much of the
rest of the region. The colonial experience, whilst far from ideal, was reasonably pleasant
for many of the nations. Sovereignty was often granted without struggle and in some
cases accepted with great reluctance. It is common to find people in the region who with
great pride in their independent nation look towards the colonial power with nostalgia.
For some states like the Solomon Islands, Wesley-Smith argues that beyond the “intrinsic
value of sovereign independence”, day-to-day conditions have even decreased since
independence.
The push towards decolonisation in the region came as part of a UN effort in 1961
calling for self-determination in the form of decolonisation. This effort was problematic
in many ways. Wesley-Smith notes that it “discriminated among the colonised peoples of
the Pacific” as it allowed France and the US to argue that the problematic votes by New
Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and Hawaiʻi for their statuses should
allow them to be removed from the list of non-self-governing territories.183 The process
was also very driven by the wills of the colonial power rather than the people of the
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islands.184 Also problematic, was the focus on imposing a Western view of the nation and
the political structure.185 As was the case in much of the colonial experience, nations
were divided or combined with little regard to common cultures or previous governance
structure.186 Whilst some of this was logistically necessary given the low population
sizes, it has meant that many cultures have been ignored in building the larger national
identity.
Nevertheless, most of the nations of Oceania have been politically stable since
independence. As Wesley-Smith notes, even the more serious conflicts in the region
“pale in comparison to the conflicts that characterise many other parts of the previously
colonised world”.187 He suggests that the issues they have had have been in part caused
by a conflict between traditional and new models of governance, arguing that states with
“hierarchical traditional political systems, a history of centralised forms of organisation
and culturally homogenous populations” have been most successful. States such as Tonga
and Samoa were able to adapt traditional practice to a Western political system, whilst
the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in their lack of traditional state model have struggled.
Hassall likewise suggests that there is a conflict between traditional authority and legal
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systems and “modern” systems.188 Group-based consensual approaches to governance
and traditional customary law were replaced with Western models of limited utility.189
Several other authors have attempted to catalogue and further explain the political
situation in the region. Amongst the more comprehensive efforts is Dave Peebles book
Pacific Regional Order. He divides the problems the region is facing into five broad
categories; “challenges to sustainable economic development; to security; to the rule of
law; to democracy; and the challenge represented by the rise in regionalism elsewhere in
the world, a development that has so far excluded Pacific states”.190 Challenges posed by
economic development are largely related to the limited resources and remoteness of the
islands.191 Security challenges are limited with a few major conflicts representing the
largest concerns.192 Peebles expresses concern over the region’s general lack of
ratification of key humanitarian law instruments and a “general ambivalence” towards the
domestic rule of law.193 He notes and dismisses the common explanation for this attitude
towards the domestic rule of law of the “Pacific Way” favouring consensus and
traditional dispute resolution.194 Though he fails to recognise it, the lack of adoption of
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international law is often explained by resource limitations and governmental priority
rather than a statement on the nation’s support for humanitarian principles. His charts are
also somewhat misleading in failing to recognise the treaties that apply in less
conventional ways.
Peebles argues that in the region “colonial powers often implemented an
imperfect model of Westminster democracy, which in some cases has been further
corrupted rather than improved by Forum island countries”.195 He seems to suggest that
the only acceptable system is a Westminster democracy. The coups in Fiji are presented
as an example of democratic failure, completely ignoring the undemocratic portions of
the system that were unconnected. He also suggests that “imbuing traditional authority
with political power” is undemocratic.196 This conclusion is questionable. Jon Fraenkel,
amongst others, has challenged the applicability of European governance models to the
region.197 Across the Pacific, a number of unique or unusual models exist with reasonable
success. He notes that whilst the European models were highly influential in the colonial
period, wholesale lifting of governance models is often unsuccessful.198 Though not
rejecting the utility of foreign models, he calls on reformers to “avoid grandstanding on
international principle, and instead to base arguments on a deep and rich appreciation of
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the local contexts.”199 Though this is likely critical for successful governance in the
region, there is a real danger of it providing a justification for practices that are harmful
to the nation.
Many of the independent states in the region maintain significant ties to their
previous colonial power. The Solomon Islands and Tuvalu both consider Queen
Elizabeth II their head of state. Though this position is typically presented as largely
ceremonial, Jon Fraenkel argues that this power is both significant and provides several
examples in which through the Governors-General, the Queen has utilised these
powers.200 He suggests that the influence goes well beyond the role of the crown to
symbolise the “unity of a national community” in having a “critical part in Pacific
constitutional crises”.201
Though other nations in the region have seen scattered studies, French Polynesia
and New Caledonia have received the most scholarly attention. New Caledonia had one
of the region’s few traditional-style struggles for sovereignty. Between 1976 and 1988
the indigenous population, the Kanak, led an active independence movement against the
French who had annexed the islands in 1853. This movement saw serious violence and
disorder including seized farms and a pro-independence hostage-taking in Ouvéa
resulting in the death four gendarmes, nineteen hostage-takers, two members of the
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military and three additional deaths of hostage takers whilst in custody. The Matignon
Agreements were signed in 1988 establishing the groundwork for the Nouméa Accord in
1998. This accord set up a 20 year special transition period ending with an independence
referendum to be held in November 2018.
In many ways, the struggle for independence in New Caledonia represents the
typical fight against colonialism. For French Polynesia, however, Nathalie Mrgudovic
argues that “there was never such a strong feeling of deprivation of indigenous cultural
and social identities as there was in New Caledonia”. She suggests that the movement is
primarily a political one and that “the claim for sovereignty in French Polynesia had little
to do with the struggle of an indigenous people”. The native people of French Polynesia
remain the dominant ethnic group in the islands, and French Polynesia already operates
largely as an independent country.
The Nouméa Accord encourages the government of New Caledonia to develop
national symbols (including a motto, anthem, banknotes, and a flag). Its loyalist President
has led the adoption of a number of symbols that though representing a separate New
Caledonia identity contain very pro-French symbolism.
Mrgudovic notes that free-association with France is now a “perfectly conceivable
option” for the French Pacific.202 However, she argues that free association, often
presented as a good model for late decolonisation, may not actually result in less political
instability.203
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Much of the work on French Polynesia and New Caledonia has been focused
upon the debate over the level of sovereignty the islands have. For example, Lorenz
Gonschor has challenged the idea that French Polynesia has actually been decolonized,
suggesting that France responded to calls for decolonisation by redefining the concept
and creating a “de-facto continuity of colonial rule but also to create a corrupt
authoritarian local government favourable to French interests”.204 Similarly, an article by
Gerard Prinsen, Yves Lafoy and Julien Migozzi argues that New Caledonia is not
sovereign in a Westphalian sense and that “a unique ‘Islandian’ concept of sovereignty is
emerging”.205
Beyond brief mentions, everyday nationalism and the subjects that it typically
explores have been largely absent from the literature. This interesting given the frequency
the ways in which food and language are used to build the French identity in
Metropolitan France have been studied.
Though the nations of this dissertation are feeling only the secondary effects of
climate change206, it remains one of the most significant concerns for the region. Within
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the next few decades, it's estimated that thousands of low-lying islands will be
submerged. Already, storm surges and groundwater contamination are rendering areas
unliveable. Susannah Willcox notes that “a loss of habitable territory has not been
recognised as a possible cause of state extinction in international law”.207 Nevertheless,
there become significant practical problems if a state ceases to exist due to climate
change. International law has always assumed that a successor state would absorb the
rights and obligations of the extinguished state.208 Assuming a willing host state, a
government-in-exile situation could be used.209 These, however, have always operated
under the premise that the exile is temporary with a clear population and defined territory
to which they seek to return.210 Willcox proposes a mechanism by which nations could
continue to be seen as legally sovereign following a climate change related territorial
loss. As she recognises, the usefulness of this model is still yet to be seen. Regardless of
the legal situation, it is likely that nations will lose sovereignty and have significant
cultural impact as its citizen lose their connection to the traditional territory.
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The region has hosted a number of nationalist movements over the past few
decades. Unfortunately, little has been written about them outside a purely historical or
occasionally legal context. With a few exceptions discussed above, banal nationalism has
been unstudied in the region.
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Chapter 3
Background Information

3

This chapter supplies a brief background on the four nations explored in this
dissertation. Niue and the Cooks Islands are very rarely studied, with much of the world
having nearly no knowledge of their history, circumstances, or often even their existence.
Hawaiʻi and Fiji receive more attention globally, but most of this attention is focused
upon their suitability as vacation destinations with the socio-political situations
whitewashed. Even within the region, little is often taught about the islands of Oceania
other than their own.

3.1

Geography

Hawaiʻi is a large volcanic archipelago consisting of hundreds of islands
dispersed across 2,400 km2. There are eight main islands, of which seven are permanently
inhabited. Located in the North Pacific Ocean, Hawaiʻi is approximately 4,000km from
California 6,000km from Japan and almost 7,000km from New Zealand. Consequently, it
is one of the most remote population centres in the world.
Fiji is an archipelago formed of over 330 islands, of which 110 are permanently
inhabited. It is about 2,000km northeast of New Zealand and is surrounded by several
other small island nations. Though Fiji’s population is dispersed across many islands,
87% of the population live on the islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. Most live in the
capital city of Suva or the towns of Nadi and Lautoka (and the surrounding areas of
each).
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The Cook Islands are formed of coral atolls and consist of 15 major islands
dispersed across 2.2 million km2 (849,425 sq. mi) of ocean. Rarotonga is by far the most
populous of the islands. If its ocean territory were to be considered a part of the total area
of the country, the Cook Islands would be the 12th largest country in the world. It is
about 3,000km from New Zealand and around 1,000km from its nearest neighbour,
French Polynesia.
Niue, whose name is typically translated as “behold the coconut”211 is unique in
this dissertation in consisting of only a single island. It is one of the world's largest coral
islands. As a coral island, it has limited beaches and many steep limestone cliffs. Large
reefs limit the navigable waters to a small break close to the capital, Alofi. Though a
majority of the population lives on the Alofi side, no part of the island is especially
populous. Niue is approximately 500km away from its nearest neighbour American
Samoa and is around 2,000km away from New Zealand.

3.2

Demographics

With a population of 1.4 million212, Hawaiʻi is the most populous of the nations in
this dissertation and is the largest of the small island nations of Oceania213. Fiji’s
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population of over 880 thousand is the next largest.214 In contrast, the Cook Islands and
Niue are both very small, with populations of a little over 15,000 and 1,600 respectively,
making them some of the smallest countries globally.215 The only countries with a
smaller population than Niue is Tokelau (a New Zealand colony) and the Vatican City.
Hawaiʻi, Fiji, and the Cook Islands are all experiencing small, but positive, levels
of population growth at present.216 Niue, in contrast, has seen a continuous slow
population decline.217 Despite positive population growth, “brain drain” (the outmigration of skilled workers) remains a serious problem for Fiji, the Cook Islands, Niue
and to a lesser extent Hawaiʻi. The extremely high cost of living, insufficient housing and
inadequate salaries have led to out-migration from Hawaiʻi. This is, however, balanced
by a continuous influx of new, often short-term residents, drawn by Hawaii’s myth of
paradise. Political turmoil and the promise of better opportunities have caused migration
from Fiji, but this has been balanced by natural increase and immigration from other
developing nations. Niue and the Cook Islands have seen considerable out-migration
(primarily to New Zealand) as residents leave for job and educational opportunities.
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3.3

Race and Ethnicity

The Cook Islands is one of the most racially homogeneous countries globally,
with 88% of Cook Islanders identifying as Cook Island Maori.218 Niue is similarly
homogeneous. Its population is almost 80% Niuean or part-Niuean.219 Fiji is considerably
more diverse with 56.8% identifying as iTaukei, 37.5% as Indo-Fijian, and 1.2% as
Rotuman.220 Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has been described as one of the most
racially/ethnically diverse places in the world.221 In the last census, 38.6% of Hawaiʻi
identified as Asian, 24.7% as White, 5.9% Native Hawaiian, 4.1% as other Pacific
Islander and 23.6% as two or more races. Hawaiʻi consequently has the highest
percentage of Asian Americans and multiracial Americans of any US state and is the only
state with an Asian American plurality. For each of the nations in this paper, their
demographics have produced some interesting local conceptions of race and ethnicity that
shape how nationalism operates within the nation.
Within Hawaiʻi, it is not uncommon to hear people listing a number of racial and
ethnic group memberships in describing themselves. Hawaiʻi is often characterised as
being beyond race or as being a place where race doesn't matter. Though racism does still
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exist in Hawaiʻi (most visibly towards Micronesians), race is not nearly as polarising as it
is the rest of the United States. One big divide, however, in Hawaiʻi is between local and
non-local. Though the conception is not actually racially based, race is often used as a
shortcut for determining localness. Generally, the local label is seen as a result of the
adoption of Hawai'i values (particularly a respect for the land and Hawaiʻi traditions) and
the adoption of Hawaiʻi material culture. Further, whiteness is often used as the generic
representation of the non-local person. It has become a shorthand for colonial mindsets,
militarism, and modern attempts to impose mainland culture and attitudes on Hawai'i, but
should not be interpreted typically as actually referring to race.
Race also becomes relevant in Hawaiʻi for some government and non-government
entitlements that are only available to Hawaiians (discussed in a later chapter in its
relationship to hot nationalism). Various blood quantums222 have been used for service
eligibility, but overall these seem to be primarily a legal construct rather than a social
one. There are a number of people who will describe themselves as Hawaiian despite not
meeting the full blood quantum, and similarly, there are many who do meet the quantum
standards, who do not consider themselves Hawaiian.
Little has been written on race and ethnicity in Niue. There are no actual studies
of the local perceptions of the concept. With limited numbers of non-Niueans residing in
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Niue and a strict objective criteria for residency (born in Niue or having a parent born in
or resident of Niue), race and ethnicity do not seem to have been a significant concern
politically or socially. Anecdotally, people seem to divide others into the categories of
Niuean, Pacific Islander and other. Due to the rapidly declining population in Niue, jobs
are increasingly being filled by non-Niueans, particularly by people from New Zealand or
Fiji. Further, as exposure to global discussions on indigenous rights expand many are
proudly embracing a label that was not previously significant for them and connecting to
a global conversation. It is possible that these trends may cause a future focus on race or
ethnicity that would justify further research, but at present, it does not seem to be a
particularly meaningful group level distinction.
The vast majority of Cook Islanders identify as Māori or part-Māori. They share
common origins with the Māori of New Zealand, and many believe that the Māori of
New Zealand came to New Zealand via the Cook Islands. Culturally and linguistically,
Cook Islands Māori is distinct from New Zealand Māori, however, there are many
commonalities, and the languages have a reasonable degree of mutual intelligibility. The
Cook Islands has extremely strict immigration laws that substantially limit long-term
residence by foreign workers, who are limited to three years in the Cook Islands with
extensions available only if no local worker is available and a plan to train a local worker
to replace them is in place. Permanent residency requires ten years (three years for New
Zealand citizens) of lawful residency and evidence of significant contribution or
investment in the Cook Islands. Exceptions are available for people who are married to
Cook Islanders. As such, the Cook Islands has a fairly small long-term ex-pat community
(mostly consisting of those married to Cook Islanders) and relatively small numbers of
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foreign workers. Given that most of the exposure Cook Island residents will have with
non-Māori will be as tourists or short-term workers, a model in which non-Māori people
are treated as guests in the country has developed. This is not to say that non-Māori are
not welcomed, but some have described facing considerable resentment if they try to take
a role that exceeds what is appropriate for a guest.
Race and ethnicity in Fiji remain a complex and highly politicised topic. Though
demographics have shifted following the coups, for much of Fiji's late colonial and
postcolonial history, iTaukei and Indo-Fijian populations were reasonably similar in size.
Out-migration has reduced the Indo-Fijian population such that iTaukei now represent
over half the population. Concerns of Indo-Fijian dominance have been a common
political issue, providing motivation for several of the coups. iTaukei own the vast
majority of land in Fiji, however, Indo-Fijians own nearly all of the domestically owned
businesses.
In discussions of race in Fiji, iTaukei and Indo-Fijians dominate the literature,
however there several smaller groups in Fiji. There small, but significant, numbers of
Europeans, Rotumans, Chinese and non-iTaukei/Rotuman Pacific Islanders in Fiji.
Intermarriage between all groups is increasing but still remains uncommon, though it is
typically accepted. Socially and professionally, inter-group interaction is normal and
unmarked.
Whilst it was somewhat controversial, the Bainimarama government officially redesignated Native Fijians as iTaukei (a Bau dialect word generally translated as
“Indigenous”). The label of “Fijian”, which had previously only been applied to iTaukei
people, was expanded to refer to all people of Fiji (for whom the little-used term Fiji
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Islander had officially applied). This change was a component of the Bainimarama
government's campaign focused on building a more inclusive Fiji in the hopes of
addressing the underlying causes of the previous coups.

3.4

Land

For much of the land in Hawaiʻi, typical US/Western land models are used. Land
is privately owned and can be sold with few abnormal limitations. The State of Hawaiʻi is
unsurprisingly the largest landholder with 1.54 million acres including 194,000 acres
managed through the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (which provides long-term
leases via lottery to Native Hawaiians for homesteading at very low cost). The U.S.
Federal Government is the next largest landholder with over half a million acres of which
the extremely large Hawaii Volcanoes National Park on the Big Island and Haleakala
National Park on Maui, as well as several military bases are a part.223 The vast majority
of the land held by the State and Federal governments is former crown and government
land.224 At the time of the overthrow, crown lands represented about a million acres and
government land represented about 800,000 acres.225 Crown land was land that was held
by the Hawaiian monarchy to be used as part of the fulfilment of their responsibilities to
the people of Hawaiʻi with much of it leased to generate revenue and support crown
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activities.226 Government land was land held for the operation of the state and
encompassed government buildings, public parks and similar public works.227 Both types
of land were seized in the overthrow, and about 50 thousand acres were sold by the
Republic to private landowners.228 The remainder was ceded to the United States, which
later transferred much of the land to the State of Hawaii.229 Under Hawaii Act 176, public
lands in Hawaiʻi cannot be sold or transferred without a two-thirds vote by the State
Legislature. Developing crown land is highly controversial and legally fraught. It is thus
not often tried. As a result, there a number of scattered plots of land that are undeveloped
in the midst of other large developments.
Several private landholders also own significant portions of Hawaii’s land.
Kamehameha Schools is the largest private landholder with 363,000 acres held in a trust
established by Princess Pauahi.230 In addition to several large school campuses, much of
this land is leased for residential and commercial operations.231 Alexander & Baldwin is
the next largest with 113,000 acres.232 As a major sugar producer and successor to much
of Dole’s Hawaiʻi operations and owner of Matson shipping company (the primary cargo
shipping company for the region), Alexander & Baldwin is highly economically
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significant and powerful. Parker Ranch though previously the largest private landowner
now holds 107,000 acres.233 Though much smaller today, Parker Ranch once controlled
most of the private land on the island of Hawaiʻi and was one of the largest privatelyowned ranches in the world.
The Cook Islands land tenure system is relatively complex and represents a blend
of traditional style land tenure systems with a Land Court system for validating claims. In
1901, with the transition to New Zealand administration, the transition agreement
prohibited the sale of land, a provision that was due to concerns over New Zealand’s
(mis)handling of native land.234 In 1902, the Land Court was established to resolve land
claims and to arrange for land leases.235 Land in the Cook Islands cannot be sold, only
leased.236 In 1957, the court ruled that all children are to equally inherit the land of their
parents.237 These non-Māori judges based the ruling upon a non-existent principle of
Māori culture, creating a situation in which the land rules no longer actually reflect
traditional practice despite the statutory responsibility to do so.238 This ruling has become
problematic in that there are estimated to be 130,000 Cook Islanders globally, with most
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still maintaining rights to their customary lands.239 Absentee landowners are given
considerable power to influence the usage of their inherited land regardless of the wishes
of resident landowners.240 This structure also results in highly fragmented lands wherein
land may be subdivided amongst so many relatives that it is impractical for them to use it
productively.241 Land lease prices are for many unachievable, and the complex process
makes it poorly suited for individuals seeking to build in the Cook Islands. There are also
significant land shortages in Rarotonga leading such a high population density rate that it
is actually comparable to many European countries.
Niue’s system of land tenure is extremely similar to that of the Cook Islands.242
Most notably, land rights can be maintained even after migrating from Niue. This has
created an area of contention for many Niueans still living in Niue. As most changes to
land usage require the consent of the family that collectively owns the land, it can be
difficult for those residents in Niue to gain the agreement of the rest of the family living
overseas on how the land should be used. Further, there remain a number of abandoned
buildings partially destroyed by cyclones that cannot be repaired or razed due to an
inability to gain consent from the overseas owners. There have been proposals to allow
the cancellation of land rights for long absent landowners, but these proposals have not
to-date been successful.243
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Owing to its small population size, Niue has the twelfth lowest national
population density rate in the World. The only countries with lower population density
are those who have extremely large minimally populated areas such as Canada and
Australia. Most small island nations, even those with reasonable land holding and small
populations, will quickly face land shortages as the population grows. In contrast, Niue
with its declining populations and comfortably sized island has not seen the pressures on
land usage that other small island nations have faced. Consequently, though land titles
may be messy, there is plentiful land on the island.
Fiji’s first governor established a policy that forbids any additional land from
being sold. As a result, only about 8 per cent of the land in Fiji is freehold land.244 An
additional 8 per cent is held by the state as Crown Land.245 The remainder is “Native
Land” managed by the iTaukei Land Trust Board.246 These lands cannot be sold, but can
be leased.247 Today, around a third of this land is currently leased, with the remainder
operating under customary land traditions.248 The leases are negotiated and administered
through the iTaukei Land Trust Board on behalf of, and with varying levels of input
from, the customary landholders. These policies, though effective at limiting non-iTaukei
ownership, have created a market in which the limited freehold land can be in very high
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demand with prices that are out of reach of many Fijians, leading to foreign ownership. A
2014 law aimed to address this concern by requiring that all rural land purchases by noncitizens be followed by the construction of a house valued at greater than FJ$250k within
two years. This law was intended to crack down on foreign land speculation and to
improve housing access for Fijians, though its actual effectiveness is questionable.249
Fiji’s land ownership model is often presented as an ideal model by native rights
activists elsewhere (including in Hawaiʻi). It is, however, highly problematic. This
approach is very paternalistic in preventing “landowners” from expressing their agency in
determinations of the use and transfer of their land. Generational dispersion means that
for many their share of the land profits is so small that it is only symbolic and uses of the
land require very high levels of consensus or rely upon fading traditional power
structures. Further, the system prevents people (primarily Indo-Fijians) from being ever
able to own the land that they have lived and worked on for generations. Most people in
Fiji (including iTaukei) are, as a result of the extremely limited amounts of freehold land,
highly unlikely to ever become themselves landowners in the typically understood
meaning of the term.
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3.5

Tourism

Tourism is highly significant for all four nations. Tourism and related services
contribute 75% of the Cook Island’s GDP.250 With almost ten times the number of
visitors as residents tourism has been a significant income source for Niue representing
about 40% of the island’s GDP.251 It is also expected that most economic growth for Niue
will be through an expansion of the tourism sector. Though Fiji is more diversified, travel
and tourism still contributed 37% of Fiji’s GDP in 2014 and is estimated to represent
43.5% of the country’s GDP by 2025.252 In Hawaiʻi, tourism contributes over $14 billion
representing about 20% of Hawaii’s overall economic activity.253

250

ANZ, “Cook Islands,” ANZ Business Hub, accessed January 14, 2017,

http://www.anzbusiness.com/content/anz-superregional/expanding-offshore/country-insights/cookislands.html#.WHmEFe02dhE.
251

“Niue on Track for 10,000 Tourists in 2015,” Radio New Zealand, August 13, 2015,

http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/281253/niue-on-track-for-10,000-tourists-in-2015.

Niue does not publish GDP by industry in a way that can be used for comparison. This figure is
based on the New Zealand's High Commissioner’s statement in the above article that “in 2014 we're getting
close to NZ$6 million” and Niue’s last official GDP of US$10 million (NZ $14 million).

252

Rochelle Turner, “Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2015 Fiji” (World Travel and Tourism

Council, 2016), http://www.wttc.org//media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20research/countries%202015/fiji2015.pdf.
253

Reid Wilson, “Hawaii’s $14 Billion Tourism Industry Back to Pre-Recession Levels,” Washington

Post, September 27, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/09/27/hawaiis-14billion-tourism-industry-back-to-pre-recession-levels/.

85

Indirectly, Hawaiʻi has also built a large industry selling products based on tourist
impressions of islands. The speciality crops, such as flowers, coffee, pineapple and
macadamia nuts, are sold using the same imagery of Hawaiʻi that is promoted by the
tourism industry. Fiji has a similar situation in which products, most notably FIJI Water,
is sold using images of Fiji as a paradise and on this basis, it is able to represent a
meaningful portion of the nation’s GDP alone. Niue and the Cook Islands, with their
minimal export industries, have no significant examples of this phenomenon, but given
the other small island nation trends and the new focus on premium small-scale exports, it
can be expected that as they expand their export sectors this style of branding will be
dominant.
Tourism, particularly island tourism, provides a significant motivator to shape
world perception in order to support a relaxing image that meets tourist expectations.
Ethnic conflict, environmental concerns, political instability, and sovereignty battles can
reduce the ability to sell the islands as a tropical paradise. Thus, there becomes a strong
economic motivator to lessen their impact or visibility. Issues are often downplayed or
otherwise minimised so as to allow the tourist perception of the islands to be unharmed.
Similarly, many tourists to island nations are seeking an experience of an exotic,
often fictitious, version of island life with beautiful beaches, friendly natives, and no
worries. This can be problematic as a desire for tourism dollars can cause nations to
establish policies of national identity which favour a tourist desired sense of
“authenticity” and “tradition” rather than inclusivity or historical accuracy. As discussed
in Chapter 6, a pan-Pacific representation has become favoured in many presentations of
local culture for tourists. Tourists expect certain foods, styles of dance, dress and music,
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all of which often become what the world (and sometimes even locals) see as
representing the nations. Along with many other tourist focused cultural presentations,
luaus and hula are prime examples of this in that both have been adapted considerably
from traditional practice to reflect early Hawaiʻi tourism advertising and travel stories
better. Similar trends can be seen in most of the rest of the Pacific as well.

3.6

History

Each of the nations in this paper has experienced a unique colonial and
postcolonial experience that is rarely explored. This section provides a very brief
overview of the key historical events as they relate to the formation of the nations. Of
particular concern in each nation is the initial settlement (which is key for the arguments
of native nationalism), their colonial circumstances and eventual independence (except
for Hawaiʻi). More recent events are covered in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.

3.6.1 Niue
There remains some debate over when people first came to Niue. Carbon dating
of archaeological finds suggest that humans first settled in Niue around 200 CE.254 It
appears that there were several waves of migration from Tonga and Samoa starting at
least 1500 years ago.255 Within the Niuean language and tradition, all islands other than
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Niue were described as Tonga, so there is a possibility that the migration patterns
included other Pacifica people as well256 (likely Fijians257 and Cook Islanders258).
For much of Niuean history, the island operated under a model of autonomous
family groups without hereditary chiefs. Around 1700, a system of non-hereditary elected
kings was adopted.259
The first European contact with Niue came in 1774 when the island was spotted
by Captain Cook.260 His party was allowed to land but were quickly driven off by the
Niueans.261 One narrative has Cook’s crew attacked with rocks as they attempted to raise
a British flag.262 Cook and his crew retreated after firing a musket shot, and when they
reapproached the island they were met by several warriors and chose to retreat. 263 Cook’s
crew described Niueans as “unsociable”, caused by the “inhospitality” of the island, and
saw no purpose in reattempting contact.264 Cook (re)named the island the “Savage
Island” because of this. Local stories describe the Niuean warriors as friendly, offering
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the traditional challenge, which Cook misunderstood.265 They also say that he saw red
dye on their lips, and clothing and believed it to be blood, implying cannibalism, but this
was actually the juice from a local banana.266 Though Cook’s narrative was most likely
biased, it led to Europeans avoiding the islands for some time.267 By 1828, limited trade
was occurring with Whalers, but (almost definitely false) tales of Niueans violence,
murder and cannibalism were common.268 Missionaries made several attempts to bring
their mission to Niue without success.269 Eventually, in 1830, missionaries from the
London Missionary Society were able to convince two Niueans to go with them to Samoa
to be trained as pastors. One of these, Nukai Peniamina, returned in 1846.270 After several
attempts at landing, they were accepted at the village of Mutalau.271 Peniamina was
quickly successful in convincing the island to convert.272 The conversion also brought an
acceptance of increased trade and societal change.273 After a series of missteps, regular
trade with Niue was occurring by the 1860s and a very small number of Europeans had
settled on the island.274
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Early in his reign, Niuean King Fataaiki petitioned British Queen Victoria for
Niue to become a British protectorate in a letter sent in November 1887.275 Germany
objected under the Berlin Convention, and Niue remained neutral territory.276 Fataaiki
again petitioned in 1889.277 After his death, King Togia sent another petition in October
1899.278 As the Berlin Convention had since collapsed, Niue became a British
protectorate in April 1900.279 A year later, it was transferred to New Zealand, where,
along with the Cook Islands, it became a protectorate under the Dominion of New
Zealand.280
Under the New Zealand administration, an island council was established.
However, until 1903, Niue was administered by New Zealand along with the Cook
Islands leaving residents with many unaddressed complaints.281 A separate administration
was established in 1903 with its own resident commissioner.282 The first commissioner
was Christopher Maxwell.283 He focused strongly on infrastructure but clashed with the
Island Council over their call for alcohol prohibition and other “immorality”
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ordinances.284 He was replaced in 1907 for adultery. This started several decades of
short-term minimally qualified commissioners on loan from the Post Office or Customs
whose individual impact was minimal.285 World War I saw a large number of Niuean
volunteers serve at great cost to themselves and the islands.286 The war also distracted
New Zealand from its colonial administrative responsibilities.287 Niue was an undesirable
posting for New Zealand administrators that many tried to leave as quickly as possible.288
The longest serving of these was Commissioner Joseph McMahon-Box who, after 28
years of service in Niue left, due to poor health and financial issues.289 He was replaced
by Cecil Larsen, a retired Army officer with experience in the Cook Islands (the first
qualified commissioner after Maxwell).290 He found serious financial mismanagement
and embezzlement having occurred under McMahon-Box, along with several other
issues.291 Larsen made a number of positive changes for the island, but was also
described as cruel and abusive.292 A growing unemployment problem and Niuean
concerns about European immorality (mostly related to alcohol consumption and Sunday

284

Ibid.

285

Ibid.

286

Ibid.

287

Ibid.

288

Ibid.

289

Ibid.

290

Ibid.

291

Ibid.

292

Dick Scott, Would a Good Man Die?: Niue Island, New Zealand and the Late Mr. Larsen

(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993).

91

labour) created some strife under his administration.293 Having been unable to find a
long-term police chief, Larsen unpopularly took on the role himself.294 In this role, he
was said to physically abuse prisoners and use them for household labour.295
Larsen was murdered in his bed by three escaped Niuean prisoners on August 16,
1953.296 The prisoners were fairly young and had all been convicted of minor crimes.297
After killing Larsen, they evaded capture for four days before surrendering to a Native
constable.298 Given the small size of Niue, it has been suggested that they had assistance
in evading capture.299 They were tried and convicted by a special court which quickly
sentenced them to death.300 There were many procedural issues with the case, including
the fact that one defendant had a mental age of only 10.301 The sentence was extremely
unpopular in Niue.302 Several groups in Niue and New Zealand began to petition the New
Zealand government for clemency.303 The cases of the three men and the larger concern
about the racially unequal application of the death penalty in New Zealand became a
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major issue in the upcoming New Zealand election.304 In May 1954, their sentences were
commuted to life imprisonment in a New Zealand prison, and they were eventually
released.305
This case and New Zealand’s growing support for global decolonisation brought
attention to the situation in Niue which led to the development and eventually the
offering of autonomy in 1965 (at the same time as the Cook Islands).306 Niue asked that
autonomy be delayed.307 Rapid development occurred over the next decade with
significant infrastructure improvements.308 A referendum was held in 1974, which
resulted in independence with a free association agreement.309 On the table for this
referendum (and the Cook Islands independence) were the options of complete
independence, full incorporation within New Zealand, self-government with free
association, or membership in a future Polynesian federation310.
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The first elections in 1975 saw Robert Rex, who was key to the self-governance
process, become the first premier. He served until his death in 1992, being continuously
re-elected every three years. Young Vivian completed Rex’s term in 1992 and was again
elected in 2002 for a six-year term. Frank Lui and Sani Lakatani served for years and
three years, respectively, in between Vivian’s terms. Toke Talagi defeated Vivian in 2008
and is the current premier of Niue. All of the premiers have been either independents or
until its dissolution in 2003, members of the country's only political party, the Niue
People's Party. Niue continues to face issues with cyclones and depopulation leading to
considerable concern for the long-term sustainability of the nation.

3.6.2 Hawaiʻi
It is typically believed that people first settled in Hawaiʻi around 300 CE.311 There
is, however, archaeological evidence that people may have been in there as early as 124
CE312 or even as late as 1120 CE.313 Whilst there is a recent argument for rapid later
Pacific migration and settlement, a two major migration model has been typically taught.
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The first migration is said to have occurred 300-600 CE from the southern Pacific,
particularly the Marquesas Islands.314 The second wave is thought to have occurred
around 1000-1300 CE from Tahiti.315 Quasi-mythical Pā‘ao is said to have led the second
migration which brought with it much of the social and religious structures that have
become known as Hawaiʻi culture.316 Some modern sovereignty activists describe Pā‘ao
as the leader of a “number of warlike Tahitians [who] arrived on the peaceful islands of
Hawaii”.317 Pā‘ao’s group is credited by them as having introduced human sacrifice, war
and oppression to Hawaiʻi. Pā‘ao is presented in this as the first wave of foreign invaders
who have been destroying Hawaiʻi, with the American overthrow and continuing
occupation a continuation of the same bloodthirstiness and oppression.
In the period following the second wave of migration, rule by chiefs rather than
councils of elders became the norm.318 The period was also marked by rapid population
growth, large public works projects, and the end of long-distance voyaging.319
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Though there is some evidence that Spanish explorers in the 1540s may have been
the first Europeans to encounter Hawaiʻi,320 Captain James Cook is generally credited as
the first European contact with Hawaiʻi in his January 1778 visit.321 They engaged in
brief trade, and he soon proceeded onwards.322 In January 1779 he returned to Hawaiʻi
and was warmly greeted and celebrated as his arrival coincided with the Makahiki (a
major festival).323 William Bligh (the future captain of HMS Bounty) described Cook as
welcomed as the God Lono.324 This is generally considered to be a misinterpretation of
the situation, but one that gained significant traction and helped build the global myth of
Natives seeing European explorers as gods. In February 1779, Cook returned, having
suffered the loss of a mast.325 While the ship was anchored in Kealakekua Bay, one of the
longboats was stolen by Hawaiians.326 The reasons given for the theft vary significantly
with each narrative assigning the parties differing levels of blame. Cook, accompanied by
nine British Marines, kidnapped the king of the island, Kalaniʻōpuʻu, to hold hostage for
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the return of the boat (a strategy that they had used successfully elsewhere).327 Upon
reaching the beach, Cook and the Marines were overwhelmed by Hawaiians.328 Cook was
killed along with four Marines.329 The remaining Marines returned to the ship having
killed several Hawaiians.330
There were a number of stories told about Cook’s visit and death with varying
degrees of accuracy. It has been used both as evidence of Hawaiian primitiveness and
savagery, as well as a story of Native peoples being mistreated and subsequently being
able to defend themselves and seek justice against a more powerful yet ignorant foe.
After several decades of fighting amongst the chiefs of Hawaiʻi, Kamehameha I
with a large armada of war canoes and soldiers set out to conquer the islands of
Hawaiʻi.331 By 1795, Kamehameha I had conquered all but the island of Kaua'i.332 In
1810, with King Kaumualiʻi of Kaua'i becoming a vassal of Kamehameha, Kamehameha
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had established a single Hawaiian kingdom.333 Kamehameha is typically revered as an
excellent ruler.334
After Kamehameha I's death, his first-born son Liholiho was crowned king.335
During his reign, American Protestant missionaries converted many Hawaiians to
Christianity, ending many traditional practices.336 The hereditary rule of the House of
Kamehameha lasted until Kamehameha V’s death in 1872.337 An election was held of
eligible chiefs resulting in the election of Lunalilo (grandnephew of Kamehameha I). He
died a year later.338 Kalākaua was elected by the Legislative Assembly in 1874.339 He
ruled until his death in 1891, after which his sister Liliʻuokalani became queen.340 She
ruled until the monarchy was overthrown in 1893.341

333

Ibid.

334

He is often treated with similar regard as many Americans do the “founding fathers”. His works

are often highlighted as examples of the ideal model for Hawaiʻi. He is credited with the establishment of a
complex legal system and sound foreign relations. He is also said to have established humanitarian law
within the laws of war. Kānāwai Māmalahoe or Law of the Splintered Paddle is a classic example of these.
It codifies the concept of non-combatants and can also be interpreted as an obligation to protect the safety
of “the common people” outside times of war, further establishing Kamehameha as a great leader.
335

Rita Ariyoshi, Hawaii (Washington, D.C: National Geographic Books, 2009), 29-39.

336

Ibid.

337

Ibid.

338

Ibid.

339

Ibid.

340

Ibid.

341

Ibid.

98

Starting not long after Cook’s death, sugar and pineapple became major industries
in Hawaiʻi.342 The sugarcane and pineapple plantations, like most plantations of the time,
found themselves in need of labour. Introduced disease had decimated the Hawaiian
population, creating a local worker shortage.343 Indentured labourers from China were
brought over until the Chinese government suspended the program as a result of
abuses.344 Labourers were soon brought from Portugal, the Philippines and other
European and Asian nations thus establishing the groundwork for the diversity of Hawaiʻi
today.345
The plantations brought considerable trade to Hawaiʻi with American influence
growing rapidly.346 King Kalākaua negotiated a treaty with the US under which sugar
could enter the US duty-free in exchange for the rights to use Pearl Harbour by the US
military.347
In 1887, the armed militia of the Honolulu Rifles (the Hawaiian League’s allwhite militia) forced Kalākaua to sign the 1887 Constitution, known as the Bayonet
Constitution.348 The Constitution removed much of the King’s power and gave it to the
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white American controlled legislature.349 It also restricted the right to vote to those with
an income of $600 and allowed noncitizens to vote.350 This effectively removed the right
of Hawaiians and most non-white immigrants to vote and consolidated control in the
hands of the plantation owners.351
In 1893, Queen Liliʻuokalani announced plans to adopt a new constitution.352 A
group, composed primarily of Americans and Europeans, which named itself the
Committee of Safety, was formed to stage a coup.353 The Committee of Safety via the
Honolulu Rifles took control of the palace and placed Liliʻuokalani under house arrest.354
At the request of the coup leaders, a company of U.S. Marines and two companies of
U.S. sailors provided support for the overthrow355 In a desire to avoid bloodshed, the
Queen ordered her forces to surrender, and the Honolulu Rifles took over the
government356
The Committee of Safety established a provisional government.357 Newly
inaugurated President Grover Cleveland ordered an investigation which found that the
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"United States diplomatic and military representatives had abused their authority and
were responsible for the change in government."358 Cleveland strongly supported
reinstatement but was opposed by the provisional government and the US Senate.359
On July 4, 1894, the Republic of Hawaiʻi was proclaimed with the aim of
eventual annexation.360 In 1898, the Territory of Hawaiʻi was established through the
annexation of Hawaiʻi under the Newlands Resolution.361 Hawaii remained a territory for
sixty years, during which plantation owners and other members of the wealthy elite
maintained considerable control. On December 7, 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbour by
Imperial Japan occurred, which dragged the United States into the war and brought
considerable attention to Hawaiʻi.362 In March 1959, Congress passed the Hawaii
Admission Act, which allowed for a referendum on statehood.363 In June, 94.3% voted in
favour of statehood and Hawaiʻi soon became the fiftieth state of the United States.364
There were some procedural issues with the vote, but by then, demographics had shifted
enough that Hawaiians had become a minority population. Further, the ballot gave no
option for Hawaiian sovereignty in any form. Given a choice between full admittance
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into the United States and the problematic territorial status, support for statehood cannot
be interpreted as contentment with the lack of sovereignty.
Since statehood, Hawaiʻi has undergone several waves of modernisation efforts
and increased tourism and migration. In 1993, United States Public Law 103-150, also
known as the Apology Resolution, was signed into law by President of the United States
Bill Clinton. It formally apologised for the overthrow but has no practical legal effect.

3.6.3 Cook Islands
People are thought to have first arrived in the Cook Islands around 800-1200 CE,
though there is some evidence of humans there much earlier.365 Tradition holds that
Aitutaki, Tangiia and Rarotonga were settled by people from French Polynesia, whilst the
northern islands were settled from Samoa and Tonga.366 It is said that New Zealand was
settled by Rarotongan Maoris and others who arrived around 1000 CE with the Cook
Islands as their final stop before reaching New Zealand.367
The first recorded European contact is a sighting by Spanish sailor Álvaro de
Mendaña in 1595.368 He was followed by Portuguese-Spaniard Pedro Fernández de
Quirós in 1606 who was the first to make landfall.369 Captain James Cook visited in 1773
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and 1777 landing on the uninhabited Palmerston Atoll.370 Russian Baltic German
Admiral Adam Johann von Krusenstern renamed the islands the Cook Islands in 1823
(though the name was not widely used until 1888).371 The same year, missionaries from
the London Missionary Society brought Christianity to the islands with considerable
success in their efforts at conversion.372
In 1862 and 1863, the Cook Islands were visited by Peruvian slave traders
(blackbirders) who kidnapped and enslaved people from several islands and took them to
Peru.373 Hardest hit was the island of Penrhyn where they lost at least three-quarters of
their population.374
The islands became a British protectorate in 1888 when there were fears of
occupation by other foreign powers, including France which had recently taken Tahiti.375
On 6 September 1900, a petition was circulated to request annexation.376 On 8–9 October
1900, seven instruments of cession for the islands were presented by the chiefs and
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accepted by the British thus incorporating the Cook Islands into the British Empire.377
The island of Aitutaki did not submit a cession request, but the inhabitants of the island
did nevertheless consider themselves British subjects and the island was annexed in the
Proclamation accepting the others.378 In 1901, the Cook Islands was added to the Colony
of New Zealand (and eventually the Dominion of New Zealand).
In 1915, the Cook Islands Act caused a shift in the way the Cook Islands were
administered.379 Prior to the Act, they were seen as individual islands operating as
separate political entities.380 Under the Act, the Cook Islands became administered as a
single political unit. This marks the birth of the modern Cook Islands nation.381 It was
administered exclusively by a resident commissioner until 1946, when the Legislative
Council was established.382
The Cook Islands became a self-governing territory in free association with New
Zealand in 1965.383 Independence was of mixed popularity with Cook Islanders, many of
whom felt the previous arrangement with New Zealand was highly beneficial to the
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islands.384 New Zealand has been accused of pushing for independence more to serve its
interests than those of the islands.385 As it was a vocal supporter of the newly independent
Asian and African nations within the UN holding colonies, regardless of the desire of
their inhabitants, was politically embarrassing for them and harmful to their foreign
policy objectives.386
Albert Henry was the newly independent country’s first premier387. He was reelected five times but remains a polarising figure in the Cook Islands.388 He had many
beneficial achievements for the Cook Islands, particularly in the early part of his term.
His later years were, however, marked by accusations of mismanagement, dictatorial
conduct and other scandals. Many of Henry’s actions have been presented as self-serving.
While often bringing positive developments to the Cook Islands, the actions also often
provided for his personal gain.389
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The 1978 elections were hotly contested as a result of growing dissatisfaction
with Henry’s government and his Cook Islands Party.390 His opponents accused him of
treating the islands as his own personal fiefdom with rampant nepotism.391 He is said to
have strictly controlled the state-run media and used the radio as a personal propaganda
tool.392 Due to an oddity of Cook Islands law at the time, all of age Cook Islanders in the
Cook Islands and abroad were eligible to vote, but could only do so when physically
present in the islands.393 The parties developed a scheme to increase voting by chartering
aeroplanes to fly in New Zealand resident Cook Islanders to cast their vote at a reduced
cost.394 Henry’s party illegally subsided flights for his party using government funds.395 It
was victorious in the election, but he was soon charged and convicted of corruption and
election law violations.396 He was thus removed from his position of premier by the court,
and his knighthood was revoked.397 Following the court order, opposition party leader
Tom Davis (Democratic Party) became premier, marking one of the only times in which
a court has successfully deposed a sitting government.398 The Cook Islands Party returned
to power in the 1983 elections with Albert Henry's cousin Geoffrey Henry becoming
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prime minister. He served for ten years, followed by a brief term by Joe Williams. The
1999 elections saw the Democratic Alliance Party (a successor to the Democratic Party)
taking a majority which they held under Terepai Maoate (until a no-confidence vote in
2002), Robert Woonton (2002-2004) and Jim Marurai until their loss in the 2010
elections. The Cook Islands Party under Henry Puna won both the 2010 and 2014
elections and is currently the majority party.
The Cook Islands, having significant maritime territory, focused much of its early
foreign policy on defining these boundaries. In 1980, the United States signed a treaty
with the Cook Islands delimiting its the maritime boundaries and dropping the US’s
claim to the islands of Penrhyn, Pukapuka, Manihiki, and Rakahanga (on behalf of
American Samoa). A similar treaty was signed in 1990 with France that clarified the
maritime borders between the Cook Islands and French Polynesia.
Though overall fairly politically stable since the 1978 elections, on June 13, 2008,
eight of the 15 high chiefs in the House of Ariki (an advisory body to Parliament)
attempted to dissolve the government proclaiming themselves the rightful source of
government.399 They argued for a return to the traditional chief structural and restoration
of their power.400 The attempt failed to gain the support they had expected and ten days
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later they abandoned the effort, and members of the House of Ariki returned to their
typical duties.401
Today, issues of overfishing, global warming and depopulation remain significant
concerns. These concerns, along with development challenges typical of small states,
remain problematic. The relationship with New Zealand does nevertheless soften some of
the effects through foreign aid and migration options.

3.6.4 Fiji
Fiji has generally been thought to have been settled between 2000 and 1000
BCE.402 More recent work suggests that the first settlement may actually have been even
earlier,403 possibly as early as 8000 BCE.404 It is typically thought that Austronesian
peoples first migrated to Fiji followed about 1000 years later by Melanesians.405 The Tu'i
Tonga Empire included Fiji from the 10th century until its fall in the 13th century.406 This
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Tongan empire brought Polynesian culture and language into Fiji, though most
indigenous Fijians are Melanesians.407
The islands were first recorded by a western explorer in 1643 when Dutch captain
Abel Janszoon Tasman visited north-eastern Fiji.408 European trade came heavily to Fiji
in the early nineteenth century.409 There was extensive trade with Fijian produced
sandalwood, and beche-de-mer exchanged for many European tools including muskets.410
This trade led to the establishment of the first European settlement, Levuka, in 1822.411
Missionaries first came to Fiji in 1830 from the London Missionary Society via Tonga.412
They were followed by Methodist missionaries (supported by Tongan Prince Enele
Ma'afu) in 1835.413
Fierce warfare amongst rival small kingdoms was common in Fiji for much of the
nineteenth century, particularly heightened by recently available muskets.414 Using
Swedish supplied weapons, Ratu Tanoa Visawaqa, the Vunivalu of Bau (essentially
Paramount Chief of Bua), took control of much of Western Fiji.415 In 1852, Ratu Seru
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Epenisa Cakobau succeeded him.416 He soon claimed the title of Tui Viti (King of
Fiji).417 His claim was tolerated, but not supported by many of the local chiefs who saw
him more in the role of first among equals rather than their ruler.418 It was also opposed
by Ma'afu, who had claimed the Island of Lakeba.419
Cakobau claims were also indirectly challenged by an incident in which American
consul, John Brown Williams’ store was looted by Fijians after a fire caused by stray
American cannon fire during a Fourth of July celebration in 1849.420 Williams’ house
was also burned in a suspected arson attack in 1855.421 The commander of the United
States naval frigate USS John Adams demanded US$38,531 from Cakobau (as King of
Fiji) in compensation for these incidents.422 Unable to pay and with his control of the Fiji
limited, he offered to cede the islands to the United Kingdom in exchange for the debt
and the condition that his claims as Tui Viti be upheld.423 After four years of
consideration, the United Kingdom rejected the offer.424 In return for 5,000 km² of land,
the Australian-based Polynesia Company paid the debt in 1868.425 Other settlers soon
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arrived with messy land claims and limited actual governance over the settlers.426 In June
1871, under the direction of the British honorary consul John Bates Thurston, an
arrangement was made in which a constitutional monarchy, with Cakobau as King and a
settler-dominated Legislative Assembly, was established.427
Government overspending soon produced excessive debt leading Cakobau to
offer again to cede the islands to the British in 1872.428 The offer was revised, with his 21
March 1874 offer being accepted leading to British annexation on 10 October 1874.429
Though maintaining the title of Vunivalu of Bau, Cakobau, formally ceded the title of Tui
Viti to Queen Victoria.430
Sir Arthur Gordon was appointed the first governor of the new colony in June
1875.431 He adopted a series of policies that were intended to protect iTaukei.432 Central
to these was his ban on further land sales (requiring the remaining land be leased) and a
prohibition on using iTaukei labourers on the plantations (theoretically to protect them
from exploitation).433 He also elected to allow the chiefs to maintain control of their local
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areas and established the Great Council of Chiefs as an advisory body.434 Fijians were
also prohibited from enlisting in World War I, again in what was described as an attempt
to protect them.435 Though these measures allowed for a reasonably good, though highly
paternalistic, colonial experience for iTaukei, the prohibition on using iTaukei labourers
was a problem for European plantation owners whose business models depended upon
cheap labour.
A system of indentured labourers to address the labour shortage was started in
1878 using labourers from India.436 The program was ended in 1916 due to concerns of
abuse. Over the course of it, around 61,000 people came to Fiji from India.437 They
worked under a five-year contract, after which they could pay to return to India or work
five more years to allow the choice of a paid return to India or staying in Fiji.438 The
majority choose to stay.439 Many parts of the system were quite brutal, and recruiters lied
heavily about work conditions and the distance from India.440 Labourers were recruited
from several parts of India, allowing much more diversity than is typical under the
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indentured labourer system.441 This, amongst other factors, also led to the disappearance
of caste amongst Indo-Fijians.442
In a shift in British policy, Fijians were allowed to participate in the Second
World War.443 Many thousand iTaukei joined the Fiji Infantry Regiment which fought in
the Solomon Islands campaign.444 Fiji was also used as a training base for the Allies.445
Indo-Fijians largely did not participate in the war efforts, as their demands for equal
treatment with Europeans was refused.446 This non-participation was used by ethnonationalists to justify exclusion and discrimination in the post-war years.447
The Legislative Council became a partly elective body in 1904.448 It was,
nevertheless, a largely European dominated and the iTaukei members were appointed by
the Governor from a list of 6 candidates submitted by the Great Council of Chiefs.449 In
1953, the Council became equally divided amongst the three major ethnic groups of
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Fiji.450 Of the five members each for Indo-Fijians and Europeans, three were elected, and
two were appointed.451 All five iTaukei members were selected by the Great Council of
Chiefs.452
By the mid-1960s Britain was divesting itself of its colonial empire.453
Independence was popular amongst Indo-Fijians who felt that it would allow for an end
of discriminatory policies.454 Indo-Fijians were by this time a larger percentage of the
population than iTaukei.455 As such, many iTaukei feared that independence would allow
Indo-Fijian domination and a change in land protections.456 They opposed independence
on these grounds. Despite iTaukei opposition, the British were determined to divest
themselves of Fiji.457 A compromise was eventually reached in which Fiji would be
governed by a Senate dominated by Fijian chiefs and a popularly elected House of
Representatives (with ethnic quotas).458 Under this arrangement, Fiji became independent
on 10 October 1970.459
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The Alliance Party of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara dominated post-independence
politics; Mara served as prime minister from 1970 to 1992 (except a brief period in 1987)
and as president from 1993 to 2000.460 Indo-Fijians took a majority in 1977 but were
unable to form a coalition government.461 In April 1987, a coalition led by Timoci
Bavadra (ethnically iTaukei) formed of Indo-Fijians parties established the
government.462 This government was removed in a military coup led by Lt. Col. Sitiveni
Rabuka on 14 May 1987.463 Rabuka, unhappy with the interim government, staged
another coup on 25 September 1987.464 He declared Fiji a republic on 10 October.465
After protests from foreign governments, he resigned on 6 December, and Mara was
reappointed prime minister.466 A highly problematic and discriminatory constitution was
established in July 1990 which guaranteed iTaukei supremacy.467 Facing ongoing foreign
and domestic pressure, a new constitution was created in 1997 which addressed many of
the issues.468 The first elections held under the new constitution took place in May 1999
leading to the defeat of Rabuka's coalition by an Indo-Fijian coalition led by Mahendra
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Chaudhry.469 In May 2000, Chaudhry and much of Parliament were taken hostage in the
House of Representatives by an armed group led by George Speight.470 Speight was an
iTaukei failed businessman who had been living in Australia.471 Though successful in
deposing the government, Speight was never able to meaningfully gain any control of the
islands.472 He was unpopular amongst many in Fiji, though the coup itself was seen by a
number of iTaukei as needed to address their fears of changes to land laws stroked by
ethno-nationalist propaganda.473 Commodore Frank Bainimarama took control of Fiji
soon after and implemented an interim civilian government led by Laisenia Qarase.474 In
the 2001 elections, Qarase defeated Chaudhry.475 Speight was convicted of treason in
2002.476
Controversial legislation to pardon those involved in the coup and allegations of
government corruption caused clashes between Bainimarama and Qarase.477 Tensions
between the military and Qarase’s government intensified following the May 2006

469

Ibid.

470

Brij V. Lal, “‘Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides’: The Making of George Speight’s

Coup,” Journal of Pacific History 35, no. 3 (December 2000): 281–93,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223340020010571.
471

Ibid.

472

Ibid.

473

Ibid.

474

Ibid.

475
476

Lal, Historical Dictionary of Fiji, xxix-xxxvi.
Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End

All Coups? (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 3-20.
477

Ibid.

116

election.478 As Qarase was unwilling to meet his demands, Bainimarama launched a
military coup on 5 December 2006.479 Bainimarama arranged to have himself appointed
Prime Minister.480 On 9 April 2009, the Court of Appeal ruled that the coup-appointed
government was illegal.481 In response, Bainimarama dissolved the government and the
constitution dismissing all judges, and civil servants.482 Bainimarama adopted a number
of policies designed to address systemic discrimination, corruption and promote
development. There were also serious allegations of civil rights violations and
government brutality occurring under Bainimarama. A new constitution was established
in 2013 and, after several delays, elections were held in September 2014, which were
won by Bainimarama under the FijiFirst Party483. The coups and relationship to the
nationalist movements are discussed in further detail within Chapter 5.

3.7

Conclusions

The four nations of this dissertation provide a valuable, but largely unexplored set of sites
at which to study the effects of nationalism. Though in the same region with considerable
similarities, the islands have noticeable differences in population, ethnic diversity and

478

Ibid.

479

Ibid.

480

Ibid.

481

David Hegarty and Darrell Tryon, Politics, Development and Security in Oceania (Canberra: ANU

E Press, 2013), 207.
482

Ibid.

483

Though the elections did have some issues (most notably restrictions on public assembly prior to

elections and strict party registration rules), external observers described it as fair and free. There are,
nevertheless, sceptics who describe the elections as rigged.

117

land rights. Their experiences with colonialism and independence, whilst with many
commonalities to each other, represent a reasonably unusual experience when compared
with that of other post-colonial nations.
On the global stage, all four nations have tiny populations. Even Hawaiʻi and Fiji,
the largest of the region, are still smaller than almost 150 other nations. With Niue’s
population under two thousand, it is one of the smallest countries in the world. The Cook
Islands is nearly ten times larger with a population of a bit over 15,000. Fiji and Hawaiʻi
have populations of about 880,000 and 1.4 million, respectively. The nations also differ
considerably in ethnic diversity. Hawaiʻi is one of the most ethnically diverse places in
the world. Fiji also has considerable diversity, particularly for a small island nation. Niue
and the Cook Islands, in contrast, are some of the most ethnically homogeneous countries
globally. This has had significant effects on how ethnonationalism can be utilised in these
nations.
Land rights remain a major issue for the islands. Niue and the Cook Islands
maintain a complex model intended to meld traditional land ownership practices with
Western forms, creating a system of collective family land tenure. This has been
problematic as migration from the islands has created issues with the ability to make land
use decisions. Fiji mostly operates under a system of long-term land leases. The concerns
surrounding the expiration of the leases and the land tenure system, in general, has been
the cause of much of the instability in Fiji and is frequently presented by nationalists as
one of the largest threats facing the Fijian nation. Within Hawaiʻi, the legacy created by
the theft of the land taken during the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi remains one
of the largest problems the islands face. Perceived improper land stewardship is a
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frequent cause of tension and the fight against it has become a core part of Hawaiian
nationalism.
The four nations’ colonial experiences were atypical. Fiji, the Cook Islands and
Niue became colonies as the result of cession agreements that were initiated by the
governments of the islands. Hawaiʻi became a territory and state of the United States
following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. Their colonial powers administered
Fiji, the Cook Islands and Niue in such a way that direct impact on the Native peoples
was much less than colonial models typically had. Hawaii’s situation was also unusual in
that the focus of the overthrow was eventual annexation by the United States. The
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi maintained diplomatic relations with the United States for almost 70
years until the government was overthrown with the support of the US military.
Independence also came differently to the nations (and Hawaiʻi has yet to gain
independence). The Cook Islands, and particularly Niue, showed considerable reluctance
to become independent states. New Zealand, however, was a vocal advocate for
decolonisation and was in a politically embarrassing situation in having its own colonies
whilst advocating for other to divest themselves of their colonial holdings. However, the
islands’ relationship with New Zealand was fairly positive, and their economic and
logistic dependancy was well recognised. These concerns led to the formation of the new
concept of “free association”. This arrangement created a system under which the islands
could outsource to New Zealand the governmental functions they were unable to provide,
yet still be an independent nation. Within Fiji, independence was mostly the result of
advocacy from Indo-Fijians. Many iTaukeis saw the colonial arrangement as serving
them reasonably well, with no urgency towards autonomy. When Fiji did gain
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independence, its changeover celebration was carefully designed to be a calm and
respectful handover of power.
Hawaiʻi is today a part of the United States. Though calls for independence are
frequent and many describe Hawaii’s current status as under occupation, there has not
been a viable path to independence for decades. Hawaii’s position is relatively unique in
that it had a recognised government prior to being invaded by a geographical remote
larger state. Its later full incorporation into that state is also unusual.
Each of the nation’s histories, and particularly their colonial experiences, has
produced a legacy that has very interesting effects upon how sovereignty and nationalism
are manifested in these islands. There are several areas explored in the following chapters
in which we can see these effects. The expression of sovereignty in Niue, the Cook
Islands and Hawaiʻi has especially been shaped by the islands’ experiences with
colonialism and occupation. The manifestation of hot nationalism in Fiji and Hawaiʻi,
likewise has a clear historical basis. Though the effects can sometimes be subtle, much of
nationalism in these islands can be connected back to the nation’s historical formation
and experiences.
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Chapter 4

4

Sovereignty
Sovereignty and nationalism are two extremely closely connected concepts.484 As

Ichijo notes, “nationalism is typically equated with a nation achieving independence.”485
Protecting and asserting sovereignty is assumed to be one of the major interests of a
nation.486 It is often one of the primary focuses of nationalists. For recognised nations,
nationalist attention will be on protecting the sovereignty of the nation from internal and
external threats (which may or may not actually exist). Unrecognised/under-recognised
nations will generally see nationalists attempting to assert their nation’s sovereignty.
Sovereignty is, however, not absolute for any modern state. Every state faces a variety of
limitations and external pressures that prevent it from acting as a complete sovereign
entity. Many nationalists now recognise that absolute state sovereignty is no longer an
achievable goal today.487 Nationalist movements in several areas have as a result become
increasingly creative in the ways in which they seek to build a sovereign nation (several
of the more creative attempts can be seen utilised by nations within this dissertation).
This chapter will explore what sovereignty and particularly statehood means for each of
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the nations. None of them fit the classic model of a fully sovereign state. As such, they
provide an interesting set of examples of how sovereignty applies to smaller nations.
Fiji, as the least ambiguous sovereign nation in this dissertation, faces the typical
challenges of a small state. Though there are no competing claims for its territory or overt
attempts to undermine its sovereignty by other states, their ability to express their
sovereignty is nevertheless limited. Economic dependency, pressure from NGOs and
multinational organisations, and occasional breaches by its neighbours, prevent Fiji from
operating as a fully sovereign nation. The effects of globalisation and interference by
larger states have meant that many small nations are unable to function as a sovereign
state in the same way that larger more powerful states can. Despite the practical
limitations in expressing its sovereignty, Fiji remains widely recognised as a sovereign
nation.
Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ situations are greatly complicated by the
unusualness of their free association agreements. This agreement has them effectively
outsourcing some areas of sovereignty to New Zealand. As extremely small nations, they
are highly dependent upon New Zealand both financially and logistically. Whilst the free
association agreement is unusual, as this chapter will show, they are nevertheless legally
fully sovereign states. Though the legal position is reasonably clear, their size and
uncommon governance status challenge the popular conception of what a sovereign state
“should” be like.
The situation for Hawaii’s sovereignty is extremely muddled. There is no
escaping the fact that Hawaiʻi is under the control of the United States. However, its
position under international law is debatable. The government of Hawaiʻi was
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overthrown in 1893, with the United States providing military support for the overthrow,
contrary to international law. Its incorporation into the United States as a territory and
later a state are similarly legally problematic.
Additionally, Hawaii’s geographic remoteness and the United States’ federalist
system has allowed a level of legal sovereignty in ways that would otherwise be
unexpected. Sovereignty is the primary battleground for nationalists in Hawaiʻi. Given
the ambiguity of its legal status, they are increasingly focusing their energies on ways in
which tools such as legal definitions of sovereignty can be employed in the struggle for
the restoration of a sovereign Hawaiian nation.
This chapter explores how these four nation’s sovereignties can be defined and
how these definitions are utilised by nationalists. After a brief discussion of the types of
sovereignty, I will explore how each nation fits into the various criteria for statehood
(international legal sovereignty) and the multitude of issues they face in asserting their
sovereignty.
The factual basis for many of the common arguments surrounding the nations’
sovereignty is also looked at within this chapter so as to provide a point of reference for
exploring the creativity of the claims of nationalists. A full legal analysis of these
arguments is outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, by providing a brief
exploration I hope to demonstrate the ways in which nationalists have embraced
conceptions of sovereignty and expanded their use to activities that would traditionally be
out of scope for studies of nationalism.
In Niue and the Cook Islands, the way in which the legal community describes the
states is congruent with how nationalists present its status. Despite this, there exists a
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popular impression in other nations that Niue and the Cook Islands are not actually
sovereign given their special status. In Fiji, without a meaningfully contested status,
sovereignty is generally discussed by nationalists only in the context of how other nations
are breaching it. Whilst any case in which a nation's borders are breached is concerning,
nationalists have used these cases far beyond the actual impact of the breaches. Hawaiian
nationalists present a fascinating case. The way in which sovereignty activists typically
present Hawaii’s legal status differs noticeably from that which the legal community
typically considers accepted. Many of their claims even go so far beyond the legal
consensus that they can almost be seen as creating a new conception of what the term
sovereignty means.

4.1

Types of Sovereignty

Krasner in his highly influential book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy presents
four conceptions of sovereignty: international legal, Westphalian, interdependence, and
domestic.488 This model recognises the limitations of the notion of absolute state
sovereignty and describes the situations in which sovereignty can acceptably be breached.
For legally focused nationalists, these provide the models under which their nation is able
to define itself. Within nations that have contested sovereignty, discussions of exactly
how their nation meets one of these criteria are becoming of growing importance for
nationalist movements. As international law gains public attention, supporters are no
longer content with vague folk notions of the meaning of independence. Increasingly
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nationalists will frame their argument for independence around (often poorly applied)
expressions of one of the commonly recognised sovereignty models.
International legal sovereignty refers to states recognising one another as
independent.489 The two dominant models for recognising statehood are the declarative
theory and the constitutive theory. Both are discussed in detail in the following section.
Of the four nations, only Fiji has an entirely unambiguous case for international legal
sovereignty. Niue and the Cook Islands have a somewhat less clear case, whilst today’s
Hawaiʻi has virtually no ability to claim international legal sovereignty.
Westphalian sovereignty recognises that each state has full authority over its
territory and domestic affairs without interference from any other state.490 Though
somewhat eroded by globalisation and intentionally limited by principles of universal
human rights, states are expected to respect the territorial integrity of other states. Fiji,
Niue and the Cook Islands all have full Westphalian sovereignty (at least as much as any
other small state today). Hawaiʻi by virtue of the continued US presence clearly does not
have any Westphalian sovereignty.
Interdependence sovereignty is the ability to control the flow of people, goods,
and capital across the state’s borders.491 It has been severely curtailed by globalisation.
Though greatly reduced from that which could be seen in previous ages, Fiji, the Cook
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Islands and Niue all largely maintain this power. Even Hawaiʻi has some limited
authority in this area (though of course still subject to US federal authority).
Domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s capacity to develop and deploy policy
within the state.492 Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Niue all unambiguously have this power.
Within the system of federalism which the United States utilises, the State of Hawaii has
a reasonable amount of domestic sovereignty. Despite a number of powers reserved to the
Federal government, the federalist system leaves most domestic government functions
within the control of US states.

4.2

Criteria for Statehood

There are two dominant theories defining the criteria for statehood (and with it,
international legal sovereignty) under international law; the declarative theory and the
constitutive theory. Both models have reasonably significant limitations, which becomes
increasingly clear in edge cases, such as extremely small states and groups struggling for
independence. Further, neither model has universal acceptance in the international
community. They, nevertheless, represent the currently most accepted way for statehood
to be defined. The ambiguity that these definitions feature represents one of the
significant concerns for many nationalists. It forces a focus on the question of whether a
state is in-fact a state. This creates a situation in several nations where much of the
nationalist energy is focused primarily upon showing their nation’s legitimacy and even
existence. In contrast, most larger and more recognised states typically do not have to
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concern themselves with the question of whether they are really a state as it is selfevident.

4.2.1 Declarative Theory
The declarative theory suggests that a state is a state because it has declared that it
is one through the meeting of certain criteria. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States largely codifies the declarative theory of statehood and
provides the classic definition of a state as recognised within modern international law.493
The first article of the treaty describes a state as possessing “(a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other states.” Further, it declares in article 3 that "the political existence of the state is
independent of recognition by the other states." The Badinter Arbitration Committee of
the European Union adopted a fairly similar definition, in which they stated that “the
State is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population
subject to an organised political authority; that such a state is characterized by
sovereignty.”

4.2.1.1 Permanent Population
The first criterion of the Montevideo Convention is that the state494 possesses a
permanent population. For this definition, the permanent population does not exclude

493

Mario Silva, State Legitimacy and Failure in International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, 2014), 15.
494

Though it can be somewhat ambiguous in the case of Hawaiʻi, for the purposes of this discussion

of statehood under the Montevideo Convention (and continued throughout this chapter), the term state
should be assumed to be used to refer to theoretically independent sovereign Hawaiʻi rather than the State

127

transitory or nomadic groups.495 Rather, it requires a more nebulous criterion of
permanent bonds to the territory.496 It is recognised that a state cannot be solely
composed of foreigners, however, how a person becomes counted in the state’s
permanent population is undefined.497 This criterion seems to be best represented in most
nation-states by the sense of inclusion that is encompassed by Anderson’s theory of
imagined community. The vague sense of belonging to a nation seems to be what the
Montevideo Convention is trying to clumsily capture within the notion of a permanent
population. One opinion on this by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany)498 in Re Duchy of Sealand suggested that the
population should form a “cohesive and vibrant community”.
There is not a minimum size specified for statehood.499 In theory, any number of
people, no matter how few, could form a state.500 There is, however, a practical, though
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ultimately undefinable, lower bound to the population; to have even a minimally
functional government requires a certain number of people in order to provide basic
services. Provided this minimal number is reached there does not seem to be a problem
with having extremely small states. The United Nations in 1974, as part of the UN
Committee 24, expressed concern about the size of non-self-governing states seeking
statehood.501 The UN today does not seem to share this concern any longer.502 UN reports
have repeatedly noted that they recognised the “the aspirations of the peoples of the
[Non-Self-Governing] Territories” for self-governance and the need to find solutions for
self-determination “without any prejudice to territorial size, geographical location, size of
the population or natural resources”. This report on Non-Self-Governing Territories also
expressed concern with the continued existence of Non-Self-Governing Territories and
notes that “all available options for self-determination of the Territories are valid as long
as they are in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and
in conformity with” the principles expressed in previous UN resolutions.503 Given that
this list currently includes the sparsely populated territories of the Pitcairn Islands (pop.
50), Tokelau (pop, 1,411) and the Falkland Islands (pop, 2,500), this would suggest that,
at least in principle, the UN allows for statehood despite an extremely small population.
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Niue, as of the last annual estimate, had a population of around 1,400.504 It thus
has a smaller population than any UN member state. The island nations of Nauru and
Tuvalu, which are currently the smallest UN member states, have populations almost
seven times larger than Niue.505 If Niue were to seek UN membership, it would have by
far the smallest population within its borders of any UN member state. However, when
considering the population size of Niue, the large number of Niueans abroad should also
likely be included. Niueans living in other countries represent a much larger group than
those still in Niue. New Zealand alone, accounts for over twenty thousand Niueans
abroad.506 If this population were included in any metrics of size, it would make Niue one
of the smallest, but no longer the absolute smallest.
The Cook Islands, whilst still a fairly small state with a population of almost
twenty thousand, is still larger than UN member states Nauru, Tuvalu, and Palau.507
Population size is not an issue at all for either Fiji or Hawaiʻi. Fiji’s population of about
eight hundred and fifty thousand and Hawaii’s population of almost 1.5 million make
them larger than several dozen existing UN member states. Problematic for a sovereign
Hawaiʻi, however, is the implied requirement for acceptance of the population’s inclusion
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in the state and the fact that the population is claimed by another state. Though not
directly expressed, it seems as a practical point that the population must acknowledge at
some level the existence of the state which is claiming them. To allow otherwise would
violate the principle of community that this criterion seems to seek. This point may be
academic, though, as most states with contested populations also have more serious
issues in defining territory.

4.2.1.2 Defined Territory
The criterion of defined territory has been somewhat problematic to delineate. At
its most basic level, it seems to require only that the state be able to actually define what
its borders are. A state needs to be able to say where the state starts and where it ends.
This ties fairly cleanly into Anderson’s notion of the nation being bounded. Though this
seems to be a reasonably straightforward criterion, several states have expressed concern
with how disputed territory can qualify under this definition.508 In regards to the
admission of Israel to the UN, the Syrian delegate in the 1948 assembly stated that “the
first qualification is that it should have a defined territory which is not contested by other
States”.509 A US delegate made a similar statement arguing that “the reason for the rule
that one of the necessary attributes of a state is that it shall possess territory is that one
cannot contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit”.510 In essence, they are
arguing that the state must have a clear title to their territory in order for it to count.
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This definition seems to create a virtually impossible barrier to statehood if it
were to be evenly and unhypocritically applied. There are hundreds of ongoing border
disputes, many of which extend back to the state’s founding. Even the normally peaceful
neighbours of the United States and Canada maintain an extremely low-key dispute
created by an ambiguity in the Treaty of Paris over Machias Seal Island. The small island
is on the border of the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine and is occupied only by an
ongoing rotation of 2 Canadian Coast Guard lighthouse keepers, but both states claim it.
To suggest that all disputes over territory, even fairly insignificant ones such as these,
should block statehood creates serious issues for most states. Even the more generous
interpretation of the Syrian and US suggestions that a state must have at least some of its
territory undisputed (which would still block Israel but does not create issue for Syria in
their dispute with Turkey over the Hatay Province), undesirably places considerable
power to block statehood in the hands of any other state willing to make a claim. Despite
the inconsistency in the UN, the International Court of Justice has repeatedly found that
not all of the territory has to be free of controversy in order to be considered defined
territory.511 As such, the control of Hawaii’s territory by the United States and the
ongoing dispute over the rightful owners of the territory does not seem in itself to block
Hawaiʻi from meeting this criterion.
The qualifying size of the territory is not defined by the Montevideo Convention.
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht in Re Duchy of Sealand noted that size was
irrelevant to statehood. This case centred around a 0.03km2 artificial island that was
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claiming statehood. Given a willingness to accept this a state (though Sealand statehood
was rejected on other grounds), there does not seem to be a meaningful lower limit to the
size of territory. Further, Niue with a territory of 260 km2 and the Cook Islands with a
territory of 236 km2, though extremely small, are still larger than several UN member
states (the Marshall Islands, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Tuvalu, Nauru, and Monaco).
Likewise, Hawaiʻi and Fiji are both significantly larger than quite a few UN member
states with total areas of 28,311 km2 and 18,272 km2 respectively. If we are to consider
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of each state as a part of the defined territory, all
four grow considerably in comparison with other states. Hawaiʻi and the Cook Islands
both have extremely large exclusive economic zones owing to their widely dispersed
island nature. Hawaii’s EEZ512 covers over 2.3 million km2, and the Cook Islands has an
EEZ greater than 1.8 million km2 placing them in the top 20 largest EEZs. Fiji and Niue,
though with somewhat smaller EEZs, are still larger than the majority of global states. In
a comparison of total controlled territory (exclusive economic zone plus total internal
area), the four nations of this paper actually become amongst the larger world states.

4.2.1.3 Government
A government is required under the Montevideo Convention criteria. The type or
system of government is not defined and is generally not considered a meaningful part of
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the criteria for statehood. Along with Article 1(2), it is very strongly implied in the
definition that the government must be independent (at least theoretically) and have
control of their domestic affairs. Each of the nations in this paper has some form of
government meeting this definition, though Hawaiʻi has issues with the independence
requirement.
The Government of Niue consists of the Premier of Niue, a 20-member elected
Assembly, 14 village councils, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Niue.513 Under
the Premier is the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the
Ministry of Social Services, the Central Agencies (Finance & Planning, Police, etc.) and
the Commercial & Trading Arm (Broadcasting Corporation of Niue, Tourism, etc.).
Though many of the groups within the government are extremely small, and members of
government often hold many roles (the current Premier, for example, is also the Minister
of Transport, the Niue Development Bank, Police and National Security, and seven other
areas), the government is fully formed and is of similar complexity to other larger states.
The Cook Islands is a representative democracy with a parliamentary system. It
has a prime minister, parliamentary legislature and an independent judiciary. The
executive branch has several dozen ministries and departments representing the typical
governmental needs of a small island nation.
Though interrupted by coups, Fiji has generally functioned as a parliamentary
representative democratic republic with a well-developed executive, legislature and
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independent judiciary. Like the other states above, there is no issue for Fiji under this
criterion.
This criterion of a sovereign government is very problematic for Hawaiʻi. Prior to
the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi in 1893, Hawaiʻi maintained a fully sovereign
government, except for a brief period of foreign occupation by the British in 1843. The
arguably sovereign Provisional Government of Hawaii was established after the
overthrow of the Kingdom, leading to the Republic of Hawaiʻi in 1894. The Newlands
Resolution in 1898 established the Territory of Hawaii as organised incorporated territory
of the United States, fully ending any form of recognised independent governance for
Hawaiʻi. Though it has received very little legal support, the possibility of a Hawaiian
government in exile/under occupation is explored later in this chapter. A limited
argument could also potentially be made that the State of Hawaii fills the spirit of the
criterion expressed in the Montevideo Convention. This argument is also explored later in
this dissertation.
As of today, there is not a functional government in Hawaiʻi independent of the
State of Hawaii. Though several sovereignty groups have attempted to re-establish
governments, they have not received much serious attention, and none have been able to
provide even minimal government services or exercise any control over territories larger
than personal residences or essentially squatter communities in public parks. Though
sovereignty groups have frequently “appointed” people to various positions of their
“government”, these appointments fail to convey any actual power or often any
meaningful duties. Rather the governments seem to exist only as organisational charts
online. Few groups have even managed to reach the point where they have established
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the basic symbols of government, much less any real progress towards forming a credible
state.
If we are to look at the State of Hawaii as the unit of government (somewhat
ignoring Article 1(2)), the State of Hawaii provides the vast majority of the major
services that are expected of a country with the noticeable exception of immigration
services. The Federal Government also exclusively prints money and provides postal
services. Other powers reserved to the Federal Government, and thus unavailable to the
State of Hawaii, include the power to regulate interstate and international trade, make
treaties and conduct foreign policy, declare war and form an army and navy.
Though these powers are reserved to the US Federal Government, their absence is
not especially problematic in this case. Hawaiʻi, like all other US states, has a reserve
military force in the form of the Hawaii National Guard. During typical operations, the
National Guard operates under the state governor and may be called up to respond to
emergencies or otherwise as designated by the governor. National Guard units may also
be “federalized” in which authority is transferred to the US president under certain
conditions. Hawaiʻi also has a currently inactive State Defense Force which is designed
to protect the state when the Hawaii National Guard is mobilised and is under the
authority of the governor. The State Defense Force is formed of retired military and other
selected volunteers. The presence of a military force under the control of the local
government could be seen to lend considerable legitimacy to the State of Hawaii forming
its own government for the purposes of the Montevideo Convention. However, neither
the Hawaii National Guard nor the State Defence Force would be especially useful in a
real contested sovereignty scenario as US federal law (10 USC § 332) allows the National
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Guard to be federalised to enforce Federal authority and the State Defence Force is
formed primarily of US Military retirees. With respect to the power to print money,
Section 10 of the US Constitution forbids states to “coin money” or “emit bills of credit”.
This lack of an independent currency is not necessarily a problem, given that several
independent countries use other country's currency (for example, El Salvador and the
Turks and Caicos Islands exclusively use the US dollar). Finally, there exists a chicken
and egg problem for immigration services as well as general foreign policy. As a part of
the United States, the State of Hawaii whilst has no need nor ability to meaningfully offer
these services and thus does not offer them (creating this gap in services). However,
should it gain independence, there is no reason to believe that the new government would
be unable to provide these functions514.

4.2.1.4 Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States
The requirement of a capacity to enter into relations with other states is one of the
more obtuse requirements of the Montevideo Convention. Though it is most clearly met
by states having active diplomatic relations with other states, the requirement seems only
that the state has the means to enter into a relationship and the ability to bind the state to
any agreements made in this relationship.515 However, even if the capacity exists, there
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does not appear to be any requirement that states actually do enter into relations with
other states. Many small states will have fairly low numbers of diplomatic missions from
other countries to their state and limited numbers of foreign missions to other countries.
Liechtenstein and the Vatican City both lack any resident embassies or consulates
located within their territory. Other small states such as Palau, Nauru, Micronesia, the
Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Lesotho, Kiribati and Saint Kitts and Nevis each have
less than five resident embassies. They also each have very few embassies of their own
abroad. Micronesia, Tuvalu, Tonga and Palau each operate four overseas embassies,
Nauru and Kiribati have two, and the others above have less than 15. Though these small
numbers are supplemented by honorary consulates and non-resident representatives,
many states largely lack any sort of meaningful diplomatic relations in a multitude of
other states. This is not generally interpreted as a statement on the state’s lack of
sovereignty, but rather a reflection of practical realities.
Embassies can be very costly to operate. On the high side is the US Embassy in
Baghdad with a USD$700 million facility516 and a post-war operating cost of USD$1.8
billion a year.517 Other US embassies and consulates have been much cheaper to
construct with lower operating costs but are still exceptionally expensive compared to
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most small states’ budgets.518 For smaller countries like Ireland, the cost can be lower due
to reduced security and staffing needs. It remains nevertheless quite expensive. Ireland
spent an average of €740,000 per embassy/consulate a year on operating costs (excluding
Department of Foreign Affairs staff). Even for small island nations costs can be fairly
high. Fiji’s current budget allocates a little over FJD$31 million for overseas missions.519
With 20 overseas missions, Fiji is spending over FJD$1.5 million per mission (assuming
zero cost for honorary consulates520). To have diplomatic missions to every UN member
state, even at Fiji’s lower budgeted cost, would alone cost about two-thirds the GDP of
the Cook Islands, 14 times the GDP of Niue and whilst overall a small portion of GDP
would be a very noticeable increase in Fiji’s government expenditures.
States also often lack any practical need for especially developed diplomatic
relations. States may have little meaningful effect upon each other. Even within today’s
increasingly globalising world, many states will never have an ongoing need to interact
with quite a few other distant states. For example, the small island state of Seychelles
lacks any resident diplomatic missions to any Oceania state, and there are none within
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Seychelles from any Oceania state. This is unsurprising given the near complete lack of
connection they have. It is almost 10,000 kilometres away from the closest Oceania state
and thus has no territorial connection. There is also no significant trade between them and
Seychelles is not meaningfully competing with any Oceania state. Even within tourism,
there is little connection. Most months saw less than three visitors to Seychelles from
Oceania with many months having not a single Oceania visitor.521 As such, there is little
practical need for the states to have any significant diplomatic relations beyond creating
the basic frameworks of diplomacy. Establishing a resident embassy for these states
would be a completely unnecessary expenditure. Rather a system in which states have an
ambassador accredited to multiple states or outsource their consular services to another
state is used. For example, the Fijian ambassador to the UAE is also accredited to
Seychelles along with several other states and Canadians in Hawaiʻi are advised to seek
consular services from the Consulate General of Australia in Honolulu.
The Cook Islands and Niue by the handful of states they have diplomatic relations
with seem to have demonstrated that they have the capacity to enter into relations with
other states but choose to do so very infrequently. Fiji, in contrast, by their active
participation in world affairs, has shown that they have both the capacity and desire to
exercise it. Hawaiʻi is in a very problematic position in this regard. Though the preoverthrow Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had relations with many other states, the State of Hawaii
and the sovereignty activists’ kingdoms have very little ability to do so. It is perhaps
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meaningful for this criterion that there are a number of consulates located within Hawaiʻi,
but as these do not recognise Hawaiian sovereignty their value in this regard is uncertain.

4.2.2 Constitutive Theory
The constitutive theory provides the other major model of statehood. It suggests
that a state exists when other states recognise it as a state.522 Recognition, in this model,
is the only meaningful criterion for determining legitimacy.523 This theory takes a very
practical approach. For its citizens, a state which is unrecognised is of little utility when
they are outside their home state. Declaring the existence of the state is fairly useless to
its citizens abroad if the state’s passports are unrecognised, its currency not exchangeable
and it is not able to provide consular services.
Conversely, within the state, recognition by other states may have, potentially,
little practical effect on its citizens’ daily lives. Assuming an otherwise functional
government, international recognition means little to the presence of police and fire
services, garbage collection, road maintenance and the multitude of other services a
government can provide regardless of recognition. Even completely unrecognised states
may maintain the ability to enforce laws on their citizens independently of their
international recognition. Though a strict interpretation of the constitutive theory
mandates it, in practice, states do not regard unrecognised states at terra nullius (nobody's
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land). Even when other states are not willing to formally recognise the state, they still
seem to maintain a form of pseudo-recognition.
The approach of the constitutive theory seems very rational and useful in that it
completely shifts from an impossible to precisely define criteria to something that should
be clear and measurable. It, however, seems to rely upon a very naive worldview. For this
model to work, states are to recognise other states as sovereign whenever they are
actually sovereign. Though the criteria are left undefined for the ways in which states are
to make their determination, it seems to mostly be assumed that states will recognise all
“real” sovereign states. Unviable or unconvincing attempts that technically meet
Montevideo Convention can be safely ignored under this model using a common senseesque approach. Where this theory appears to fall apart is when the decision of
recognition is made by the state for solely political reasons. It seems absurd to say wellestablished de facto states such as Taiwan, Israel or Palestine are not real states because
others have chosen to make a political point by not recognising them. Further, it allows
for the extremely messy notion of governments in exile. Under the model of the
constitutive theory, a government can exist without any practical control or influence
over its territory solely because other countries are willing to accept the claim. The utility
or sensibility of recognising states whose ability to negotiate is on a solely theoretical
basis is highly questionable. This model overall creates a situation in which the law no
longer reflects facts.
This theory is also highly problematic in regard to the right to self-determination.
Under this approach, if states are to decide that another state does not exist regardless of
the reality or the peoples of the state’s will, then it does not exist as far as international
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law is concerned. More secure states thus become able to use recognition as a bargaining
chip and a tool to enforce their will on smaller states.
Under the constitutive theory, the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi (pre-1893) does appear to
have a strong claim for statehood. The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had a significant number of
states with diplomatic presences in Hawaiʻi and Hawaiʻi likewise had significant
representation across the world. They signed a number of treaties with other states and
participated in the Universal Postal Union. The Provisional Government of Hawaii and
its successor the Republic of Hawaii should also be recognised under the constitutive
theory. Despite a brief delay by Japan in recognising the Provisional Government of
Hawaiʻi, all of the states that had recognised the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi immediately
recognised the Provisional Government.524 Similarly, all of these states soon recognised
the Republic of Hawaiʻi.525 Today, though a number of states have diplomatic missions
located in the State of Hawaii, none of these missions are actually to Hawaiʻi. Rather they
are all consulates to the United States. The geographic distance from other consulates and
the demographics of Hawaiʻi have resulted in an unusually high concentration of
diplomatic missions when compared with most other smaller US states creating a clear
impression of difference in foreign affairs. However, as all of the consulates in Hawaiʻi
are to the United States, they do not provide any benefit to sovereignty claims under the
constitutive theory.
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Fiji has no problem with recognition under the constitutive theory. They have
diplomatic relations with much of the world and participate in a variety of international
organisations. Further, as a United Nations member, their existence as a state is well
recognised. It has frequently been argued that UN members have an obligation to
recognise all other members as states.526
The Cook Islands’ case is somewhat weaker, but it can still be considered a
sovereign state under the constitutive theory. Though they have limited diplomatic
missions to other states and even fewer from other states, they do have formal diplomatic
relations with a large number of states. The Cook Islands, however, are not currently a
UN member state; nor have they applied to become one. Nevertheless, they do participate
in UN associated agencies such as UNESCO and WHO as a state.
Niue has only a single diplomatic mission located within its borders and only two
overseas diplomatic missions of Niue. Just a few dozen states have formal diplomatic
relations with Niue. Similarly, to the Cook Islands, though not a UN member state, Niue
does participate in UN associated agencies such as UNESCO and WHO as a state. Given
the constitutive theory’s vagueness on the threshold for recognition, it remains unclear if
Niue can be considered a recognised state. However, given the power of the states that
have diplomatic relations with Niue (including a third of the Security Council) and the
lack of objection to their recognition, it would seem that Niue should probably be
considered a state under this theory.
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4.2.3 Exploitation of the Montevideo Convention Model by
Nationalists
The declarative theory, as expressed in the Montevideo Convention model, seems
to encourage sovereignty activists across the world to essentially “play pretend”. They
have deluded themselves into thinking that if they claim a bit of land, give their friends
desirable titles in their play government and get an oblivious immigration agent to stamp
their freshly printed passport527, they now have a sovereign state. The Constitutive model
resolves this somewhat in allowing states to shut down claims of sovereignty by pointing
to a lack of recognition. Even in this model, activists have come up with some very
creatively absurd ways to show recognition. For example, Sealand, an extremely small
artificial sea platform that was then in international waters, has long claimed to
sovereignty in part because of what they argue is recognition by Germany. This
recognition consists solely of a single incident in which Germany sent a diplomat to help
negotiate the release of a German citizen which Sealand was holding hostage. This clear
lack of common sense in the interpretation of the Montevideo Convention model has
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allowed many activists to try for legalistic approaches to justify sovereignty where it
clearly does not exist.

4.3

Challenges for Statehood

Despite the clarity provided by the theories mentioned above, there remain several
challenges for the unambiguous declaration of statehood which affect the nations of this
dissertation. None of them are in-fact barriers to statehood, but each creates concerns for
the popular conception of what it means to be an independent state.

4.3.1 Unusual Approaches to Foreign Affairs
In discussions of the sovereignty of Niue and the Cook Islands, their choice to
delegate some aspects of foreign affairs to New Zealand is often presented as a barrier to
sovereign statehood. This, however, should not be considered to be the case. As per their
free association agreement, New Zealand provides foreign affairs and defence assistance,
but only when requested by Niue or the Cook Islands. This section will show that while
this agreement seems unusual (only three other states have free association
arrangements), there are actually a number of other states that have similarly atypical
arrangements. These states have adopted non-typical arrangements in which consular
services and diplomatic representation are provided by third parties including other states.
These services are provided under an agreement which defines the arrangement without
any recognised effect on overall sovereignty.
One form of atypical diplomatic representation is through a “protecting power”.
During wartime, most states will suspend all diplomatic relations and withdraw its
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diplomats from the state they are in conflict with.528 Under the rules of the Geneva
Conventions, the belligerents appoint a protecting power to handle diplomatic relations
between them and to oversee the application of the Geneva Conventions.529 During
peacetime, states may select a protecting power if they would otherwise lack diplomatic
relations with another state.530 The protecting power remains a representative of their
own state, but anything done on behalf of the protected state is considered to be as the
representative of the protected state.531 The protecting power’s mandate can either be
comprehensive, wherein the protecting power provides all diplomatic functions on behalf
of the protected state, or it can function as a way to allow for an informal exchange of
representatives of the protected state. Australia, Canada, and the United States are
represented under a comprehensive agreement by Sweden within North Korea.532 Canada
and Iran have a similar arrangement in which Italy serves as a protecting power for
Canada in Iran, and Oman serves as a protecting power for Iran in Canada.533 Special-
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interest sections are also operated by Switzerland in several of its embassies.534 These
sections are officially a part of the Swiss embassy but are staffed by nationals of the
protected state.535 Switzerland serves as the protecting power for both Iran and Saudi
Arabia, as well as between Russia and Georgia. They also represent Iran in Egypt and the
United States in Iran.536 With the instability in Syria, the United States, Australia and
Canada were represented in Syria as a protected state by the Czech Republic (US),
Hungary (Canada) and Romania (Australia).537
In addition to protected power arrangements, several countries have also signed
agreements to handle consular services in countries in which they lack representation for
reasons other than conflict. Amongst the most comprehensive of these is the CanadaAustralia Consular Services Sharing Agreement. This agreement specifies 17 Canadian
missions that are to provide consular services for Australia and 12 Australian missions
that are responsible for providing representation for Canada in specifically designated
consular areas.538 All of the Australian missions are located within Oceania, whilst the
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Canadian missions are mostly in the Americas and Africa.539 Under this bilateral
agreement, the missions are responsible for providing typical consular services (with the
notable exception of non-emergency visa and passport processing) in accordance with the
appropriate consular guide.540 These agreements are somewhat unique in their level of
formalisation. However, limited consular assistance has long been provided on a “bestendeavour basis” between New Zealand Australia, Canada, the United States and the
United Kingdom under an informal agreement.541
European Union states also have a mechanism for shared diplomatic services.
Article 20 section 2c of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that
citizens of member states have “the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in
which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of
the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as
the nationals of that State”. Under this arrangement, European Union citizens are entitled
to consular representation by other EU states, if their state does not have “accessible
permanent representation” or appropriate Honorary Consul in the area.542 The states are
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obligated to treat the person as if they were a citizen of their own country and provide
equal consular services.543
Colocation has also been adopted in several countries to lower the cost of
operating embassies. Under these arrangements, allied states will share the physical space
of an embassy and support staff. Though each state’s diplomatic staff is separate, counter
staff and security will be shared allowing for greater efficiency and lower cost.544 The
joint Nordic embassies in Berlin provide one of the more visible examples of this
model.545 Following the relocation of the German capital, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden established a large joint complex with a shared entrance and
communal building.546 The United Kingdom and Canada have also established a
Memorandum of Understanding for Enhancing Mutual Support at Missions Abroad
which provides a similar framework for establishing co-located embassies.547 This model
only minimally reduces a state’s sovereignty in that it creates some disclarity with regard
to whom shared staff are representing, as well as reducing the physical space of the
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embassy's exclusive sovereignty. It is, however, explicitly allowed under the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.548
Several countries have entered into arrangements with private companies in order
to outsource some consular services.549 For example, India has outsourced visa
applications, Overseas Citizen of India status processing and passports issuance for
residents of several states to VFS Global, a privately owned company.550 VFS, along with
other companies including Travisa and Computer Science Corporation, are increasingly
providing these services for several states.551 This model reflects neoliberal trends
focused on privatising governmental services wherever possible.552 The outsourcee is
contracted to handle “non-judgemental” tasks such as collecting fees and processing
applications, allowing the regular consular staff to handle only tasks such as assessment
and interviewing.553 Outsourcing of these tasks is said to reduce costs and allow for more
efficient handling of applications.554 There is, however, a concern that whilst the
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outsourcing firm officially does not have decision-making authority, their role in
processing applications still allows them to shape or obstruct applications.
Liechtenstein’s arrangement with Switzerland provides another example of
sovereign states allowing another sovereign state to represent them. In addition to a
common economic, monetary area, and patent system, Switzerland has been granted the
authority by Liechtenstein to represent them in treaty negotiations and provide consular
protection. Switzerland is also responsible for Liechtenstein national defence as it does
not have its own military. This arrangement is by far the most similar to the arrangement
of the freely associated states. The only meaningful difference is the lack of colonial
history.
This great variety of ways to handle consular services shows that allowing a third
party to provide diplomatic services need not meaningfully harm a state’s sovereignty.
Though Niue and the Cook Islands elect to have very minimal foreign affairs
involvement by choosing to allow New Zealand to handle most of it, this does not seem
to disqualify them from being considered sovereign nations.

4.3.2 Citizenship
Residents of Niue, the Cook Islands, and Hawaiʻi all hold another state’s
citizenship. Of the nations profiled in this dissertation, Fiji is the only one that currently
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has its own passports and citizenship.555 Citizenship is often seen as a key component of
statehood and nationhood, as the direct individualistic expression of these concepts.
Under United States Federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1401), a person born in Hawaiʻi
since statehood is a US citizen. The Hawaiian Organic Act (31 Stat. 141) in 1900 stated
that any person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaiʻi was then a US citizen. The
1894 Constitution of the Republic, Art. 17, had previously recognised those born or
naturalised in the Hawaiian Islands as citizens. Given the time that has passed since the
overthrow of the Kingdom and the establishment of the Territory of Hawaii, there is no
longer any person alive who was recognised as a citizen of either the Kingdom of
Hawaiʻi or the Republic of Hawaii. Citizenship in Hawaiʻi today is no longer independent
of US citizenship.
Niueans are granted New Zealand citizenship and travel under a New Zealand
passport. For most lex soli citizenship purposes, Niue is considered a part of New
Zealand. Under the Niue Immigration Act 2011, New Zealand citizens who are born in
Niue have the irrevocable “right to travel to or remain in Niue at any time” and are
entitled to visa/permit free access. These rights are also extended to people who have a
parent born in Niue or whose parent was a permanent or long-term resident of Niue.
These rights effectively form an equivalent to Niuean citizenship in granting Niueans a
permanent and irrevocable right to remain in their country and would likely serve as the
basis for citizenship if the free association agreement was to end. New Zealand citizens
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who are not covered under one of the conditions above are not afforded any special
consideration in entering or working in Niue. Like citizens from other countries, they are
required to obtain a 30-day visa. It is unclear what, if any, rights non-New Zealand
citizens who are born in Niue have in Niue as they are not, under New Zealand law, New
Zealand citizens.
The Cook Islands likewise does not have its own citizenship. All Cook Island
nationals have New Zealand citizenship and travel on New Zealand passports. The Cook
Islands grants all people born in the Cook Islands permanent residency provided that they
have a permanent resident parent. Children of permanent residents born abroad are also
entitled to similar rights to that of permanent residency. New Zealand citizens, who are
not permanent residents of the Cook Islands, are not granted any special rights to enter or
stay in the Cook Islands. Further, the Cook Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs &
Immigration notes that the “grant of Permanent Residency in the Cook Islands does not
carry any guarantee of gaining New Zealand citizenship”.556 It is thus possible for a
person to become a permanent resident of the Cook Islands without being a New Zealand
citizen, further emphasising the Cook Islands’ right to make its own immigration policy.
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Niue and the Cook Islands maintain full control over their own immigration
policy with full rights to determine whom they admit and allow to stay in the country.
Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has almost no control over its immigration or citizenship policy.557
In practice, there does not appear to be any actual requirement for a state to have
its own citizenship in order to be recognised as sovereign. For a number of years after
independence, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia did not have their own citizenship.
Citizens of these states were considered British subjects and travelled on British
passports. There is a noticeable delay between independence under the 1931 Statute of
Westminster and the new countries’ granting their own citizenship. Canada did not have
its own citizenship until 1947, with New Zealand and Australia not providing their own
citizenship until 1949558. Despite not having their own citizenship, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, all participated in foreign affairs as sovereign nations including becoming
founding members of the United Nations.

4.3.3 United Nations Membership
Though the United Nations charter requires all members to be sovereign states,
there is no requirement that all sovereign states become members. Several states
including Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga chose to not become member states for a number of
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years after independence. Furthermore, given the withdrawal of Indonesia in 1965 and
the proposals to expel apartheid South Africa, without any attempt to de-recognise their
statehood, it does seem possible for a state not to participate without effect on their
statehood. Though UN membership can be seen as a clear recognition of statehood, nonmembership cannot be interpreted as a sign of non-statehood. For the Cook Islands and
Niue, despite not being members of the UN, their "full treaty-making capacity" was
recognised by United Nations Secretariat in 1992 (Cook Islands) and 1994 (Niue).

4.3.4 Economic Sovereignty
Globalisation is frequently presented as eroding national sovereignty.559 It is
commonly argued that in a globalised world, governments are forced to adopt particular
economic policies over which they have little control.560 Small states have little ability to
oppose these policies, which are often to their detriment. Further, small island states often
suffer from severe trade imbalances, as their general remoteness and high costs render
them largely uncompetitive in a general export market. Rather, they are forced to rely
upon fickle industries such as tourism and limited specialised, often romanticised,
“island” goods. Foreign aid thus generally comes to form a large portion of the
economies of small island states.
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Issues of economic sovereignty and dependence, however, are further magnified
in foreign aid as it commonly comes with policy conditions explicit or implied. This is
most noticeable in Niue and to a lesser extent the Cook Islands. In 2014, Niue received
$14 million USD in official development assistance (foreign aid), whilst the Cook Islands
received $27 million USD.561 The vast majority of this aid came from New Zealand with
Australia also providing a smaller, yet meaningful portion. In 2014, Niue had a GDP of
approximately $20 million USD562 and the Cook Islands a GDP of over $310 million
USD.563 Clearly, Niue is extremely dependent on foreign aid, given that it represents
nearly two-thirds of the country’s GDP. The Cook Islands, whilst less dependent, still
receives foreign aid equivalent to nearly a tenth of its GDP. It also remains under fiscal
limitations controlling taxation and spending as part of a 1998 austerity package
negotiated with New Zealand and the Asian Development Bank.564 Under this agreement,
the Cook Islands has entered a unique position in which the Cook Islands economy is
strong enough to no longer need foreign aid, but policy limitations set by the aid granters
create an ongoing dependency.565
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High dependence on foreign aid severally limits a country’s ability to exercise its
sovereignty. Niue’s continued need for New Zealand aid requires an ongoing positive
relationship with New Zealand and at least theoretically prevents Niue from fully
exercising its sovereignty without fear of reprisal. The Cook Islands, with less economic
dependence, is in better shape in this regard but is still highly dependent. It does not,
however, seem that this economic dependence is a meaningful barrier to state
sovereignty. UN member state Sao Tome and Principe has a slightly higher GDP/ODA
ratio than Niue and around 30 states have higher ratios than the Cook Islands.566 As such,
economic dependence should not alone be considered a barrier to statehood. Given the
complete absence globally of solely self-sustaining economies, the limitations imposed
by foreign economic dependence are universal amongst otherwise sovereign states.

4.3.5 Monarchy
Being a part of an extraterritorial monarch’s realm also establishes limitations on
the exercise of national sovereignty. Though a state may have an otherwise fully
independent government, many states share a head of state. Whilst this may be a legally
distinct position between states, the person in this position is the same across most of the
former British Empire.
From 1874 until 2012, the monarch of the UK has officially held the traditional
title of Tui Viti of Fiji (Paramount Chief). This position has been largely symbolic since
Fiji became a republic in 1987. The position was dissolved in 2012 when the Great
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Council of Chiefs was officially disbanded. Despite this, symbols of the monarchy
remain throughout Fiji. Pre-2013 currency featuring the Queen remains in circulation, the
St Edward's Crown continues to be featured on badges of the military and the police, the
Union Jack remains part of the Fiji flag, and the military motto remains "Fear God and
honour the King/Queen". The Queen's Official Birthday remained a public holiday until
2013. Further, the current Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama proudly displays a portrait
of the Queen above his desk and has stated "I'm still loyal to the Queen. Many people are
in Fiji. One of the things I'd like to do is see her restored as our monarch, to be Queen of
Fiji again."567
Niue and the Cook Islands are today a part of the Realm of New Zealand with
Queen Elizabeth II, as head of state in her capacity as Queen of New Zealand. The
constitution of the Cook Islands recognises the position of Queen's Representative as
separate from the Governor-General of New Zealand. The Governor-General is limited in
role to only limited defence and foreign affairs functions. Niue's Constitution, in contrast,
has the Governor-General of New Zealand act as the Queen's representative. Though
officially a part of the Realm of New Zealand and indirectly subject to the NZ Royal
Succession Act 2013, the current relationship of the Monarchy is that of any part of the
Commonwealth realm.
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4.3.6 Military
For many nationalists across the world, a military is seen as the quintessential part
of the nation-state. Within many highly militarised countries, such as the United States,
supporting or celebrating the nation is often closely paired with military symbols. The
idea of a country without its own military is looked at as unthinkable. However, a number
of states actually lack a military.568 There does not appear to be any legal nor practical
requirement for sovereignty which requires a military.
As an alternative to having their own military, many states choose to allow other
states or regional consortiums to provide military defence. For example, Andorra has
treaties with Spain and France to provide defence, Kiribati receives defence assistance
from Australia and New Zealand under an informal agreement, and Australia is
responsible for Nauru's defence under a similar informal agreement. Likewise, under a
1962 Treaty of Friendship, New Zealand is responsible for the defence of Samoa. As with
Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ agreement with New Zealand, defence for the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia is the responsibility of the United States
under their respective compacts of free association. Within the Caribbean, several states
have adopted a consortium approach to defence. Under this, defence for Dominica,
Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is the responsibility of the
Regional Security System.569

568

Kathy Gilsinan, “Countries Without Militaries,” The Atlantic, November 11, 2014,

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/countries-without-militaries/382606/.
569

Ibid.

160

Furthermore, given the extremely small size of the militaries of many states, they
cannot be seen to be able realistically to defend their territory alone. For example,
Antigua and Barbuda have a total of 250 active and reserve members in its military.570 Its
mainland neighbour of Venezuela in comparison has a force of 115,000 active duty
members and 8,000 reservists.571 Should Venezuela have any desire to annex the islands,
they have clearly superior direct military might. As such, given their size and the needs of
the state, the Royal Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force function largely in a civil role
rather than having any meaningful ability to protect the island from invading forces.
Rather, Antigua and Barbuda participates in the Regional Security System and hosts U.S.
military presence. Even larger island nations, such as Fiji, still lack meaningful military
power to provide defence against most large state invaders; rather their military serves to
provide civil defence functions and to supply troops to the United Nations for
peacekeeping.
The absence of a military, though challenging to the popular conception of a state
has no meaningful effect on the legal status of the state. As more countries de-emphasise
their militaries, it is likely that this popular conception will start to fade.
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4.4

Nation Specific Issues

As well as the more general challenges small island states have in gaining
recognition of their sovereignty, the states in this paper each have several issues specific
to their situation.

4.4.1 Hawaiʻi
Hawaiʻi as the only nation in this paper without any meaningful external
recognition faces the most severe problems in exerting its position as a sovereign state
and thus dominates the remainder of this chapter. Since the fall of the Kingdom and the
later annexation by the United States, Hawaiʻi has not had an independent government.
One of the major divisions amongst supporters of a sovereign Hawaiʻi remains the
question of whether the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi continues to meaningfully exist. If so,
should Hawaiʻi be considered an occupied territory? The political and social
consequences of this divide are explored in detail in the following chapter. This
subsection looks at the issues and justifications related to restoring Hawaiʻi as a
sovereign state.

4.4.1.1 United States Occupation
Hawaiʻi is often presented as being under prolonged United States occupation.
Sovereignty activist Kauai, for example, suggests that Hawaiʻi was under US occupation
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from January 16, 1893 (overthrow) until December 13, 1893 (creation of the Provisional
Government) and again from August 12, 1898 (US annexation) to present.572
The first period of occupation occurred following the overthrow of Queen
Liliʻuokalani in 1893. The overthrow was conducted by a small group of insurgents with
support from the US military. The group formed a brief provisional government leading
to the formation of the Republic of Hawaii in 1894. It seems fairly unambiguous that this
period was one of US occupation. The ongoing situation is, however, much less clear.
In 1897, recently elected US President William McKinley negotiated a treaty with
the Republic of Hawaii to annex Hawaiʻi. Annexation had been amongst the goals of the
plotters, but previous US President Grover Cleveland was supportive of Queen
Liliʻuokalani and unwilling to accept annexation. The treaty of annexation was never
ratified by the US Senate due to the lobbying efforts of Hawaiʻi officials and a petition
from Native Hawaiians. It failed to be ratified, with 46 votes in favour out of 90 senators
(the US Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to support ratification). On July 4,
1898, the Newlands Resolution was passed by the US Congress and signed on July 7 by
President McKinley. This joint resolution annexed the Republic of Hawaii and created
the Territory of Hawaii.
Using a joint resolution allowed for the motion to pass, but it has been argued that
this is not a legal method by which a state can acquire territory. Chang notes that the only
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accepted ways for a state to acquire territory belonging to another state is through
conquest, prescription or by treaty.573 The United States has never claimed to have
acquired Hawaiʻi by conquest and prescription does not apply in this case.574 Given that a
treaty was not ratified, he argues that the United States cannot have legally acquired
Hawaiʻi through a joint resolution, and thus the US’s control of Hawaiʻi is that of
ongoing occupation.
The US Senate debate in 1898 surrounding the joint resolution shows that even at
the time, several senators had concerns regarding the viability of acquisition of foreign
territory by joint resolution.575 Senator Allen of Nebraska stated that it is “impossible for
the Government of the United States to reach across its boundary into the dominion of
another government and
annex that government or persons or property therein”576. Senator Spooner of Wisconsin
concurred stating that the “Joint Resolution itself, it is admitted, amounts to nothing so
far as carrying any effective force is concerned. It does not bring that country within our
boundaries. It does not consummate itself”.577 Other Senators also expressed concerns
related to the lack of mechanism for annexation by an act of Congress as well as concerns
of validity given that if accepted any country could claim another country through
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internal law.578 Senator Bacon of Georgia notes that if allowed, the Hawaiʻi legislature
would logically be able to “acquire the United States by a Joint resolution of its own.” 579
As Bacon argues, allowing the notion that any state can simply claim another state and
have that claim have legal force produces a clearly absurd result. The legally sound
approaches available to the US to annex Hawaiʻi were through a treaty with Hawaiʻi or
by conquest. Using internal law solely was untried then and has not been employed since
then580.
In support of using the joint resolution to acquire Hawaiʻi, Senator Stewart of
Nevada and Senator Foraker of Ohio presented arguments that were poorly received at
the time.581 Senator Stewart argued for essentially unlimited power to annex as they wish
with the only limit being the objection of the other state.582 When asked the hypothetical
of annexing England, he stated that a joint resolution could annex England provided
“England did not object”.583 Senator Allen then asked “But suppose the people of
England did object?” to which Senator Stewart responded, “Then we would have to fight
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for it”.584 He further stated “We can annex anything. But we do not suppose that
Congress is going to do those things. The fact that sovereign power exists implies that it
might be abused. It is not abused in this case because we know that the people of the
Sandwich Islands want to be annexed to this country.”585 He was essentially advocating a
“might makes right” theory with a half-hearted attempt at recognising some element of
consent of the people. Though clearly invalid under international law, this argument
seems to be the one which continues to be used to justify the taking of Hawaiʻi.
The other argument in favour of the resolution's validity is exceptionally
convoluted. Senator Foraker argued that since the resolution would dissolve Hawaiʻi as a
party to the agreement, it need not be a treaty.586 He notes that “people of Hawaii become
merged into the United States” and there ceases to be a distinct entity to enforce an
agreement.587 This argument did not gain much traction, and he later stated “We cannot
by a joint resolution annex Hawaiʻi … We can recite the fact that they have manifested a
willingness, as shown by the treaty which we had in mind when that joint resolution was
drafted to make a cession to us, but when we do not ratify the treaty, but do something
else, namely pass a joint resolution the transaction is not consummated until they agree to
it.”588
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Though it has occasionally been suggested that Hawaii’s acquisition is justified as
part of the Spanish-American War, Hawaiʻi was not a territory of Spain and was
officially neutral during the conflict.589 Thus, there does not exist a recognised legal basis
for it to be a wartime acquisition.
The use of the joint resolution to annex Hawaiʻi has been the subject of many of
the legally focused sovereignty activists. Chang argues that absent any mechanism by
which a joint resolution can acquire foreign territory (lacking a ratified treaty), then the
“Republic of Hawaiʿi never did pass dominion to the U.S”. He suggests that this break in
dominion invalidates the inclusion of Hawaiʻi islands in the Territory of Hawaii and later
the State of Hawaiʻi.590 Thus, “there was—according to U.S. law—nothing within the
Territory of Hawaiʿi[sic]” and “starting with the Organic Act, the Territory of
Hawaiʿi[sic] and the U.S. simply pretended, acting as if the Hawaiian Islands were within
the U.S.”.591 The Act of Admission (1959) defines the territory of the State of Hawaii to
include the islands, reefs, and waters of the Territory of Hawaii.592 The Territory of
Hawaii was defined under the Organic Act as “the islands acquired by the United States
of America under an Act of Congress entitled “Joint Resolution to provide for annexing
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the Hawaiian Islands to the United States”.593 This seems to create a chain wherein the
State of Hawaii is defined as including the islands of the Territory of Hawaii which itself
was defined as including the islands under the Joint Resolution.594 Chang suggests that
since the Joint Resolution was invalid, the subsequent acts that use its definition are also
invalid and result in a territory-less State of Hawaii.595 Further, he suggests that the
territory-less-ness of the Territory and State of Hawaii were known to the US
government, who intentionally chose to deceive the public into believing that the islands
of Hawaiʻi were the territory of the US.596 Thus, given an absence of legitimate authority,
the US’s effective control of Hawaiʻi constitutes an occupation.
Chang’s core legal analysis seems potentially sound. There does not appear to be
any mechanism under US law by which a joint resolution can annex foreign territory.
There, however, is a lack of political will to address this issue and a widespread
willingness to continue to ignore the constitutional issue. For example, when US
Supreme Court Justice Scalia was asked at a talk about the constitutional issue of
annexation via joint resolution, he stated that “there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits Congress from annexing a foreign state through the means of a joint
resolution”.597
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Chang’s description of a vast conspiracy to avoid exposure of the deficiencies to
the territoriality definitions seems to greatly undermine his credibility but may be very
useful in giving him power within sovereignty activism. As is seemingly common in
many writings on contentious sovereignty, he has chosen to adopt a style that allows for
an exciting narrative of conspiracy to which he is the only voice brave enough to expose
the truth rather than the far more likely explanation that the issue of the legitimacy of the
Joint Resolution for annexation is a relatively minor point of constitutional law in the
eyes of most politicians and government employees. Though in this case potentially
extremely significant, there is no reason to believe that any of the drafters of later
documents that he alleges are part of the conspiracy had any awareness of this issue. The
exact power of a joint resolution is not a subject that is well taught or an area of common
discussion outside of a subset of constitutional scholars. A lack of awareness rather than a
conspiracy seems a much more likely explanation. Furthermore, assuming that they were
aware of the issues, there is nothing other than convenience that prevented lawmakers
from including a map of Hawaiʻi as their definition rather than referencing previous acts
and completely eliminating the entire argument.
There is also the practical issue of how could the deficiency that Chang identifies
corrected. Attempts to challenge territorial jurisdiction in state courts have,
unsurprisingly, been unsuccessful. Even if we are to accept that the issues of the joint
resolution remain past the formation of the State of Hawaii, the remedy is largely a
political question rather than a legal one. Again, whilst the legal issues raised are both
largely unactionable, the ability to present a coherent legal justification for sovereignty is
highly appealing and useful for nationalists.
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4.4.1.2 Right of Conquest
The right of conquest through force was used globally by colonial powers as a
theoretical justification for seizing territory from indigenous people without their
consent.598 Conquest is defined as “‘an act of force by which, in time of war599, a
belligerent occupies a part or the whole of the territory of the enemy State with the
intention of extending its own national sovereignty over that territory’”.600 Until more
recently conquest was recognised as a valid method of obtaining territory, provided the
action was morally justified.601 This justification would not be well received today, given
that spreading religion, commerce, and civilisation were amongst the accepted supporting
reasons.602 Conquest under this model would convey a clear legal title to the conquered
territory (though obviously not a morally clear title).603
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The United States’ actions in Hawaiʻi raise the question: if a state effectively
takes another state by conquest, but refuses to call its taking “conquest”, is it still
acquisition by conquest? In the case of Hawaiʻi, armed members of another country took
over Hawaiʻi by force taking control of the territory and the government. The country of
which these combatants were citizens later took control of the state and incorporated it
within its borders eliminating any previous government. Further, they claimed their
actions were justified to protect the property and safety of American interests in Hawaiʻi.
Except in name, Hawaiʻi appears to be have been claimed by conquest.
Though after World War II the right of conquest has become codified as
unacceptable to the international community, the right was long a principle of
international law and a key part of the formation of many modern states.604 Considering
that it occurred prior to the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact (which recognised it as unlawful to
annex territory by force), there does not appear to be any legal barrier to the US claiming
Hawaiʻi as acquisition by conquest and in doing so largely terminating any remaining
legal claim to a sovereign Hawaiʻi. However, whilst it is extremely politically undesirable
for the US government to admit that their actions constituted an act of conquest, it very
much seems they are. It is important to note that in the case of Hawaiʻi, the US was
unable to make use of the theory of terra nullius (nobody's land).605 Terra nullius refers
to the idea that unowned territory is available to be claimed by a state.606 This theory
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posits that only nation-states can own territory. Thus, any territory that is not owned by a
nation-state is unowned.607 During the colonial period, only the territory of “‘civilized’
and recognizable governments” was seen as being capable of exerting territorial
sovereignty.608 This justification was used by Western powers to seize much of the world;
they argued that, while the land was occupied, it was not by a government that was
recognisable and was thus “up for grabs”.609 This appalling legal fiction, however, could
not be applied in Hawaiʻi as the United States (along with several other recognised states)
had established diplomatic relations with Hawaiʻi thus asserting that Hawaiʻi, possessed a
recognisable government.

4.4.1.3 Citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi
Many Hawaiian Sovereignty activists go to great lengths to explain that
citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was open, inclusive and not racially based. Prior
to the 1887 Bayonet Constitution, race was not used as part of the criteria for citizenship,
but rather allegiance was the major criteria.610 It was not until the Bayonet Constitution
that American conceptions of race, particularly anti-Chinese views, were imposed on
Hawaiʻi allowing race to become a part of the citizenship process.611 Following the
overthrow, the citizenship model became even more exclusionary and more racially
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based.612 The model that is currently used for legally identifying Hawaiians is based upon
these later race-based conceptions rather than the models of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi613.
Kauai argues that given the absence of a treaty of annexation, “Hawaiian
sovereignty was never extinguished and continues to remain intact today”.614 He suggests
that Hawaiʻi is under US occupation and should be subject to the obligations of an
occupying power under Hague Convention615 Kauai interprets this to mean that the US’s
allowing of Americans to settle in Hawaiʻi and the granting of citizenship to those born in
Hawaiʻi is an actionable violation of international law.616 He suggests that as a result only
those who can trace ancestry to a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi prior to the US
occupation can be considered a Hawaiian national.617 Thus according to his estimates,
306,000 people of 1.4 million residing in Hawaiʻi can be considered Hawaiʻi nationals
and the rest aliens.618
This narrow view of citizenship in a new Hawaiʻi significantly hinders
sovereignty attempts by removing the majority of Hawaiʻi from being able to participate
fully in the process. If we are to assume that the way forward for Hawaiian sovereignty is
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through a democratic process (as opposed to an unlikely legal victory or the essentially
impossible armed rebellion), it establishes a significant obstacle from the start. It asks
voters to support a platform that will result in a choice between uprooting their lives and
leaving Hawaiʻi or being disenfranchised. This creates an extremely difficult sales pitch
in asking for people to go against their own self-interests in order to correct an injustice
from over a hundred years ago. Even amongst many staunchly pro-sovereignty nonHawaiians, citizenship remains a point of passionate disagreement. In many ways, it
seems that an obsession with building a legal case through international law has
distracted activists from what is morally right and politically advantageous.

4.4.1.4 Advantages of being part of the United States
One of the biggest obstacles to Hawaiian sovereignty is the practical advantages
of being a part of the United States. There are a number of resources that Hawaiʻi has
gained through US occupation which provide a powerful disincentive to asserting
sovereignty. Being a part of the United States seems to have been advantageous to the
economy of Hawaiʻi and its development. With a per-capita GDP of $55,598USD,
Hawaiʻi dwarfs the economic output of any other state in Oceania. The next highest is
Palau (which has a Compact of Free Association with the US) with a per-capita GDP of
$16,300USD, less than a third of that of Hawaiʻi. In terms of human development
metrics, Hawaiʻi likewise exceeds those of the rest of the region (though it still struggles
compared with much of the US). Given that many other states in the region have similar
natural resources and similar small island state challenges, the major differentiating factor
seems to be the United States’ control of Hawaiʻi. A study of 25 dependent and 30
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independent small islands found that the dependent islands did significantly better in
most economic and development metrics than independent small islands states.619
Many of those from Hawaiʻi also benefit greatly from their US citizenship.
Thirty-five per cent of people born in Hawaiʻi live elsewhere in the United States.620
Without jus soli citizenship in the United States, many of these people would be subject
to a convoluted immigration system rendering a significant portion unable to live in the
United States. In world travel, US occupation of Hawaiʻi is likewise very useful. By
virtue of US citizenship, the people of Hawaiʻi gain access to a US passport. The US
passport is widely considered one of the most useful passports.621 It allows visa-free
access to 154 countries with preferred status for many others.622 In comparison, Fiji, as is
typical of small island states, has visa-free access to only 75 countries.623 The ease of
movement that Hawaiʻi residents enjoy is directly connected to their being a part of the
United States.
Further, given the militarily strategic location of Hawaiʻi in the Pacific, it would
have likely been of great interest to a multitude of world powers. The Kingdom of
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Hawaiʻi had little military strength of its own, as demonstrated by its brief occupation by
the British in the Paulet Affair, the Sacking of Honolulu by the French, and the eventual
overthrow of the Kingdom. It is highly likely that if the US had not taken over Hawaiʻi,
another state would have.624 Alternatively, it is possible that the Kingdom would have
entered into a protectorate style arrangement with another state, but even in this scenario,
considerable sovereignty is lost.
US occupation, however, has not been without disadvantages, particularly for
Native Hawaiians. They are dramatically overrepresented amongst those with health
issues625, in poverty626, and educational problems627. Further, they have seen considerable
efforts to intentionally destroy their cultural identity, disenfranchise them and rob them of
their traditional land rights.628
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Despite these issues, the people of Hawaiʻi overall do have a higher standard of
living than most other small island states in the region. Though it is impossible to tell
what the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi would have built had it been left alone, it does seem likely
that Hawaii’s elevated position compared to the rest of the region is in large part due to
its being in the United States. This creates a significant barrier in motivating people to
fight for their nation’s sovereignty when the alternative is mostly personally
advantageous.

4.4.2 Niue
Niue has an exceptional small population and a rather tiny territory. It remains
economically and logistically fully dependent on New Zealand. As a result of these
factors, Niue’s sovereignty is often ignored or treated as a technicality. As the previous
sections have demonstrated Niue can and should be considered a sovereign state under
the accepted conventions of international law. However, despite the fairly compelling
evidence for sovereignty, many treat Niue as if it were still a territory of New Zealand.
Maps will often depict Niue as “Niue (NZ)” in the same way they style territories.
Similarly, many NGOs continue to group Niue into New Zealand in reports. Socially,
even amongst those who are aware of Niue’s existence, its sovereignty is often ignored.
Compared with Hawaii’s much messier legal challenges to sovereignty (and of course the
fact that it remains claimed by another state), Niue’s barriers to sovereignty are mostly
world acceptance of a situation that many are indifferent towards.

4.4.2.1 “Apathy/Contentment”
One of the biggest issues for Niuean sovereignty is simply a lack of attention to
visibly asserting its sovereignty. There is little direct advantage to challenging the status
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quo, and there is a variety of more pressing matters for the government and people of
Niue to address. As Billig argues in regard to banal nationalism, for most established
nations, there is little need for overt displays of nationalism. The fact that a place is a
nation is a part of the fabric of daily life. Given an absence of competing claims629 (such
as there are in Hawaiʻi), there is little practical reason to expend considerable effort in
attempting to prove that you are sovereign. Fighting against the small and ultimately
insignificant examples where Niue is incorrectly described as part of New Zealand would
be very labour intensive with little of value actually gained from the efforts.
On the other side, there is also a lack of attention towards Niue from other
countries. Its size and absence of geopolitical or economic significance place it extremely
low on most other countries’ diplomatic priority list. Given that it lacks even a UN vote
with which to bargain, there is little reason for other states to justify the time investment
of meaningful diplomatic relations. Even for a large state that has the resources to build
diplomatic relations with every small sovereign state, Niue’s size and lack of political
utility greatly limit any return the large state would gain. Though some have interpreted
this prioritisation as a statement on sovereignty, this seems to be incorrect.
The current arrangement is also quite beneficial for Niueans, they maintain their
sovereignty, but also gain considerable advantages through their relationship with New
Zealand. The ambiguity of the situation remains largely in their favour. They remain able
to take advantage of the benefits of New Zealand, but since New Zealand accepts their
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sovereignty and other states seem indifferent, they are able to express their sovereignty in
areas that matter to them.

4.4.2.2 Connection to New Zealand
As discussed previously, the free association agreement between Niue and New
Zealand binds the two states together in a special relationship. The agreement has New
Zealand providing financial support, some administrative assistance, and defence; and
they previously managed virtually all foreign affairs. All of these services are provided
on Niue’s behalf with the full consent of the Niuean government. Niueans also receive
New Zealand citizenship.
Niue is extremely dependent on New Zealand. All flights into the country are
from New Zealand (1-2 times a week from Auckland), and as a result, it supplies the vast
majority of tourists (which in turn provides much of the GDP of the island). New Zealand
also provides most of the materials used by the government for school-based education
and public health campaigns. The Niuean legal and health system also relies heavily upon
New Zealand.
Unlike the free association agreements that several states have with the United
States630, the agreement between Niue and New Zealand is fairly one-sided. Niue benefits
disproportionately from the arrangement. New Zealand’s major reward, beyond the
general benefits of supporting a safe and prosperous region, is the fulfilment of colonialera obligations. As a leading force in the decolonisation movement, Niue’s status as a
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New Zealand colony was politically embarrassing to New Zealand. However, the
complete abandonment of the island would have been economically disastrous for Niue
and not within the spirit of New Zealand's general positions towards Oceania. Free
association provided a compromise that allowed New Zealand to decolonise but did not
harm the people of Niue.
New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade describes the relationship
with Niue as “different from full independence” noting that New Zealand “provides
necessary economic and administrative assistance, and is responsible for Niue's defence
and surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).”631 The Associate-Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Joe Walding described the relationship to Parliament on the eve of
Niue’s independence as a “new period of partnership on a basis of equality”.632 He
further notes that “Niue will take its place as a full member of the South Pacific Forum
along with other independent and self-governing states”.633 Given New Zealand's actual
handling of Niue in practice as a fully sovereign state, these statements leave
considerable ambiguity in regards to what makes the relationship cause Niue to be
“different from full independence”.
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4.4.2.3 Size
Niue’s extremely small size creates challenges in gaining recognition, particularly
in the popular imagination. For many, it just feels “too small to be a real country”. The
entire nation of Niue is dwarfed by most towns elsewhere. Even most medium to large
organisation such as schools or universities will be several times the size of Niue. Though
there does not appear to be anything that requires a sovereign state to be a certain size, it
remains difficult to get people to look beyond their preconceptions of what a state should
look like.

4.4.3 Cook Islands
The Cook Islands remains in a somewhat ambiguous situation. Its relatively small
size and special relationship to New Zealand has led some to question its sovereignty. It
does, however, appear to meet the criteria of both the declarative theory and the
constitutive theory; and in nearly every way functions as a sovereign state. In many ways,
the fact that there is even any question about its sovereignty seems to be an artefact of a
stubbornness to accept the sovereignty of a country that does not quite look like is
expected.

4.4.3.1 Connection to New Zealand
Though the Cook Islands is relatively small, it is not excessively so being
comfortably in the middle of the small island state sizes. The issue that most challenges
the Cook Islands sovereignty is its connection to New Zealand. As recognised by a 2001
joint declaration signed by the Prime Ministers of both New Zealand and the Cook
Islands, New Zealand maintains “some residual responsibility for the external affairs and
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defence of the Cook Islands”.634 This, however, confers“ no rights of control to the New
Zealand Government and can only be acted on at the request of and on behalf of the
Government of the Cook Islands”.635 The declaration also notes that “In the conduct of its
foreign affairs, the Cook Islands interacts with the international community as a
sovereign and independent state.”636 Cook Islanders, however, do remain New Zealand
citizens and the Cook Islands remains a part of the Realm of New Zealand.

4.4.3.2 Tourism
Tourism remains one of the largest and most profitable industries for the Cook
Islands. Its political closeness to New Zealand is used strategically to make the Cook
Islands feel less intimidating and more accessible to tourists, yet at the same time exotic.
The way in which the Cook Islands presents its national identity is also very heavily
shaped by tourism’s demands of authenticity. Any attempt at changing the ways in which
the Cook Islands exercises its sovereignty could be seriously limited by a desire to avoid
negatively impacting the tourism industry of the islands.

4.4.4 Fiji
As a United Nations member-state, Fiji has by far the least ambiguous
sovereignty situation of the nations in this dissertation. It clearly meets the criteria under
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both the declarative theory and the constitutive theory. Fiji’s main concerns relating to
sovereignty are related to its small size and lack of geopolitical power.

4.4.4.1

Commonwealth

Though Niue and the Cook Islands participate in Commonwealth activities
through New Zealand, only Fiji of the countries in this dissertation is itself a member of
the Commonwealth. Headed by Queen Elizabeth II, the Commonwealth is an
intergovernmental organisation formed primarily of states that were previously a part of
the British Empire. Participation in the commonwealth is voluntary. The Commonwealth
emphasises this point, noting that “when countries had recently achieved their
independence from the UK, it was important for them to stress the change in their
relationship, from dependent status to equal partnership.”637 Nevertheless, membership
and the benefit of participating in the program are used to support the goals of the
Commonwealth states. Fiji’s membership in the Commonwealth was suspended as a
punishment for failing to restore democracy as quickly as the Commonwealth
demanded.638 Their membership was reinstated following the 2014 elections.639 Though
countries are theoretically equal within the commonwealth, many have seen Fiji’s
suspension from the Commonwealth (in 2000 and 2006) as another example of Australia
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and New Zealand exerting its power over Fiji. Fiji joined the Non-Aligned Movement640
shortly after its suspension from the Commonwealth, which some have described as a
protest of another nation’s bullying.

4.4.4.2

Breaches of Sovereign Territory

In addition to the complications of economic sovereignty and globalisation that
are the most significant direct threats to Fiji’s sovereignty, Fiji has also alleged that there
have been a few recent direct breaches of their sovereignty.
Fiji accused Tonga of breaching its sovereignty when Tonga extracted Lieutenant
Colonel Tevita Uluilakeba Mara in 2012.641 Charges of sedition and attempted mutiny
were pending in Fiji against Mara when he was “rescued” from Fijian waters by a
Tongan Patrol boat.642 Mara and the Tongan government claim Mara was fishing off of
Kedavu island when he found himself in trouble and put out a distress call.643 They state
that a Tongan Patrol boat was coincidently nearby and was able to rescue him.644 Once on
board, he requested that he be brought to Nuku'alofa to seek the protection of the Tongan
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crown.645 The Tongan government has denied any involvement in any planned escape
attempt of Mara’s.646 Fijian and New Zealand maritime authorities, however, state that
they did not receive a distress signal.647 Additionally, Tonga is over 700km from Kedavu
island. Mara was a significant part of the 2006 coup, the commander of Fiji’s biggest
military regiment and was close to PM Bainimarama.648 There were a variety of rumours
about the reasons for his falling out with Bainimarama including financial irregularities
and sexual improprieties.649 Since fleeing to Tonga, Mara has been publishing videos
speaking out against Bainimarama.650 These videos have been embraced by foreign
media and anti-Bainimarama social media sources.651 It has been speculated that Mara’s
escape and Tonga’s involvement may have been supported by Australia to assert pressure
on Bainimarama.
In the immediate aftermath of the May 1987 coup, the Australian government
initially sought to use the Australian military to extract the deposed Fijian Prime

645

Ibid.

646

Ibid.

647

Ibid.

648

Graham Davis, “#25 THE KING AND I : A PACIFIC INTRIGUE,” accessed April 23, 2016,

http://www.grubsheet.com.au/busbies-monocles-and-betrayal-a-south-seas-tale/.
649

Crosbie Walsh, “Ratu Tevita Mara Flees Fiji: Why and What Effects?,” Iji: The Way It Was, Is

and Can Be (blog), May 16, 2011, http://crosbiew.blogspot.com/2011/05/ratu-tevita-mara-flees-fiji-whyand.html.
650

Davis, “#25 THE KING AND I.”

651

Ibid.

185

Minister, Timoci Bavadra.652 The Chief of Australian Defence Force, General Peter
Gration, opposed the plan owing to logistical challenges.653 There was also a proposal to
assist in transporting Fijian military personnel stationed in the Middle East to Fiji to
retake the islands under the command of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces commander,
who was visiting Australia at the time of the coup.654 Lacking the support of New
Zealand and noting the popularity of the coup in Fiji, they dropped the plans to intervene
directly.655 They did, however, go forth with a plan to provide for the potential
evacuation of the Australian nationals residing in Fiji.656 From May 20 until June 7,
Australia had several Navy vessels, including two warships and an amphibious landing
ship, off of the Fijian coast.657 The ships were initially docked in Fiji under diplomatic
clearance which expired on May 18th.658 Australia moved the ships outside Fiji's
territorial waters on May 20th after the Fijian government ordered them to depart. As the
situation in Fiji never escalated to the point where military aided evacuation was
necessary, Australia did not make direct use of these ships.659 The Australian military
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maintains that any evacuation efforts would be done with the cooperation of the Fijian
military and had no intention of challenging them militarily.660 Though some analysts
have stated that Australia's deployment would not have been sufficient to challenge Fiji
military661, Australia's military presence would have been intimidating, and given the
disparity in armament and naval resources, quite possibly sufficient for limited hostile
actions. It is reasonable to believe that for Australia's interest in Fiji, serving as an
intimidating presence rather than actually engaging in hostilities best serves Australia. It
is further concurring that Australia would even draw up serious plans to support a
military invasion of another sovereign nation.
Australia returned once more to Fijian waters in the build-up to the 2006 coup as
Operation Quickstep.662 Again the stated purpose of the operation was to allow for the
evacuation of Australian nationals with the cooperation of the Fijian government.663 This
operation gained significant attention following the crash of a military helicopter killing
two Australians.664 Though the mission was officially to be carried out only with the
cooperation of the Fijian military, the mere presence of the Australian military
immediately outside of Fijian waters created pressure. Fijian officials also accused
Australia of breaching its sovereignty by sending people Fiji alleged were mercenaries or
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Australian police along with weapons onto Fijian soil.665 The Australian Defence
Department later stated that they were most likely Australian Defence Force personnel
assigned to provide additional security for the Australian diplomatic missions.666
These incidents could be seen as examples of a global trend of countries failing to
respect the sovereignty of less powerful states. Australia, in particular, has been
repeatedly accused of pushing around smaller countries in the region; Timor-Leste
described Australia as a “bully state”.667 Its government minister, Agio Pereira, expressed
this common sentiment stating, “Australia is a powerful country; it's a very rich country
in this region. And sometime when you are really powerful, you think that you can do
everything you like.”668 The commander of Fiji's Land Force, Colonel Pita Driti,
described Australia's policy in the Pacific as "Sheer ignorance, or hegemonic shoving of
big brother policies down our throats".669 Even for well recognised sovereign states,
foreign interference can restrict a state’s actual autonomy.

4.5

Political Will

Within a discussion of sovereignty, the concept of political will is of great
importance. Political will is the desire of a government to carry through a policy. Though
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a government may officially agree with a concept (such as one of international law) in
principle, actually carrying out their obligations under it remains subject to their current
desires. It is not unusual in international diplomacy for a state to form agreements around
broad (and generally vague) concepts, such as human rights, but be unwilling to actually
enact or enforce meaningful applications.
As well as needing the political will to incorporate international law into domestic
law, states must also have the political will to enforce their agreements between states. As
awful as it seems, within actual applications of international law “might makes right”
often functions as the dominant paradigm. There are a number of countries, notably the
United States and Russia, which have undertaken actions that seem to be very clear
breaches of international law for which no meaningful action is taken in response whilst
smaller states will more frequently (though still far from universally) be held to account.
The International Criminal Court, for example, has been frequently criticised by African
leaders for having focused near exclusively upon situations in African countries despite
its global mandate.670
The role of political will in the application of international law has created a
situation that is very different from domestic law. Barring a significant miscarriage of
justice, domestic law is generally respected in most developed nations. It is reasonable to
expect that if a crime or civil wrong has been committed the victims will eventually be
able to receive justice, at least in theory. The actual applications of international law, in
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contrast, can be as much about diplomacy as it is about the law itself. In many cases,
clear wrongs have occurred, but there is no meaningful ability to handle the wrong, or the
application of sanctions for the wrongdoing is judged to result in greater detriment to
various interests. Though these decisions are increasingly now framed within
international law principles, it often seems that decisions were made, and only then legal
principles were found and stretched to serve the political goals of the involved groups.
As such even if claims such as that of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement can be
determined to be morally and legally correct, they remain largely meaningless without a
political will to respect the claim. States in deciding if they wish to support the Hawaiian
sovereignty movement must accept the enormity that the decision to directly challenge
the United States entails. Whilst Hawaiʻi has some military utility (though increasingly
limited), and support for Hawaiian sovereignty could be politically useful as a way to
deliberately show a willingness to challenge the US, there lacks any compelling strategic
reason for a state to support Hawaiian sovereignty given the immediate threat of US
response. A sovereign Hawaiʻi is unlikely to become a meaningful enough trade partner
to justify losing the US market; nor would it likely command enough political power to
be a useful international ally. Even its utility for military operations in the Pacific is
rapidly dwindling as long-range ships and planes become more common. Calculated
foreign support for Hawaiian sovereignty in any meaningful form would likely only come
as part of an otherwise politically justified campaign against the United States. For
example, in the scenario of China declaring war on the United States, support for a
sovereign Hawaiʻi might suit Chinese interests in causing domestic chaos, as part of an
attempt to gain limited moral authority in supporting Native rights, or to protect the
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sizable Chinese population in Hawaiʻi. With a likely “best case” scenario of Hawaiʻi
being a pawn in an international power play significant international support for Hawaii’s
international law claims cannot be expected.
Furthermore, support for a sovereign Hawaiʻi also requires states to face their
own mistreatment of Native peoples. Most states, at least at some level, were built upon
land that previously belonged to Native peoples taken without their consent. Even
relatively progressive states would require fairly radical changes in their own Native
policies to be able to unhypocritical mirror what Hawaiian sovereignty would grant to
Hawaiians. The world looks to be a long way away from this ultra-radical reform.
It seems that amongst many Hawaiian sovereignty activists a misconception exists
that international law functions as domestic law will in its general compliance. They
appear to believe that if the law is on their side, they will be victorious. Rather, in
practice, states frequently ignore international law when doing so matches their political
agendas. International law lacks any sort of meaningful enforcement body that would
compel states to honour their agreements should they choose to ignore them for political
reasons. This political reality is often overlooked (intentionally or otherwise) with
sovereignty activists presenting their international law arguments as if there were a
magical formula that summons justice. Though an ultimately flawed understanding of
international law, this belief in magical justice can be useful for the sovereignty
movement. Claims of legal superiority, even if false, misleading, or unenforceable, can
be powerful tools in shifting public opinion and political will. As a narrative of justice
reflecting the arguments of sovereignty activists gains traction, they gain power. The
saying of “trying a case in the court of public opinion” is particularly pertinent when we
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look at cases like these which are ultimately political questions and only secondarily legal
questions. If sovereignty activists can convince the public that they are correct (even
when their interpretation of international law is misleading and highly convenient), they
are able to sway the political will of the voters (and with it the government) to support
their position.
Similarly, Niue and the Cook Islands biggest problem seems to be a lack of
political will to take any action. Ignoring the two states is in many ways the safest bet for
most politicians and governments. Though both groups’ ethnic populations have become
meaningful voting blocs in New Zealand, inaction along with continued ambiguity best
serves most of the voters. Whilst most are quite proud of their island identity and heritage
opposing any sort of annexation, they also benefit greatly from the special relationship
with New Zealand. Globally, Niue and the Cook Islands have so little geopolitical or
economic power, expending any meaningful political effort on their behalf would be of
limited utility. This, however, can quickly shift as other states start to find the utility of
having small states available for bargaining671.
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Though in many ways international law is very high-minded and idealistic, it is
ultimately highly subject to the political will of the states. Whilst actions are increasingly
being taken to protect the rule of law even with minimal direct self-benefit to other states,
it remains a fairly uncommon and recent phenomenon. This phenomenon, however, is
being increasingly used by nationalists. They attempt to shape the issues around
sovereignty as unambiguous cases in which international law clearly supports their
positions. They play upon the public’s conception of law as overall just and enforceable.
International law is presented as simply another set of laws that a country must follow
without question. In doing so, activists are able to actually shift the political will of the
state in such a way as to see meaningful change. Though it is too early to determine if
these efforts will actually be successful, they remain a promising avenue for their
supporters.

4.6

Conclusions

Though fundamentally a legal term, sovereignty has become a critical part of
nationalism across the world. Sovereignty typically provides a concrete goal for
nationalists, which is a sovereign nation-state. It represents an, at least theoretically,
achievable outcome and an idea that must be protected once established. Threats to the
nation are presented as threats to the sovereign state and vice versa. Sovereignty is also
useful as a less intimidating way to frame nationalistic rhetoric. Radical overt nationalism
is often concerning for the public, but when framed within the context of selfdetermination and preserving sovereignty, it can be much more readily received. Modern
nationalists seem to have embraced the notion that for a strong nation they must have a
sovereign state, not just in practice, but also in law.
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International law and legal sovereignty have become, in many ways, the dominant
language of pro-sovereignty activists in democratic states. It provides a framework under
which radical change is theoretically possible. Activists see the previously unthinkable
peaceful transition of former colonial states into independent countries, seemingly guided
largely by idealistic principles of international law, and wish the same for their nation.
The sort of armed hot nationalistic fight for independence that for much of the world long
defined nationalism and the struggles for sovereignty is largely unworkable today. The
military power differential between emerging nations and their holders are too great, and
the public has lost its appetite for armed independence struggles. Politics and the courts
seem today to be the tool of choice. Even when the law is not meaningfully on their side,
many nationalists have developed incredibly creative ways to suggest that they are in the
right morally and legally and with it try to move the political will of both their state and
the larger world community.
Hawaiʻi has been fighting for sovereignty since the Kingdom was overthrown. It
provides the most significant motivator and goal for Hawaiian nationalists: the restoration
of the Hawaiian Kingdom. This struggle is increasingly one of shaping public opinion so
as to convince people that this is both the correct course of action and is possible.
Attempts to build a legal case for sovereignty using the framework of international law
and even the less successful efforts to establish a restored state provide by far the most
viable way for nationalists to accomplish their goals.
Fiji is increasingly seeing use of the global conversation of what sovereignty
means and how native rights should interact with the sovereign nation. This conversation
largely assumes an ongoing struggle for Native peoples’ self-determination, minority
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status, a lack of political power and mass-land theft. By and large, iTaukei have not faced
these challenges, which has placed them in a fairly different position than their
contemporaries. Sovereignty and self-determination though have become a convenient
way of talking about nationalism in an environment in which the government is actively
trying to discourage ethnonationalism in favour of a unified civic nationalism.
The Cook Islands and Niue struggle with the challenge of their sovereignty being
unaccepted in the popular space, despite clearly meeting the legal standards for it. This
gap shows the challenge that many nationalists fighting for sovereignty have neglected.
Even when the law and other nations support you, this still does not always translate into
acceptance of your nation.
Across these nations, sovereignty, and particularly the legal frameworks it
provides, serves as an extremely useful tool for nationalists. It gives the impression of an
objective factual criteria for answering what is ultimately a political question built by
public and world opinion. The following chapters explore the ways in which nationalism
(and with-it public opinion in favour of sovereignty) is being developed both through
traditional hot nationalism and, perhaps more influentially, everyday nationalism.
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Chapter 5

5

Hot Nationalism
Hot nationalism is the form in which nationalism is typically imagined. It is active

and “in-your-face”. It is a representation of “social disruption” and struggle. Hot
nationalism is an extremely powerful force that may call on people to commit incredible
action on behalf of their nation. This chapter looks at how hot nationalism is expressed in
four nations, none of which seem to match the expected model.
Though it is often presented as a clear dichotomy, it should be recognised that the
line between hot nationalism and everyday nationalism is extremely fluid. As Jones and
Merriman argue, hot nationalism generally underlies the expression of everyday
nationalism. This chapter focuses upon hot nationalism by looking at the organised and
semi-organised nationalist movements occurring within the four nations. Whilst the
groups of interest focus primarily on hot nationalist style actions, it is becoming
increasingly common that groups will manipulate everyday nationalism, intentionally or
not, to match their agenda. As there is considerable bleed-over between hot nationalism
and everyday nationalism, there is also bleed-over between this chapter and the following
chapter, which focuses on the subtler forms of nationalism.
Hot nationalism within modern Oceania has been fairly rare. When it has
occurred, it has generally been isolated short-lived flare-ups as part of larger longrunning issues. With the exception of Tonga, all of the nations in the region are former
colonies of a Western power. Through the colonial experiences of each differed
considerably, they remain shaped by their occupation. Fiji, Cook Islands and Niue were
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previously colonies of Great Britain. Hawaiʻi was a territory of the United States for 61
years until it was absorbed as a state. It was also previously briefly occupied by France
and Great Britain. The expression of hot nationalism in these nations has reflected this
legacy.

5.1

Hawai'i

Hot nationalism within Hawaiʻi is almost exclusively centred around the
Hawaiian sovereignty movement. This movement is founded upon the notion that the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was a legal and/or moral wrong that needs to be
corrected. The movement, however, is extremely fractured with little agreement on most
issues. Some activists focus largely upon the right of indigenous peoples for selfdetermination, whilst others see it is a non-racial issue of restoring a government that was
unjustly overthrown. Still, others see it as a largely modern issue focused around building
a nation that represents today’s Hawai'i. Perhaps the only commonality amongst the prosovereignty groups is an assertion that the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was
illegal and has established an injustice that needs to be corrected. There is little
agreement upon the appropriate methods to correct the wrong nor the desired outcome.
Further, there is even a lack of consensus on the question of whether the Kingdom of
Hawaiʻi still meaningfully exists.
This section looks at hot nationalism in Hawai'i by dividing it into actions and
desired outcomes. The actions sub-section explores the functional ways in which hot
nationalism is being expressed in Hawai'i. The subsequent sub-section looks at the
various outcomes Hawaiian nationalists are seeking through their nationalist efforts. This
division reflects the common divide presented in the patriotism vs nationalism debate, in
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which nationalism is framed in terms of action and consequences whilst patriotism is
presented in terms of ideology.

5.1.1 Actions
Hot nationalism is marked by its focus on action. Whilst everyday nationalism
can be subtle and unconscious, hot nationalism is active and very visible. It is important
to note that of the methods that are functioning in Hawai'i, none really match the level of
intensity that Billig uses to contrast hot nationalism from banal nationalism672. However,
they do represent something that is clearly different from banal or everyday nationalism.
There is nothing subtle about the ways in which Hawaiian nationalism is expressed. The
methods described in this section are the efforts of organised nationalist groups that are
engaging in these intentional non-subtle actions. Though largely lacking the intensity
implied by hot nationalism, they have a lot more in common with hot nationalism than
what could be considered banal/everyday/soft nationalism. McVeigh’s dichotomy of
“hard” and “soft” nationalism captures this somewhat in allowing hard nationalism to
represent nationalism beyond the “taken-for-granted”. He, however, largely applies the
negativity and otherness of extreme nationalism that Billig argues against. Given these
limitations in describing nationalism using existing definitions, it thus seems appropriate
that hot nationalism for a nation like Hawai'i should be considered to include the nonsubtle organised actions of nationalists. The rest of this sub-section looks at three ways in
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which this form of hot nationalism is being expressed in Hawai'i and then explores how
violence and armed resistance, both hallmarks of hot nationalism, are largely absent.

5.1.1.1 Legal Challenges
Whilst traditionally the courts have not generally been seen as a significant tool of
nationalism, it should not be surprising that it is now being used as one. Given that in
modern conflicts, issues are increasingly settled in court rather than on a battlefield, the
courts have become a frequent tool of sovereignty activists across the world. In Hawaiʻi,
there have been several attempts to force state courts to indirectly rule upon Hawaiian
sovereignty. These cases generally attempt to get the courts to find that the defendants
should be relieved of their liability because the State of Hawaii has no jurisdiction over
them since they are citizens of a still existent sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i. Regardless
of the legal merits of the cases (which are often dependent on fairly tortured
interpretations of the law), they are fundamentally problematic in asking for an outcome
that the court is unable to actually provide673. Despite the routine failure of the cases,
sovereignty activists cling to the court’s acceptance of minor points of judicial
proceedings as supporting their cause. The courts, however, have been reluctant to
directly rule on the continued existence of the Kingdom of Hawai'i preferring to rely
upon other reasons to dismiss the arguments. The cases are frequently fairly messy, with
defendants attempting a variety of arguments in the hope that one of them “sticks”.
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non-existent is logically and legally impossible.
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State v. Lorenzo and Nishitani v. Baker provide two cases that typify the
Hawaiian nationalist use of the legal system. In State v. Lorenzo, Anthony Lorenzo was
charged with several counts related to an automobile accident he was involved in. He
sought to have the case dismissed as “the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with
the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a
citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai`i have no jurisdiction
over him”. The trial court dismissed his claims finding that the continued existence of the
Kingdom and his citizenship in it would not pre-empt nor preclude jurisdiction in the
criminal matter before the court. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Nishitani v. Baker saw a similar finding. Nishitani v. Baker involved an attempt to
enforce promissory notes and mortgages. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of
the court under a similar argument to that of Lorenzo. The appeals court found the case
and the land under which the case was about to be under the jurisdiction of State of
Hawaii. These cases, along with several others including State v. French and State v. Lee,
have established that individuals remain subject to the state court's’ jurisdiction
regardless of their claims to not be citizens of the state.
Direct legal challenges to the occupation of Hawai'i have also been completely
unsuccessful. One of the most prominent recent examples, Sai v Obama, et al. saw
sovereignty activist Sai naming President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Governor Linda Lingle and Admiral Robert
Willard of the US Pacific Command as defendants wherein he asked the court to declare
the 1898 Joint Resolution which annexed Hawai'i to be a violation of Hawaiian
sovereignty and unconstitutional under US law. He also attempted to include as
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defendants the ambassadors of 35 countries which have what he claims are illegal
consulates in Hawai'i. The court dismissed the case finding that any ruling on the matter
was barred by the political question doctrine674.
In contrast to the above cases (which were largely doomed from the start), Hawaii
v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs provided one of the best hopes for a legal victory for limited
Hawaiian sovereignty and one of the few exceptions to the above-mentioned pattern.
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs was a United States Supreme Court case that asked
the court to address the issue of the State of Hawaii selling land obtained from the
overthrow of the Kingdom in light of the 1993 Apology Resolution.675 Despite much
activist optimism, the Court ruled against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), finding
the apology resolution did not confer any additional rights. Though this case addressed a
fairly narrow portion of the wrongs created by the overthrow and a finding in favour of
OHA would have had little direct effect on much of Hawai'i, it was hoped that an OHA
success would establish a legal precedent for the reclaiming of stolen land.
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Despite the routine failure of the cases and the apparently unrecognised irony in
attempting to have occupier’s courts rule against their own occupation, the courts have
been a favourite tool in recent years for expressing Hawaiian nationalism. The cases
become a rallying point for activists who despite the record of failure seem to keep
holding out hope that a court will eventually accept their argument.

5.1.1.2 Attempts to use International law
As discussed in the previous chapter, several groups have attempted to gain
support for their efforts by employing international law. Starting with the legitimate legal
wrong of the unlawful overthrow of the Kingdom, these groups attempt highly
questionable and often blatantly spurious legal arguments in an effort to get other nations
and global groups, such as the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, to
intervene. These efforts have met with predictably little success and completely ignore
the political will of the groups they are petitioning, in favour of unique interpretations of
international law principles.
Also characteristic of the attempts of Hawaiian sovereignty activists to make use
of international law is the practice of over-interpreting minor portions of responses in
ways that favour their cause significantly beyond the meaning the organisation intended.
An example of this can be seen in the “Hawaiian Kingdom” posting regarding the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) response to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s allegations of
war crimes committed at Mauna Kea. Where protesters were arrested by Hawai'i police

202

676
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they felt had a chance of responding favourably regardless of rational connection. The
RCMP unsurprisingly concluded that it did not have “jurisdiction over the issues brought
forward based on the requirements of section 8 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes act”. The RCMP cites the absence of Canadian citizen involvement as the reason
for the lack of jurisdiction. Despite the RCMP rejecting the case, this is presented by the
Hawaiian Kingdom as a great victory for sovereignty activists, as they claim RCMP’s
rejection under section 8 rather than because of the substantive issues of the complaint
means that the RCMP (and by extension the government of Canada) is accepting the
issues as true. As is typical for the evaluation of cases, the RCMP rejected it on the first
criteria of jurisdiction. There was likely no evaluation of the substantive issues in any
form, and no such evaluation can be concluded from their response. Nevertheless, the
Hawaiian Kingdom chose to reinterpret this procedural rejection as meaning the RCMP
fully agrees with the Hawaiian Kingdom but happens to be blocked by jurisdiction, rather
than the RCMP statement meaning only that they are blocked by jurisdiction, and any
other issues have remained unevaluated. This sort of usage of the infrastructure of
international law remains characteristic of Hawaiian sovereignty activists’ interpretation
and manipulation of international law to promote the Hawaiian nation. It is very possible
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Canada and Canadians, however, had only incidental connections to the telescope project that the activists
are objecting to. They also argued to the RCMP that the 1851 Hawaiian-British Treaty remains in effect
and remains binding on Canada.
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the members of the Hawaiian Kingdom are fully aware they are misinterpreting
international law, but in doing so are providing very useful ammunition for enhancing
Hawaiian nationalism. Their misinterpretation helps energise the movement in giving
hope and helping to keep going the notion that the Kingdom of Hawai'i is still alive and
could be restored if they could get the “correct” people to listen to their claims.

5.1.1.3 Political Action & Social Activism
Political and social activism is a very visible feature of the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement. As well as being a common way to express nationalism, it is generally a sign
of a healthy civil society.677 Protest rallies are a fairly common occurrence within Hawai'i
with protesters often addressing issues indirectly related to the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement. Environmental issues are a frequent subject of protests with the issue
commonly framed around “malama ʻāina”678 (to care for the land). The protection of the
land and its resources have become a persistent rallying cry for sovereignty activists.
There is often an underlying implied (or occasionally overt) message that the destruction
of the Hawaiian environment is a direct result of the occupier's lack of respect for the
land. The solution suggested is thus both an end of whatever destructive project that is
being protested, as well as an end of US occupation of the islands.
The controversy surrounding the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) typifies this kind
of activism. The Thirty Meter Telescope is a planned “Extremely Large Telescope” to be
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built on Mauna Kea on the island of Hawai'i.679 Despite opposition extending back to
1964, 13 telescopes have been built on Mauna Kea, a 4,205m mountain located on the
island of Hawai'i. Though uninhabited, it is a very sacred site. Kealoha Pisciotta, of the
opposition group Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, describes the mountain as “where our origin
story begins. It’s a place where significant ancestors are buried, so it’s a burial ground.
It’s the abode of the gods and goddesses”.680 The construction on the mountain has been
said to desecrate the sacred site.681 Protesters have also brought up a number of
environmental and economic issues related to the development of Mauna Kea.682
On October 7, 2014, during the ground-breaking of the TMT, protesters
interrupted the ceremony and obstructed the roadway with picketing and chanting.683
Further up the mountain, protesters laid down in the road to block the progression.684 In
March 2015, protesters again blocked the road leading to several arrests685. Protests have
continued despite a temporary halt in construction686.
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Hawaiian opinion has been very mixed, especially amongst young adults. One of
the more visible faces of the protests, Joshua Lanakila Mangauil, sees his task as
protecting the mountain and allowing the sacred place “to rest”.687 There are many who
do support the construction, even amongst Hawaiians. As well as the significant
economic and scientific benefits, supporters note that Hawaiians have traditionally placed
a great emphasis on astronomy. The telescope’s function, its focus on the stars, is they
suggest fully compatible with the sacredness of the mountain. Others reject the
complaints as being a part of a proxy battle for Hawaiian sovereignty. They suggest that
the controversy over the TMT is really only an attempt to readdress issues of the selfdetermination and land management stemming from the overthrow of the Kingdom.
The debate has grown significantly beyond the issue of the telescope itself and
has become a place in which people are able to centre their frustration and other feelings
towards the US government and its history in Hawai'i.688 Social media has seen a wide
variety of people weighing in to support the protesters, including several global
celebrities. Far beyond the issue of the telescope itself, the TMT has become a rallying
point for the Hawaiian nation and has been slowly gaining global attention for the cause.
State holidays have repeatedly served as the catalyst for protests directly related to
the issue of Hawaiian sovereignty. Hawaii Admission Day689 (also known as Statehood
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Day) has been particularly controversial, stirring up several protests and limited counterprotests, as well as an attempt to occupy ‘Iolani Palace.
The overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi can be seen as one of the core symbols
of the modern Hawaiian nation. ʻIolani Palace and particularly the Quilt Room in which
Queen Liliʻuokalani was imprisoned after the overthrow has often served both as a
symbol of defeat, but also as a rallying point for restoring the nation. Though it has much
less of an invented quality than many other nations symbols, the emphasis placed here
mirrors the role in identity Steven Mock describes. As he notes, there is a seemingly
contradictory practice in which nation will use symbols of their defeat as central to their
national identity.690

5.1.1.4 Violence
Nationalism has frequently been described as fundamentally connected to
violence.691 Depictions of nationalism in the media stereotypically present it in a
framework of excessive violence.692 Nationalism is popularly seen as directly connected
to “images of bloodshed, killing, dying, martyrdom, suffering, and destruction” as well as
“insurgencies and terrorism”.693 Despite this perceived fundamental characteristic of
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violence in nationalism, there are “no natural linkages between nationalism and
violence”.694 Hawaiian nationalism appears to largely support this finding.
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) notes that there are no known hate
groups in Hawaiʻi and there is a “much-trumpeted spirit of aloha or tolerance”.695 There,
however, does remain a serious issue with racism which does occasionally result in
violence.696 Though many groups have been targeted, anti-white sentiments are the most
relevant to this paper’s discussion of Hawaiian nationalism. This sentiment has been
described as being caused in part by an “ancestral memory”.697 The invasion and
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, along with the resulting theft of the land and loss
of culture is passed down between generation breeding resentment.698 More recent
attempts to deracialize Native Hawaiian benefiting entitlement programs have created
further resentment.699 Whilst Hawaiian sovereignty in its modern form is generally not
presented as a racial issue, in the frustrations of the struggle, a narrative of white
oppressors can emerge.
Haunani-Kay Trask, a Hawaiian Studies professor at the University of Hawaiʻi, in
one of the stronger expressions of anti-white sentiment, wrote "Just as … all exploited
peoples are justified in feeling hostile and resentful toward those who exploit them, so we
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Hawaiians are justified in such feelings toward the haole700. This is the legacy of racism,
of colonialism".701 Despite this resentment, hostility and racism, racial violence has been
very minimal.
Hawaiʻi reports an extremely low number of hate crimes each year. In the first six
years that hate crime data were collected (2002-2008), only 12 hate crimes were
reported.702 Given the size of Hawaiʻi population, national data would suggest that there
should be over 800 hate crimes during this period. With these low rates of documented
hate crimes, unreported “schoolyard” and “alleyway” violence also needs to be explored
to get a fuller picture of the relationship between nationalism and violence in Hawai'i.
Unfortunately, these data are largely uncollected. There are numerous anecdotes of white
targeted violence, but little evidence of a systematic problem. In a dissent by Judge
Reinhardt of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, he wrote that “the last school day in
Hawaiian schools, for example, has long been known as “Kill Haole Day,” with white
students—“Haoles”—targeted for harassment and physical abuse”. Yet there remains a
lack of documented incidents of this sort of ritualised racial violence actually occurring.
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Honolulu Advertiser reporter Cataluna notes that "in terms of actual, first-person,
eyewitness accounts of Kill Haole Day, no one had any that happened in the last three
decades. Not one teacher, not one police officer, not one victim or perpetrator".703
Interviews I conducted with teachers and former public-school students similarly
revealed little knowledge of the concept of Kill Haole Day and no first-hand knowledge
of it ever actually occurring.
Individual cases of racial violence are challenging to identify because of
frequently unclear motives. In many of the violent incidents that could be labelled as
racially connected, the offender cites a non-racial slight that the victim is said to have
made that the offender claims to have reacted to rather than attacking them largely
because of their race. Road rage or typical bar fight motivations generally accompany
these incidents of potential racial violence. There is also a lack of clear data on bullying
motives. It has been suggested that while white students have been bullied in ways that
include racial taunts, it is not at any higher rate than bullying with racial elements
directed at other races. Race is argued to be just one of many features that bullies can
taunt their victims using (similarly to wearing glasses or hair colour) rather than being a
key motive in victim selection.
An example of the ambiguity of racially motivated violence can be seen in a 2007
assault which received significant media attention. In this case, a white soldier and his
wife were attacked by a Hawaiian man and his teenage son near Pearl Harbor after the
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soldier’s car hit the other man’s car.704 The soldier and his wife were pummelled and
kicked by the two men.705 The son shouted "fucking haole" during the assault.706
Following the attack, a prosecutor stated that the incident should not be considered a hate
crime, but rather it was a road-rage incident.707 The case combined anti-military
sentiment (only some of which is connected to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement708),
road rage and a racial slur. It remains impossible to tell if the same violent response
would have occurred if the couple had been of a different race or had been local. As such,
as in many similar cases, it becomes very hard to classify it as a case of racially
motivated violence.
The low number of hate crimes and directly connected to racial violence would
suggest that there does not appear to be any (or at least very little) systematic violence
directly tied to Hawaiian nationalism. Whilst racially connected violence justified by
perceived white oppression likely does occur, it does not appear to be a meaningful part
of Hawaiian nationalism.
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5.1.1.5 Armed Resistance
Armed resistance is a common part of the imagined stereotypical nationalism.709
Particularly given that the issue at stake is one of independence and sovereignty, armed
resistance, even if only by a fringe group, is to be expected and can be seen to have
occurred in many historic independence struggles.
Following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, a counter-revolution by
royalists took place in 1895 known as Kaua Kuloko 1895. This conflict lasted three days
with three battles and a decisive victory for the Republic. At the end of the conflict,
Queen Liliʻuokalani and other political leaders were convicted of misprision of
treason710. Robert Wilcox and other plotters were convicted of treason by a military
tribunal and sentenced to death (which was reduced to 35 years imprisonment). Queen
Liliʻuokalani formally abdicated her throne in an effort to avoid further bloodshed on
January 24, 1895, 15 days after the end of the counter-revolution. This marked the last
significant attempt at restoring the Kingdom through military action. Given the
overwhelming military power of the United States and the complete lack of popular
support for a modern-day counter-revolution, armed resistance is likely to never be an
effective tool again for Hawaiian sovereignty.
Despite the lack of viability for armed resistance, China threatened in early 2015
to provide arms to Hawaiian independence activists.711 This came in response to U.S.
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arms sales to Taiwan against the wishes of China.712 Whilst it is almost certainly just
political sabre-rattling failing to present a meaningful consideration directly, of
significance, is the implication that Hawaiian sovereignty could be a geopolitical
bargaining chip in the future.

5.1.2 Desired Outcomes
The Hawaiian sovereignty movement has little agreement on what outcome the
movement should try to achieve. Whilst there is general agreement that something needs
to be done to correct the wrongs created by the overthrow of the Kingdom, the proposed
solutions have ranged from enhanced social programs to a fully independent nation.
There is a definite trend within the movement to advocate for the more extreme solutions,
even whilst recognising the lack of political viability. This seems to match the ways in
which hot nationalism is typically expressed. It is very difficult to raise the same level of
excitement characteristic of hot nationalism for relatively minor increases in entitlements
compared to the promise of a restored homeland. As increased sovereignty becomes more
politically viable, it remains to be seen if softer compromise solutions gain traction or if
the hardline full sovereignty position continues to dominate.

5.1.2.1 Increased (or Maintenance of) Entitlements
Today, there already exists a system of entitlements that aim to help correct some
of the imbalances created by the overthrow of the Kingdom. The continued maintenance
and expansion of these programs provide ways to correct for the overthrow of the
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Kingdom without creating any meaningful increases in sovereignty. They provide
concrete advantages to Native Hawaiians and further legitimise the idea that Hawaiians
are a distinct group entitled to differing benefits, but largely leaves sovereignty
unaddressed directly. Additionally, as several of the programs were actually established
prior to the overthrow, the continued maintenance of the programs and their power
demonstrates a continued legitimisation on the system of entitlements from a nation
perspective rather than purely a correction of imbalances.
One of the clearest examples of these entitlements is Kamehameha Schools.
Kamehameha Schools were established by the will of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop
who was the great-granddaughter of King Kamehameha I.713 The trust was granted
375,000 acres of crown land.714 Today, it holds 365,000 acres of land, making it the
largest private landowner in Hawaiʻi.715 Whilst the vast majority of its holdings are kept
for conservation and agriculture, over 15,000 acres are used commercially (including
some of the most valuable commercial properties in Hawaiʻi).716 The trust is estimated to
be worth nearly US$8 billion.717 These holdings are used to support the school’s mission
of educating Native Hawaiian students both directly within the Kamehameha Schools’
campuses and through scholarships for K-12 and postsecondary education.718

713

Kamehameha Schools, “About Our Endowment.”

714

Ibid.

715

Ibid.

716

Ibid.

717

Dooley, “Kamehameha Schools Settled Lawsuit for $7M.”

718

Kamehameha Schools, “About Our Endowment.”

214

Kamehameha Schools has long held a policy that gives “preference to children of
Hawaiian ancestry”.719 This policy has been extremely controversial but remains in place
despite several legal challenges.
As the number of Native Hawaiian applicants generally greatly exceeds the
number of slots available, very few non-Hawaiian students are ever admitted.720 On
Maui, which sees fewer applications for the number of slots it has compared to other
campuses, only one non-native Hawaiian student has been admitted in the past 40
years.721 Prior to the mid-1960s, non-Hawaiian children of school employees were
permitted to attend.722
The school currently requires students to demonstrate that they have at least one
ancestor who lived in Hawaiʻi prior to 1778.723 This policy was challenged in 2003 by
Brayden Mohica-Cummings, a seventh-grader, who was rejected from the school after
being unable to supply proof of Native Hawaiian ancestry.724 Brayden MohicaCummings’ mother was adopted by a Hawaiian family and considers herself and her son
to be Hawaiian.725 They brought a lawsuit against the school alleging violation of federal
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anti-discrimination laws.726 The school eventually settled, allowing Brayden to attend the
school.727
A 2003 suit (John Doe v. Kamehameha) also challenged the admission policy
under the federal Civil Rights Act. Though a District Court Judge ruled against Doe
stating that the policy served "legitimate, remedial purpose by improving native
Hawaiians' socioeconomic and educational disadvantages"728, in 2005, a three-judge
panel of the 9th Circuit of Appeals reversed the lower court; they found that the policy
was in-fact racially exclusionary.729 This finding was itself reversed by a 15-judge en
banc panel in February 2006 reaffirming the lower court’s finding 8-7.730 The case was
expected to be heard by the US Supreme Court, but was settled for $7 million US dollars
in favour of Doe, immediately prior to the court’s decision on accepting the case .731
Additional challenges are expected with uncertain results. The school has already stopped
accepting federal funds due to fears of further civil rights challenges.732 Future challenges
could also result in the trust's tax-exempt status being revoked which could cost the
school US$80 million a year and up to a billion in back taxes.733
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Na Pua Ke Alii Pauahi (an organisation of Kamehameha Schools students,
parents, teachers and alumni) collected 84,000 signatures opposing the MohicaCummings’ challenge to Kamehameha Schools' admission policy, with many alums
expressing strong opposition to any change in school admissions.734 One alum described
the Mohica-Cummings settlement as being like “another overthrow of the monarchy” and
claimed that the school represented “the last icon for native Hawaiians”.735 Kamehameha
Schools has also been described as the “only forum in which native Hawaiians can get
together as native Hawaiians”.736 The later admission of a non-Native Hawaiian in Maui
also drew strong emotional responses. Haunani-Kay Trask, a professor of Hawaiian
studies and an alum, said that the admission of the student “really hurt people, … and the
pain was so palpable you could almost smell people's anger”.737
Kamehameha Schools maintains that their policy is not race-based and should not
be treated as a racial issue.738 The vast majority of students are of mixed-race with 78 per
cent of the students identifying as part Caucasian, 74 percent as part Chinese, 28 per cent
as Japanese, and 24 per cent stating that they were of other ancestries.739 The courts,
however, have largely disagreed, finding that ancestry is being used as a proxy for
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race.740 Though in similar cases, courts have allowed the use of federally recognised
American Indian statuses for entitlements, this usage does not apply to Hawaiian groups
as American Indian groups are said to represent political units, not racial groups.741 Given
the current lack of recognised Native Hawaiian tribal governments, this option remains
unavailable to Kamehameha Schools and similar groups.
The strong emotions the Kamehameha Schools issue provokes, and its clear
framing as one of keeping Native Hawaiian culture and connection are emblematic of the
position of entitlements as a nationalist issue. The language and emotions surrounding it
differ greatly from typical affirmative action justifications of correcting inequality and
more closely resembles other nation-building efforts.
Another significant entitlement is the Hawaiian Home Lands program. This
program was established by the US Congress through the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920 under the guidance of Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana’ole.742 It provides for
the creation of a commission to allocate select public lands (over 200,000 acres) for use
by Native Hawaiians as homesteads743. In addition to providing financing assistance, the
commission provides “99-year homestead leases at $1 per year for residential,
agricultural, or pastoral purposes”.744 In contrast to Kamehameha Schools and several
other entitlements programs, Hawaiian Home Lands defines Native Hawaiians as persons
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with at least 50 per cent Hawaiian blood.745 The program’s primary focus has long been
on single-family homes through returning families to the “ʻāina” (the land746).747 The
program is reasonably successful, though it has faced a number of problems related to
inadequate funding and inappropriate allocations of land away from the program. In its
management of former crown lands for the purposes of supporting Native Hawaiians, the
Hawaiian Homes Commission provides a reinforcement of the continued existence of
Native Hawaiian entitlements.
A variety of other entitlements also exists which provide special benefits within
education, healthcare and a variety of other areas. They remain very problematic legally
but are generally unchallenged as there is reasonable popular support for these
entitlements.

5.1.2.2 State-within-a-State: Integrating Hawaiian Self-Government
into the State of Hawai'i
The state-within-a-state model provides the weakest form of self-governance.
This model provides for an increased role for Hawaiians in the operation of the state
government, most equivalent to that of a county. It would allow for the creation and
enforcement of ordinances but also leaves its members fully under the jurisdiction of the
existing government of Hawaiʻi.
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This model would likely start with the movement of existing entitlement
programs to a new entity and the granting of this new entity limited powers over selected
areas of concern to Hawaiians.748 This model is supported by the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, as a precursor to the nation-within-a-nation. They advocate moving its assets to a
“new Native Hawaiian governing entity”.749 The creation of family courts focused on
supporting Hawaiian values has also been proposed in SB992.750 This highly
controversial bill would have allowed a tribunal to receive jurisdiction over divorce and
paternity cases where one of the parties is Hawaiian.751
The state-within-a-state model provides limited recognition of Hawaiian selfgovernment, whilst not requiring a meaningful change to the lives of non-Hawaiians.
There, however, remain legal concerns of race-based discrimination. Attempts at
establishing separate systems of government or government services exclusively for
Hawaiians have met with significant legal opposition.752 As such any state-within-a-state
style programs would likely need to be open to all peoples and participation would
probably have to be voluntary to avoid drawing the attention of the courts. This clearly
limits its nationalistic utility.

748

Castanha, “The Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement: Roles of and Impacts on Non-Hawaiians.”

749

“Governance.”

750

Andrew Walden, “SB992: Creates Tribal Judiciary, Places 12,000 Hawaiian Children at Risk.”

751

Ibid.

752

Liptak, “Supreme Court Justice Intervenes in Native Hawaiian Election.”

220

5.1.2.3 Nation-within-a-Nation: Hawaiian self-government within the
United States
The nation-within-a-nation model proposes a system similar to the status of many
Native American Indian and Alaskan nations. This model would allow for limited
sovereignty whilst remaining under the authority and control of the state and/or federal
government. In following the Native American Indian and Alaskan model, the Hawaiian
nation might have sovereignty over a geographically bounded area and its member
inhabitants but would otherwise be subjected to US governance. This model is often
suggested as an intermediary phase towards full independence.
Unfortunately for its advocates, Hawaii’s modern geography is poorly suited to
traditional forms of the nation-within-a-nation model. In contrast to many Native
American Indian and Alaskan nations, Hawai'i lacks clear geographic borders on which
to establish a Hawaiian nation. Though a few islands are predominantly Hawaiian, the
vast majority of Hawaiians live in areas that are racially mixed. Barring a massresettlement program, a geographically bounded Hawaiian nation would either be so
under or over-inclusive that it would lack utility.
The nation-within-a-nation model has been suggested by the popular sovereignty
group, Ka Lahui Hawai'i, as a “realist” option.753 The group has called for the return of
former crown land to re-establish the Hawaiian nation.754 This would allow for a
reasonable level of Hawaiian sovereignty in a bounded area with limited effect upon on
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the rest of Hawai'i. The group, however, faces serious obstacles in that it needs to
convince both the state and federal governments and sway public opinion. Additionally, it
would require people to relocate to currently unused land, whilst providing the
infrastructure required.

5.1.2.4 Free Association: An Independent Hawaiʻi in Free
Association with the United States
Free association provides a possible compromise model. In this approach, Hawaiʻi
becomes an independent state, but still maintains close ties to the United States. In
adopting this strategy, Hawai'i and the United States would sign a "compact of free
association". This agreement would define the terms under which the two nations
cooperate. In other nations that have compacts of free association with the United States,
the United States provides a defined set of government services and is responsible for
military defence. In exchange, the United States receives the right to station military
forces in the freely associated state755. Other, often less tangible, benefits are also enjoyed
by the states. The associated state generally maintains full legal sovereignty over their
territory but elect to “outsource” some government functions to the other state. This may
include allowing the other state to manage significant government functions, such as
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foreign affairs and national defence or it may take the form of allowing the host state to
handle smaller tasks such as consular services and supplementary law enforcement.
If Hawai'i is successful in gaining independence, there is a reasonable chance that
this is the model that would eventually be adopted. It provides virtually all of the
advantages of independence but allows for the practical challenges independence would
create which are numerous.
A withdrawal of the federal government from Hawai'i would create a number of
significant gaps in critical services. At the present time, no sovereignty group is
anywhere near ready to form a government and whilst the State of Hawaii could feasibly
replace many of the federal government services, it too is not in the position to easily do
so. Though many of the local offices of federal services could be transferred without
significant problems, most are still very dependent upon a support structure provided
from outside of Hawai'i which would need to be replaced.
There are also a number of direct economic consequences to any form of
independence that would need to be handled. Federal funds formed 21.54% of the state
budget in 2015 with the federal government contributing $1.46 for every dollar paid in
Hawaiʻi in federal taxes (thus Hawaiʻi is being heavily subsidised by the other US
states).756 Additionally, the federal government directly employs almost 6% of the
Hawai'i workforce (excluding active duty military, who are also economically
significant).757 The newly independent Hawai'i would need to find a way to cover these
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costs without federal funds, as well as potentially pay for its own military. Increased
taxes and reduced spending might cover some of the deficit, but the levels of taxes and
service cuts this would require would likely be highly unpopular and probably alone
unworkable (at minimum a 10-15% across the board income tax increase would be
required). This also ignores the economic effect independence would likely have on
tourism and the probable out-migration from Hawai'i due to the uncertainty surrounding
the formation of any new country. Additionally, direct and indirect military spending
currently form one of the major pillars of the Hawai'i economy758 and would need to be
economically replaced. Barring new creative solutions or socially undesirable solutions
(legalised gambling, offshore banking, etc.), this deficit would likely have to be met by
foreign aid. A compact of free association between the newly independent Hawai'i and
the United States could provide this economic assistance, federal support services and
military protection.
Free association, at least theoretically, requires both states to reach an equitable
agreement in which both states provide value to the other. For Hawai'i, the benefit would
likely be largely economic whilst for the United States, the strategic utility of Hawaii’s
location is significantly advantageous militarily. Both states also maintain a likely strong
interest in supporting continuity as much as possible.
For many members of the general public who support sovereignty, this form
seems to be the one which they favour, even though few actually recognize it as being
called free association. In discussing sovereignty options, I have found that most of those
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who favour independence (outside of sovereignty activists) are still hoping for little
practical effect on their daily lives. They support the general principles of sovereignty but
are unsurprisingly not in support of a radical change to services or dramatically increased
taxation. Additionally, whilst many favour reduced military presence, having to rely
solely upon the Hawaii National Guard for military defence is a scary prospect for them.
There is also a very practical concern that an independent Hawai'i would not be
financially viable causing serious changes in daily quality of life. Free association, either
indefinitely or for a transition period, largely addresses these concerns.
The most significant problematic aspect of free association remains the
psychological and moral issue of ridding Hawai'i of the colonising force. Free association
would mean a continued dependence upon a country that illegally overthrew the
Kingdom and then occupied it. Much of the call for Hawaiian sovereignty relies upon the
moralistic argument of correcting the illegal overthrow and returning the land to its
rightful owner. Thus, whilst free association may be more practical, it fails to correct the
moral wrong fully. Under it, Hawai'i would remain, at least partially, subjugated to the
United States.
There are also concerns relating to how the United States has handled people
under existing compacts of free associations. Though Micronesians form a
disproportionate percentage of the US military and the islands provide many benefits to
the US, the federal government continues to seriously under allocate resources to support
Micronesians. Micronesians also continue to face significant issues with housing,
education, healthcare and employment when living in the US. Whilst Hawaii's larger
population and greater importance to the US would likely provide them with a stronger
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bargaining position, free association does put Hawai'i in the position of negotiating with a
much more powerful country which already has a history of neglecting its obligations
under compacts of free association.
Free association was initially advocated by Robert Wilcox in 1899 through the
founding of the Home Rule Party.759 The party was successful in the first territorial
legislative election in 1900, but after losses in subsequent elections, it was dissolved by
1912.760 A short-lived version of the party re-emerged in the mid-1970s761 and again in
the 1990s. Despite its history, the parties have not received much attention nor have the
proposal of home rule or free association.
Free association provides a compromise solution which, while ultimately
desirable, is of lessened utility in the current phase of the struggle for independence.
Within a simple negotiating strategy approach, one basic principle is that “whichever
negotiator starts with the more ambitious opening position wins the compromise”.762 As
such, opening negotiations for independence by asking for the compromise of free
association would place activists in a weak negotiating position. Yet as acceptance and
political viability for independence increases, proposals such as this will likely become
more common.
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5.1.2.5 Full Independence: Hawaiʻi as a fully sovereign nation
Under this model, Hawaiʻi would become completely legally separate from the
United States and any arrangements between the two countries would be negotiated as,
theoretically equal, separate nation-states.
Prior to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, Hawai'i was recognised as a
fully sovereign state having formed treaties with many European nations as well as the
United States.763 The Kingdom had established almost one hundred diplomatic and
consular posts and was a member of international organisations including the Universal
Postal Union.764 Supporters of the full independence model argue that they are merely
calling for the restoration of this internationally recognised kingdom that was illegally
overthrown. With several nation-states within the Pacific having gained their
independence in the last few decades, independence for Hawai'i is presented as being a
realistic possibility.
There is little agreement, however, on what this new nation-state should look like.
The groups largely accept the idea of permitting residence for non-Hawaiians and most
provide a pathway by which non-Hawaiians could obtain citizenship.765 There is a
complete lack of agreement on how land ownership should function in the new kingdom,
ranging from immediate or phased eviction of noncitizens to restriction on their land
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ownership.766 The different sovereignty groups generally accept the idea of nonHawaiians in government positions, though many advocate for the highest level or
culturally significant positions being restricted to Hawaiians.767 They are very mixed on
tourism and immigration in general.768 Whilst sovereignty groups have provided several
models of how their theoretical government could function, the immense political
challenges that remain until independence can be obtained would make it likely that the
eventual government will have little actual resemblance to their proposed hypothetical
models.
The most significant challenge of establishing full sovereignty is the lack of a
clear successor government. With the death of Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole in
1922, all subsequent potential heirs to the throne were born long after the overthrow of
the Kingdom and are only distantly related to the monarchy. Quentin Kūhiō
Kawānanakoa (the great-nephew of Prince Kūhiō), a lawyer and former Republican state
representative, provides the most direct connection to the throne. Kawānanakoa has
stated in regards to the prince title that he does not “allude to myself in that fashion, but I
certainly am proud of my forefathers who in fact were of the royal family”, and it was
noted when he ran for office that he neither “claims nor rejects the title”.769 The other
most direct descendant of the royal family is Abigail Kinoiki Kekaulike Kawānanakoa
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(the great-grandniece of King David Kalākaua). However now over 90 she is unlikely to
be able to head a newly independent nation, nor has she shown any interest in doing so.770
Several sovereignty groups have people whom they claim should be the successor
to the throne. Almost a dozen groups claim to be the legitimate government of the
Hawaiian Kingdom.771 These groups range greatly in numbers of members, though most
still have fairly small numbers.772 Many of these groups are centred around a person
whom they claim has a direct linkage to the Hawaiian monarchy (though it is often fairly
tenuous) and should thus be considered to be the legitimate heir to the throne.773 There is
little recognition that any of the other groups have any legitimacy, with most choosing to
completely ignore the others claims.774 The currently operating sovereignty groups who
claim to be a successor government are seen across Hawai'i as being radical fringe
groups, none of whom would be in any way suited to form a new government (both in
terms of popular support and logistical capacity).
One greatly underexplored option is allowing the State of Hawaii government to
break away from the United States. In this model, the Governor would become the
executive of the new country, at least on an interim basis. This mirrors the peaceful
handoff of many other postcolonial states. It would minimise disruption and respects the
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democratic process. This option however largely fails to answer the moral wrongs
committed by the overthrow and rather only addresses the legal wrongs.
Full sovereignty, despite being the ultimate goal and what many would argue is
the legal and moral obligation, is by far the most unlikely outcome of Hawaiian
nationalism. In a 2014 poll by the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, only six per cent of
respondents envisioned independence for Hawaiians.775 The process of forming a new
country is frequently messy and risky. Barring some major change in US policy or a
significant shift in Hawai'i public opinion, full sovereignty seems more like a dream than
a realistic future.

5.1.3 The Counter-Sovereignty Movement
Given the intensity of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, the minimalism of a
counter-sovereignty movement is remarkable. There is a complete absence of organised
groups advocating against sovereignty. Rather there are a small number of fringe activists
and scattered court cases which form the major opposition to sovereignty.
The federal government of the United States has largely maintained a status quo
policy towards the sovereignty issue despite a 1993 Joint Resolution apologising for the
overthrow and some limited efforts by the Obama Administration. The State of Hawaii
maintains a somewhat more nuanced view, but largely effectively operates under a status
quo policy as well. Though both would likely be very involved in combating any actually
viable attempts to establish a sovereign Hawaiian nation, neither can really be said to be
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acting as part of a counter sovereignty movement at this time, at least as far as
nationalism is concerned.
Outside of the purely legal space (such as Rice v. Cayetano and Akina v. Hawai'i),
Kenneth Conklin and the group to which he is connected, “Aloha for All” provide the
closest resemblance to an organised counter-sovereignty movement. Conklin is a prolific
commenter online and is frequently selected by reporters to quote when seeking a
counter-sovereignty perspective for “balance”. He remains a highly controversial person
who has accused the Hawaiian sovereignty movement of advocating for racism and
apartheid.776
The group Aloha for All states that their mission is “to ensure that ALL citizens of
Hawaii are treated equally under the law”.777 Though the group was involved in some
legal challenges and political advocacy, they never reached the level of attention that the
pro-sovereignty groups found. Whilst the website remains online, Aloha for All’s was
dissolved as a non-profit corporation in January 2015.778 It appears that the countersovereignty platform seems to exist today largely as a handful of commenters online
without much of an active response beyond that.
There are also scattered discussions on white-supremacist websites that provide
typically racist arguments about why Hawaiians should not be trusted or permitted to
operate an independent state. Rather than provide any sort of meaningful political,
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historical or legal argument, they rely solely upon claims of white superiority over native
groups. As these white-supremacist groups do not form a meaningful contingent within
Hawaiʻi, there is little value in attempting to analyse their position further, other than
noting its existence.

5.2

Hot Nationalism in Niue

Amongst the islands that are the focus of this dissertation, the lowest level of hot
nationalism is found in Niue. Indeed, there does not seem to be any active nationalist
groups nor any sort of noticeable pro-nationalist action. Rather there is a more subtle and
passive expression of nationalism. Niueans do consider themselves to be a separate
people than New Zealanders. This, however, does not seem to have resulted in much
efforts to make this distinction clearly known. The fact that Niueans are not New
Zealanders seems to simply be accepted as an unchallenged statement within Niue, and
there has been virtually no call for Niue to end the free association agreement in favour of
full independence. Also, apparently absent is the sort of identity conflict that other groups
in similar circumstances have felt, such as what can be seen in New Caledonians
relationship with France.
It has been argued that the mass emigration from Niue has resulted in a situation
in which Niuean identity is rapidly fading.779 Barnett argues that, as a result, “national
pride is a rare feeling in Niue”.780 He suggests that this lack of national pride is closely

779

Barnett, “On the Risks of Engineering Mobilty to Reduce Vulerablity to Climate Change: Insights

from a Small Island State.”
780

Ibid.

232

tied to the lack of “signs and symbols of the nation”.781 For whilst Niue “has a flag and a
song, these are hardly the powerful icons of nationalism associated with most modern
nation states”.782 Further, he suggests that the weakness of Niuean nationalism,
particularly in comparison to other Pacific Island nations, is the result of the way Niue
gained independence.783 Most other countries, even those who have obtained
independence peacefully, have a narrative of struggle surrounding their independence.784
Niue, in contrast, obtained independence largely as a result of New Zealand’s offer and
subsequent 1974 referendum rather than a long struggle. Even the way in which it marks
its independence shares this theme. October 19-20 is celebrated as “Constitution Day”,
rather than Independence Day or Nation/Niue Day. It places the focus on the legal
document rather than a victory over outside control or even a celebration of nationhood.
As a result of the free association agreement with New Zealand, Niueans carry
New Zealand passports. Niueans can receive an optional stamp in their passports that
identifies them as Niueans so as to allow for one-way travel to Niue.785 This has led the
former premier of Niue to say that “‘the only document that tells us who we are is our
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passport, and it shows that we are New Zealanders’”.786 Niueans do not, however,
consider themselves to be New Zealanders787; and the assumption that they do because of
their passport seems to be unequivocally rejected by Niueans and by the New Zealand
Government.
Despite the mass migration away from Niue, Niueans abroad still maintain a
strong connection to their homeland. Many people I interviewed expressed the sentiment
that whilst few people wanted to stay in Niue, everyone wanted to ultimately be buried in
Niue. Though for practical purposes, New Zealand is where they live and work, Niue
remains what they consider “home”. There is a common feeling that they will eventually
return to Niue (at least when they get old), despite their lives being in New Zealand and
the resulting infeasibility of return.
Niuean nationalism seems to be most clearly expressed through cultural
strengthening and revival efforts rather than a focus on hot nationalism. The formal
efforts have come under the heading of Taoga Niue. This program is designed to build a
stronger Niue through the promotion of traditional Niuean cultural practices. Though this
mission could produce hot nationalistesque results, at least at present, it seems to fall
more under the heading of everyday nationalism.
Whilst Niue’s independence is well recognised, there have been occasional calls
to reintegrate with New Zealand.788 As increasing numbers of Niueans emigrate, it
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becomes increasingly difficult to provide services to the standard desired.789 Many
residents feel that they could improve the quality of life on the island by again becoming
a part of New Zealand.790 The Niuean Premier strongly rejected this notion in 2005.791 He
called it “immoral” and noted that the infrastructure needs of Niue would not be different
if they were to reintegrate with New Zealand.792 The discussions of reintegrating with
New Zealand largely focus on the change as a practical decision rather than a reflection
of Niuean nationhood. Supporters are not calling for reintegration because the nation of
Niue no longer exists, but rather because of resource limitations. Cyclone Heta, which hit
Niue in 2004, renewed concerns of the continued viability of Niue as an independent
nation.793 The cyclone killed one person, seriously injured several and destroyed many
homes and government buildings including the island’s only hospital. It also seriously
damaged the island’s infrastructure and cut off power and communications.794 Even a
decade later, many homes affected by the cyclone remain derelict with the owners having
left for New Zealand. The storm also devastated the island’s young commercial
agricultural industries.795 As a result, there was considerable concern with the lasting
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viability of an independent Niue.796 Rapid depopulation was expected, and many
predicted a necessary end to Niuean independence.797 New Zealand stated that decision
would be left to the government of Niue, noting "we need to acknowledge what the
people on Niue want, rather than being seen as a former colonial country imposing our
will".798 Niue ultimately remained independent with the population loss being much less
than was predicted. Niue, however, remains at the edge of the minimum number of
people to practically continue to maintain an independent nation. Niuean government
agencies are already extremely small with many people filling several roles in
government and the community. Another major wave of emigration, such as the result of
another cyclone, could be devastating. This precarious position may mean that Niue may
become the first modern nation to fail, not because of conflicts of national identity or
because of foreign actors, but rather an inability to maintain the resources required to
form the functions of a nation.
Whilst there is a clear absence of hot nationalism within Niue, it does not appear
to be the result of a lack of national pride nor a belief that Niue is not an independent
nation. Rather it appears that the lack of hot nationalism is the result of a combination of
a strong presence of everyday nationalism (discussed in detail in the following chapter),
and perhaps a lack of motivation given the continued recognition of their sovereignty by

796

“Cyclone Damages Niue’s Self-Rule.”

797

Ibid.

798

Ibid.

236

New Zealand and the significant burden many Niueans are under in maintaining the
nation’s infrastructure.

5.3

Hot Nationalism in the Cook Islands

The Cook Islands has experienced more hot nationalism than Niue. It has
emerged during several different periods, the first of which came during World War II.799
With the recent failure of New Zealand’s attempts to revive the fruit industry and
increasing migration to New Zealand of young people, many Cook Island leaders became
dissatisfied.800 An American Air Force unit stationed in Aitutaki provided increased
development and wages to the island which had been previously fairly poor.801 They also
provided a strong voice for what they perceived as New Zealand’s neglect of the
island.802 Growing dissatisfaction led to the formation of the Cook Islands Progressive
Association (CIPA).803 Though the group lacked a clear mandate or programme, it helped
develop a critical voice against New Zealand administration.804 Over time, the CIPA
developed labour union style methods to focus on wages and political reform.805 The
group’s pro-Cook Island nationalist message was very popular in the islands, but its
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leadership was fragmented.806 The CIPA and the government engaged in a series of
minor scuffles, after which the CIPA’s militant opposition to the New Zealand
Administration gradually faded.807
As noted several times already, New Zealand was a fervent supporter of the UN’s
calls to ensure the political, economic, and social development of its non-self-governing
territories.808 Amongst several programs to address this within its territories was the
granting of limited home rule in the formation of the Cook Islands Legislative Council in
1946.809 With this shift, the CIPA altered their Cook Island nationalist agenda to focus
their opposition to the New Zealand Administration into the Legislative Council.810
Though the nationalist fervour faded, the CIPA continued to exist, eventually
playing a large role in the formation of the Cook Islands Party.811 The Cook Islands Party
though a nationalist party advocated for maintaining ties with New Zealand.
During the 1965-1974 period of Albert Henry's (Cook Islands Party) government,
a very controlled type of nationalism emerged.812 In this form, Albert Henry's
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government promoted a number of carefully designed performances to show the world a
version of Cook Islands unity and identity.813

5.3.1.1 Ending Free Association
There have been occasional calls for ending the free association agreement with
New Zealand, but these efforts have failed to gain meaningful traction. Under the 1946
agreement, the Cook Islands has the right to unilaterally end the arrangement and become
fully independent. New Zealand PM Helen Clark said in 2000, that “If they [the Cook
Islands] want to exert complete independence, New Zealand would not stand in their
way”.814
Cook Island politicians have suggested that full independence would facilitate UN
membership and increase foreign relationships.815 The vote in the UN and the new
foreign relationships are presented as allowing for increased bargaining power in
obtaining foreign aid and investment.816 This approach would likely generate additional
income for the Cook Islands. Several small nations have also successfully monetised their
UN votes by offering larger states their support on issues in exchange for foreign aid.817
For example, Nauru (a small Pacific island state) was offered $50 million by Russia in
exchange for extending diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.818
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Similarly, Iran gave $200,000 to the Solomon Islands (another small Pacific island state)
to support Iran’s opposition to Israel joining the UN General Assembly.819 China and
Taiwan have both also contributed significantly to several small states in exchange for
recognition or de-recognition of Taiwan.820 Deals favourable to small island UN
members are common, resulting in aid and other concessions.821 This has resulted in
many small states supporting larger players on issues that are of little direct concern to
them.822 As these deals are commonplace and are generally seen as legal823, the Cook
Islands would likely stand to gain significant financial advantages via UN membership.
Whilst the Cook Islands could probably join the UN under its current system824, its
relationship with New Zealand would limit its ability to fully negotiate freely and thus
may leave them unable to fully reap the financial benefits.
Of great concern for full independence efforts, is the automatic New Zealand
citizenship that Cook Islanders currently receive as a result of the free association
agreement.825 It is under this arrangement that many Cook Islanders live, work, and
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receive schooling in New Zealand and Australia826. Ending the free association
agreement would almost certainly mean an end of the automatic New Zealand
citizenship.827 New Zealand citizenship is seen as providing many jobs and opportunities
that do not exist within the Cook Islands.828 Unless nationalist politicians are able to
secure an alternative arrangement for citizenship, any referendum on ending free
association is highly likely to fail.829

5.4

Hot Nationalism in Fiji

Fiji across its four coups and the instability surrounding them has seen several
flare-ups of hot nationalism. This has almost entirely manifested as pro-iTaukei
ethnonationalism. The Bainimarama government has however in recent years attempted
to establish a unified nation with deliberate attempts to replace ethnonationalism with
civic-nationalism.
Ethnonationalism is built around the idea that the nation should be formed on the
basis of common ethnic ancestry. The nation, in this view, is characterised by a shared
heritage, language and religion.830 In Fiji, this is manifested primarily through the notion
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that the nation of Fiji should be defined in terms of iTaukei heritage. For iTaukei
ethnonationalists, their long connection to the islands as the indigenous people of Fiji is
used to justify measures to ensure their continuing control over the nation.
Civic-nationalism refers to nationalism that is built around the notion that all
people who live within the geopolitical borders of the nation should be considered part of
the nation regardless of ethnicity, religion or other similar factors.831 Bainimarama has
spearheaded efforts to redefine the language used to talk about Fijians as well as shape
how the nation is reflected in sports, music and other national celebrations. Much of these
efforts fall within the realm of everyday nationalism and are discussed within the
following chapter.

5.4.1 Actions
5.4.1.1 Land Laws
The policy that most strongly defines iTaukei supremacy is Fiji’s land ownership
laws. Under policies established by Sir Arthur Gordon in 1882, about 82% of land in Fiji
is held as “customary” land or “native” land.832 This land is considered to be owned
collectively by a clan, tribe or family.833 It cannot be sold, even to other iTaukei.834 It can
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only be leased.835 Of the native land, two-thirds have been leased to non-iTaukeis.836 The
vast majority of these leases are held by Indo-Fijians.837 This has created a situation in
which despite having been in Fiji for several generations, owning the land on which they
live and work is a completely unattainable dream for most Indo-Fijians. They are instead
trapped in a cycle of land leases, that each time may or may not be renewed. The expiry
of land leases in the late 1990s caused considerable concern amongst Indo-Fijians as
many were not renewed.838
Fiji’s land restrictions are codified within the Constitution of Fiji.839 As such they
serve as a powerful reminder that despite any work to the contrary in building a united
Fiji, iTaukei will always have a more privileged position in the fundamental area of land
ownership.
The strong protections for native land ownership used within Fiji are often
presented as a model of preserving native rights form which other nations can learn. This
sort of support from academics and activists in other countries has been routinely used to
justify the continuance of the system and the whitewashing of its problematic limitations.
Fijian land tenure, as well as being used as a tool of ethnonationalism, is not even ideal
for iTaukei peoples. It imposes a paternalistic model which robs people of their agency in
the disposition of what is supposed to be their land, whilst granting the Land Trust Board
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enormous powers. It does not even actually reflect a traditional model of land
ownership.840 Exclusive rights to land was a concept introduced to Fiji by European
settlers841. Even the model of mataqali842 land claims, on which the policy was based, is
the model of the Bau group, not all of Fiji.843

5.4.1.2 Constitution
The constitutions of Fiji have served as one of the most hotly contested
battlegrounds of iTaukei ethnonationalism. Various revisions have been used to provide
constitutionally guaranteed dominance for iTaukeis.
The first post-independence 1970 constitution granted significant power to the
entirely iTaukei Great Council of Chiefs and the Fijian Affairs Board.844 It also
guaranteed the Native Land Trust Board’s control of all “native land”.845 A 22 member
senate was also created and composed in a manner that would ensure iTaukei control.846
Whilst the lower house of Parliament used an electoral system that gave equal seats to
Indo-Fijians and iTaukei (along with a lesser number of seats for other ethnic groups), the
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iTaukei controlled senate held veto power over issues related to iTaukei interests.847
Constitutional change would also require two-thirds of the Senate to approve it.848
Following the 1987 coups, the interim government announced a new
constitution.849 This constitution expanded the lower house of Parliament to 70 seats of
which 37 are to be elected by iTaukei, 27 by Indo-Fijians, one by Rotumans, leaving five
seats for other races.850 The Senate was adjusted to give iTaukei an even greater
majority.851 This constitution established a process wherein the Prime Minister was
selected by the President from amongst the iTaukei members of the lower house.852 Both
the president and the iTaukei members of the Senate were to be selected by the Great
Council of Chiefs.853
The National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party Coalition described the
proposed constitution as “profoundly authoritarian, undemocratic, militaristic, racist and
feudalistic. It would be derisive and sow the seeds of terrible violence. It would retard our
social and economic development. It would isolate us from many of our valued
neighbours, the Commonwealth and the international community”.854 Despite heavy
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criticism both domestically and by the international community, the constitution was
adopted in 1990.855
Constitutional change became one of the key political issues of the 1992 and 1994
elections with Indo-Fijians groups advocating for repeal and many iTaukei groups
strongly supporting it.856 Facing growing international pressure, a commission was
eventually established to review the constitution and form recommendations as provided
under Section 161 (which required a review before seven years).857 The three-person
multi-ethnic commission provided 697 recommendations.858 After eight months of
debate, Parliament and the Great Council of Chiefs endorsed most of the
recommendations859. The recommendations were incorporated into the Constitution
(Amendment) Bill 1997 which was adopted in July 1997.860 This constitution allowed for
equal representation in the lower house and removed the ethnic requirement for Prime
Minister.861
The 1997 constitution was abrogated in 2009 following the Appeals Court’s
ruling on the constitutionality of the 2006 coup.862 In 2012, a commission was established
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to draft a new constitution in preparation for the 2014 elections.863 After significant
community consultation, the Commission submitted a draft constitution to the
government.864 The government rejected the proposed constitution and elected to adopt a
modified version written by Fiji's Attorney-General.865 Though fairly similar in many
areas, the government's version rejected the Commission regional constituencies
model.866 It also preserved military power.867 The constitution contains a number of
provisions aimed at promoting a single national identity and countering
ethnonationalism.868 It also formally lowered the voting age to 18, adopted a one-personone-vote model (ending the ethnic electoral roll system) and recognised multiple
citizenships.869 Despite its positive changes, the constitution has been heavily criticised
by human rights groups, including Amnesty International, who state that the “new
constitution not only erodes basic human rights for the people of Fiji but grants military,
police and government officials absolute immunity for past, present and future human
rights violations”.870
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5.4.1.3 Political
Political parties in Fiji have historically been divided largely along ethnic lines.871
Despite this division, most have adopted a somewhat centrist policy.872 Though several
parties such as the Alliance Party under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, have advocated a “Fiji
for All” platform, they do not generally see great cross-ethnic support.873 Other parties
such as Sitiveni Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei party started as staunch
ethnonationalists, but eventually shifted to be more inclusive.874 Further, for several
parties, despite being officially committed to national unity and multiracial cooperation,
many of the parties that have held power have been perceived as supporting one group
over the other.875 Of the recent governments, Chaudhry’s was popularly perceived as
being too strongly Indian oriented, whilst Qarase was seen as too focused on iTaukei
issues.876 The political parties have though whilst generally taking an officially
multiracial stance used their power to reinforce more subtle ethnonationalist agendas.
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Interestingly, despite the ethnic divide and rhetoric, strongly ethnonationalist
parties do not seem to have been especially successful. This is particularly evident in the
2014 election in which no strongly ethnonationalist parties ran.877

5.4.1.4 Coups
Matching what many imagine when they think of hot nationalism, Fiji has seen
significant political upheaval. Fiji has undergone four coups since independence in 1976.
Three of the four coups were directly related to ethnonationalist policies, whilst the fourth
was presented as necessary to counter ethnonationalism.
The first coup came in 1987 following the April election of a coalition
government led by Timoci Bavadra (an iTaukei), with a majority Indo-Fijian
membership.878 Though the government was multiracial, the power of Indo-Fijians within
the coalition government greatly concerned many iTaukei nationalists.879 A strongly
racist and ethnonationalist movement known as the Taukei Movement held a number of
protests demanding a government formed of only iTaukeis be created.880
With ethnonationalists becoming increasingly vocal, Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka
removed the Bavadra government in a military coup less than a month after the
election.881 Rabuka accompanied by ten armed soldiers entered the Fijian House of
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Representatives and ordered the Members of Parliament to leave the building.882 They
complied with his demands, allowing Rabuka to dissolve the government and declare
himself head of state.883 He claimed to be acting to prevent racial violence and maintain
order.884
Having lost faith in and control of the post-coup interim government he
appointed, Rabuka staged a second coup on September 25th.885 In December, facing
international pressure, Rabuka resigned as head of state allowing the previous PM Ratu
Sir Kamisese Mara to be reappointed and Rabuka to become Minister of Home Affairs.886
A discriminatory constitution (discussed above) was put into effect in 1990 which
prevented Indo-Fijians and minorities from holding a majority in parliament.887 Under
this constitution, Rabuka became Prime Minister in 1993.888
In May 1999, in the first elections held under the 1997 Constitution, Indo-Fijian
parties led by Mahendra Chaudhry won, and Chaudhry became Fiji's first Indo-Fijian
prime minister.889 His election was used by many iTaukei nationalists to enflame anti-
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Indian sentiments.890 In May 2000, Chaudhry and Parliament were taken hostage as part
of a civilian-led coup.891 The coup leader, George Speight, has been described as a failed
businessman who had recently been dismissed by the Chaudhry government from his
position as head of the Fiji Hardwood Corporation and was facing charges of extortion.892
Speight described his actions as being in the interests of promoting “the supreme rights of
our indigenous people in Fiji”.893 He made heavy use of ethnonationalist rhetoric, though
many questioned his sincerity894.
The Fijian military was able to retake control eight weeks later895, and by
September 2001, general elections were held restoring democracy, leading to four years
of reasonable stability.896 In May 2005, the government proposed a highly controversial
Reconciliation and Unity Commission which could grant amnesty to those involved in
the 2000 coup.897 In response to the commission and accusations of government
corruption and racism, Commodore Frank Bainimarama seized power, appointing
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himself Acting President of Fiji on 5 December 2006.898 In contrast to previous coups,
Bainimarama presented his coup as anti-ethnonationalist and necessary to “clean up” the
damage ethnonationalism had done to the country. 899 Bainimarama had previously served
as the leader of the interim military government in 2000.900 In early January, he restored
Iloilo to the Presidency, who formally appointed Bainimarama the Prime Minister in an
attempt to legitimise the coup.901 In 2009, the Court of Appeals rejected these actions as
unconstitutional, leading Iloilo to revoke the constitution, prior to re-appointing
Bainimarama.902 Though this government has made significant changes aimed at
improving civil rights and correcting systematic racial discrimination, there have also
been serious issues with censorship and human rights abuse. Following five years of
delays, elections were finally held on 17 September 2014.903 In a “fair and free
election”904, Bainimarama's FijiFirst party won with 59.2% of the vote allowing
Bainimarama to become an elected Prime Minister of Fiji.905
In 2014, at least 65 people were arrested and face charges of sedition as part of an
alleged plot to form a breakaway Christian state.906 The group is accused of being
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engaged in military-style training under the direction of a former British army soldier.907
The group is said to have been preparing to declare a portion of the northern province of
Ra independent, establishing the Ra Sovereign Christian State.908 With several of those
arrested traditional iTaukei chiefs909 and the identification as a Christian State, the
attempt appears to be a rejection of Bainimarama’s plans for a “unified nation” and
another example of pro-iTaukei ethnonationalism.
The first three coups are undeniable examples of hot nationalism. They used
ethnonationalistic rhetoric to convince significant portions of the nation that the coups
were necessary to avoid serious harm to Fiji. Enthusiastic support for the coups was fairly
short-lived, and in retrospect, many have expressed regret for their role. The leader of the
1987 coups, Sitiveni Rabuka, has since apologised for the coup and advocated for
multiracialism. Similarly, Ratu Meli Vesikula, one of the most prominent and extremist
leaders of the ethnonationalist movement later asked for forgiveness from the Indo-Fijian
community. In the 18 years since the 2000 coup, ethnonationalism has not been well
received in Fiji. The Bainimarama government has made it very clear that they are not
willing to tolerate divisive ethnonationalism, including deploying often oppressive
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restrictions to protect against it. As such, ethnonationalism and most traditional
expressions of hot nationalism have largely faded away from modern Fiji.

5.4.1.5 Military
The military’s position within Fijian nationalism is one that is rife with
contradictions. The military is unusually large for a nation of Fiji’s size and has played a
significant role within Fijian governance. It is overwhelmingly composed of people of
iTaukei descent910 with Brigadier General Mohammed Aziz serving as one of the only
senior Indo-Fijians officers in the military. Overall, the Fijian military can be seen as an
organisation of ethnic iTaukei power. Interestingly, the military sees very little
ethnonationalist ideology and for the past several decades has largely served to combat
the rise of ethnonationalism.
The military under the command of Bainimarama took control of the government
following the ethnonationalist 2000 coup and quickly re-established a civilian
government. The military-led 2006 coup resulted in the establishment of a military
government that actively combated ethnonationalism and implemented a series of
policies to strengthen civic nationalism. Though members of the military have
participated in ethnonationalist events, the ideal of an inclusive Fiji built on civic
nationalism seems to be widely shared in the Fijian armed forces.
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5.4.2 Desired Outcomes
5.4.2.1 Supremacy of iTaukei
“Fiji for Fijians” has long been the rallying cry of iTaukei ethnonationalists. It
calls for a privileged position for iTaukei peoples within the nation. What this should
actually mean is often left undefined, but it remains a frequent slogan of those who
oppose civic-nationalism.
It has been suggested that modern iTaukei ethnonationalism can be traced to Sir
Arthur Gordon’s 1876 policies that strongly favoured iTaukeis.911 This principle of
paramountcy of iTaukeis interests was expressed repeatedly by the colonial
government.912 Built out of an apparent concern for native rights and as a way to avoid
Indo-Fijian demands for representation, the principles remained into the independent
Fijian state.913
Ethnonationalism in Fiji is not occurring within a vacuum. Many iTaukei
ethnonationalists have made great use of global discussions on native rights in order to
support ethnonationalist superiority. Sakeasi Butadroka, one of the most vocal
ethnonationalist politicians, justified his party’s strong ethnonationalist agenda as
necessary so as to “prevent Fijians from succumbing to competition, as the North
American Indians, Hawaiians, and Maoris had done”.914 Global calls for justice and self-
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determination for indigenous people have been repeatedly perverted by ethnonationalists
to gain support and justification for discrimination and racism. There remains no legal
basis within international human rights law to differentiate between peoples based upon
native-versus-settler status.915 The right of self-determination is recognised as belonging
to “all peoples”.916

5.4.2.2 Removal of Indo-Fijians
Conspicuously absent in iTaukei ethnonationalism is the lack of a serious
politically viable call to remove Indo-Fijians from modern Fiji. The only major exception
was when Sakeasi Butadroka, a strongly ethnonationalist politician, proposed a motion to
Parliament calling for the repatriation of all Indo-Fijians to India.917 The motion quickly
failed, and the proposal badly fragmented his party.918 The severity of this failure to his
party and his own career can be seen as indicative of the nation’s feelings.
There is a reasonably widespread recognition that Indo-Fijians contribute
positively to the country.919 Despite the lack of a call to remove Indo-Fijians, the
conditions within Fiji have encouraged mass emigration, with most of those leaving IndoFijians.920 As the migrants are disproportionately skilled and educated persons, the
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economic impact is significant with some estimates placing the loss as high as F$274.7
million.921

5.4.3 Other Ethnonationalism
In looking at the strength of iTaukei ethnonationalism, there becomes a noticeable
absence of Indo-Fijian Nationalism in Fiji.922 Though now having been in Fiji for several
generations and having been mistreated and discriminated against at many points in Fiji’s
history, despite holding substantial economic power, there has never been calls for an
Indo-Fijian nation. This appears to be the result of an acceptance of the narrative that
Indo-Fijians are visitors with limited legitimate claim to the nation.923 Ease of emigration,
particularly to Australia and New Zealand, has also helped to provide an outlet for the
most frustrated Indo-Fijians.924 Rather than fight for a nation within Fiji, the most
agitated, who would otherwise be motivated to fight, elect to leave the country.
Whilst iTaukei ethnonationalism has received most of the scholarly and nonacademic attention, there is also the long-standing issue of the Rotuma nation. The
Rotuma islands were ceded to Great Britain in 1881 to be administered as part of Fiji
following a war amongst the chiefs of Rotuma.925 Rotumans are of a different ethnic
group than iTaukei Fijians, with the joint administration being the result of practical
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administrative concerns by Britain, rather than natural commonality between the
colonies. Though there was widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the islands
were represented, there was little call to split from Fiji when it was granted its
independence in 1970.926 The 1987 Fijian coup, however, led to vote of Chiefs and
representatives of Rotuma districts. They elected to remain part of Fiji. A vocal minority
objected and formed a group which declared the islands of Rotuma to be an independent
nation.927 Fiji sent police and military several weeks after the declaration “to restore
order” and again a month later.928 Though the secession efforts have largely faded with
Rotumans now being able to elect one representative to the Fijian House of
Representatives and appoint a representative to the Fijian Senate, there still remains some
discontent.

5.5

Conclusions

The classic image of hot nationalism is one of an extreme, typically violent, fight
for the nation. In this traditionally imagined form, it is marked by flags, protests, riots and
marches. It is assumed to be an emotionally driven time of upheaval and radicalism
fighting for their nation’s sovereignty. Despite these images’ place in the popular
imagination, the vast majority of separatist movements today have abandoned most of the
extreme forms of hot nationalism. Even most of those that still have a militant component
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to their movement has seen a transition into becoming the military of a de facto state
rather than remaining as a “rebel” militant group.
Modern hot nationalism has taken on a new shape. The courts and political action
have come to replace the displays and violence of the past. Groups will engage in highly
visible attempts to promote their idea of the nation to the public. The energy and
brazenness that marks hot nationalism remains completely present within these efforts,
but the methods by which they act have only become more refined, as the public’s taste
has shifted and its tolerance for violent extremism has waned.
Fiji is an excellent example of the transitions in hot nationalism. Though extreme
hot nationalism existed in Fiji only in extremely short bursts, Fiji has still had several
coups with rather fiery rhetoric surrounding them. The first three coups heavily utilised
hot nationalistic style ethnonationalism to build support for the coups. Public tolerance of
the coup’s culture has rapidly faded, such that the last coup was sold with the premise
that it would prevent future coups through the building of a strong, unified sovereign
state.
Hawaiian nationalism has seen a similar reimagining of hot nationalism. Its
opponent in the struggle for sovereignty is so much more powerful that there is little
chance of success with an armed independence struggle either directly or in a guerrillastyle effort. Furthermore, there is a near complete lack of public support for any sort of
violent method. As such, the technique required is one that shows that it is a distinct
nation and makes a moral appeal to convince the world to correct a historic injustice.
Though many directions have been employed, the current favourite seems to be utilising
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a twin approach of showing a strong, recognisable national identity and by making an
appeal to people’s sense of justice with a legalistic approach.
Both the Cook Islands and Niue share in a lack of appetite for traditional style hot
nationalism. They are by and large happy with the current arrangement. They are
independent states with a distinct national identity without any need or desire for blatant
nationalism.
Whilst hot nationalism has changed considerably across these nations to its
modern and more politically focused form, many nationalists are increasingly turning
their attention to the subtler everyday nationalism. Though everyday nationalism is
traditionally the result of unconscious expressions of the nation, it has become
increasingly part of the tool chest of nationalists as they work to shape what their nation
looks like.
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Chapter 6

6

Everyday Nationalism
Every day we encounter many reminders that we are situated in a nation. Even in

the smallest of nations (such as several of those in this paper), subtle symbols of
nationhood are a significant, though oft-ignored, part of daily life. These symbols are
highly pervasive and include those which are both very obviously nationalistic, such as
flags and anthems, and ones which are much less commonly seen as nationalistic, such as
food and sport. Billig argues that even some of the obvious symbols of nationalism can
be a part of the realm of everyday nationalism. He uses the example of the waved and
unwaved flag to differentiate between these two ways of using nationalistic symbols. The
waved flag represents the classic imaginings of nationalism; the flag being waved
proudly calling attention to itself. The unwaved flag describes the seemingly ever-present
but mostly ignored flag depictions. It encompasses the times in which the nation’s flag
has become a part of the background. This can include most of the times it is flown from
a flagpole in front of a business or attached to a uniform. Passerbys may subconsciously
register that the symbol of the nation is being flown but are unlikely to think much about
it or the nation it represents. This chapter explores the ways in which these unwaved daily
expressions of nationalism are expressed within the four nations of this dissertation.
One of the challenges with banal nationalism is that many expressions of it
involve decisions that are made for ostensibly practical reasons. The actor did not
typically set out to create a nationalistic representation but rather chose a course of action
based upon what they see as ordinary concerns. These decisions, however, are strongly

261

influenced by ingrained, unconscious values relating to nationhood. Take, for example,
Billig’s classic case of newspaper layout. An editor may have directly chosen to divide
the paper into “national” and “world” news for practical reasons based on printing
limitations, reporter allocation, etc. Ultimately, however, the fact that this division even
seems logical to the editor (versus arbitrarily splitting the paper into fifteen-page sections
or other content-neutral policy) is because of the pervasiveness of nationalism in our
everyday lives.
Further, whilst everyday nationalism is generally reproduced through
unconscious, or at-least minimally examined, behaviour, it can be orchestrated or
manipulated intentionally to serve nationalist agendas. Particularly within sovereignty
movements, activists will commonly encourage smaller, less offensive, changes to
aspects of daily life in order to normalise their idea of a sovereign nation. In doing so,
they encourage a gradual acceptance that allows for change that might otherwise be
unachievable.
Though attempts at gaining recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty have to-date
largely been unsuccessful, subtle recognition of a Hawaiian nation is present across daily
life in Hawaiʻi. There, however, remains some challenges in interpreting these symbols.
By co-opting the symbols of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, early state leaders managed to rob
those in favour of sovereignty of any of the clearest symbols of the movement. The
differences between the Kingdom version and the co-opted version are often too subtle to
be useful as a protest. The flag gains only a tiny amount of additional white space around
the cross between the Kingdom and the State of Hawaii versions. Even, the State coat of
arms differs from the Kingdom’s version only in replacing the centre with a star and
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some extremely minor stylistic changes. Sometimes there are no differences at all. The
anthems of the Kingdom and the State of Hawaii are identical. As such, it would be
unclear if a person singing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is supporting the State of Hawaii (by
singing the State anthem) or protesting against statehood in singing the Kingdom's
national anthem, as they are the same song. For many of the other symbols, there is a
similar challenge; the differences are noticeable only when in direct comparison to each
other. Simultaneously, however, the symbolism also works against the State of Hawaii by
the fact that nearly all of the State’s official symbols symbolically undermine the
legitimacy of the State by promoting the kingdom. As discussed later in this chapter,
“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” praises the monarchy, the State seal has symbols of the crown, and
many State holidays honour the monarchy.
The Cook Islands and Niue also feature meaningful contradictions in their
nationalist efforts. Both nations have a high dependence on New Zealand to fund
government activities. Any pro-nationalist government actions are likely to be undertaken
with funds that ultimately come from New Zealand, the very state that nationalists are
aiming to express distinction from. These contradictions may also be meaningful
evidence of these states’ independence and sovereignty. If they were truly just puppet
governments under New Zealand's control, it would be unlikely that they would be
undertaking official action that affirms a nationalistic distance from New Zealand.
Fiji represents a more traditional exploration of nationalism. With its sovereignty
fully recognised, the nationalistic fight is one of building an identity within historical
circumstances, rather than a struggle for recognition. As we have seen, unlike most of the
South Pacific island nations, Fiji has significant cultural and ethnic diversity. Fijians face
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challenges in building an inclusive identity while preserving traditional culture and land
rights. Where traditional expressions of hot nationalism have been largely divisive in Fiji,
evidence of everyday nationalism suggests that a unified identity may already be
occurring with much greater success than official or most academic narratives suggest.
Despite contradictions and challenges, the expressions of banal nationalism do
reasonably reflect each nation’s typically recognised sovereignty status and version of
nationhood. Fiji’s symbols are those of a fully sovereign nation. Hawaiʻi clearly
represents a special status: not really fully part of the U.S. nation, but also still undeniably
not that of a fully sovereign nation. Niue and the Cook Islands express most of the
symbols of everyday nationalism, but in a much subtler and more muddled way than in
many other small, clearly independent island states.
This chapter opens with a discussion of some of the more banal aspects of banal
nationalism and progresses into an exploration of the more typically studied areas of
everyday nationalism. Though each of these areas can be highly important for identity,
many are seen as the result of more seemingly practical minor decisions rather than
statements of nationalism. These apparently insignificant decisions when looked at a
nation level form a meaningful part of their expression of everyday nationalism. Further,
even when practical reasons provide a reasonable explanation, the acceptability of the
choice and the climate that allows that choice would suggest that banal nationalism is
functioning across many areas of daily life in each of the nations studied.

6.1

Customs and Immigration

Crossing through customs and immigration provide the clearest and often first
encountered demarcation that a person is entering another nation. It provides an
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exceptionally obvious symbol of the state’s recognition of its own boundedness. Going
through customs and immigration is an unavoidable ritual for most border crossings929.
This ritual and the physically demarcated space associated with it serves as a place in
which boundary identities are confirmed, and the rules of acceptable goods within a
nation are enforced. As the first point of contact with the state, there is a highly
significant opportunity for the state to express its identity and define its relationship with
the world.
Travellers to Niue (including those coming from New Zealand) are required to
complete an arrival card, which must be submitted to an immigration officer along with
their passport. Baggage is screened by customs, and strict biosecurity limitations are
imposed. Although processing relatively small numbers of people, both immigration and
customs officials attach the same seriousness and attention to detail as any other state’s
inspection services. The Cook Islands maintains largely the same system as Niue. There
are no special exceptions made for New Zealanders. In this regard, both Niue and the
Cook Islands act indistinguishably from any other sovereign state to protect their borders
from unauthorised immigration, biosecurity concerns and control importation. This
contrasts with the model typically employed for overseas territories (like Guam or Puerto
Rico) where no passport is required when travelling between the territory and the state. It
thus reaffirms the sovereignty of Niue and the Cook Islands in following the model
expected of a sovereign state.

929

Even within a group of countries that have common travel areas such as the Schengen Area, there

is still typically the physical infrastructure for controlling immigration and customs checks.
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Fiji operates a customs and immigration service typical of a nation of its size. All
visitors complete an arrival card, present their passport, and submit their baggage for
customs screening. There is no special priority given to citizens from any other state. This
procedure contrasts with the model under which many other states operate. In those
states, there will be dedicated immigration queues for citizens of countries that have
special relationships with the state. For example, New Zealand has dedicated immigration
queues for Australian citizens, reflecting the privileged status of Australians under the
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement930. Fiji, however, lacks these sorts of close ties with
other states and has only citizen and noncitizen immigration queues (as well as
logistically necessary disability assistance, VIP and crew queues).
Although Hawaiʻi does not have its own immigration requirements for travel
originating in the United States, it does have strict customs-style agricultural
enforcement. All travellers are required to complete a form documenting what
agricultural items they are bringing into the state, with significant penalties for failing to
complete the form or for bringing in prohibited items. Though serving a slightly different
function, this process is most similar to the experience of travel to a foreign country,
rather than typical domestic travel. Budget cuts have reduced the agricultural inspection
process to a largely honour-based system, but visitors used to be required to submit their
agricultural inspection form to an inspector with random bag searches prior to exiting the
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This agreement between Australia and New Zealand allows for citizens of the two nations to live

and work in the other country with only a few limitations. For the vast majority of Australians and New
Zealanders, except those with criminal charges, it allows unrestricted free movement between the two
countries.
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baggage area. There have been frequent calls to return to this stronger system or an
otherwise more intensive formulation. Departing Hawaiʻi, all baggage is screened by
USDA inspectors. In this way, Hawaiʻi is fairly unique. It is exceptionally rare for states
to have inspections like this at their domestic borders. This system of formal inspection,
though legally different from customs and immigration, provides a similar feel of
crossing a nation’s border.
In all four nations, visitors are typically greeted with local style music prior to
going through the above-mentioned entry rituals (in all but Hawaii, typically performed
by a live band). This could be seen as further increasing the ritual of the border crossing
by demarcating it further and adding a non-practical, solely symbolic element to it.

6.2

Air Travel

The typical division between domestic and international as it relates to air travel
provides a very obvious, though not very frequently encountered, reminder of the
boundaries of the nation. Flights are generally sorted into domestic and international
within the physical spaces of the airports. This flagging serves to remind travellers of
what can be considered within the nation and what is outside it. Though not mentioned by
Billig, this is an extremely clear example of the style of banal nationalism he describes.
The differences between domestic and international travel are explicit, but often
underexamined by most travellers. The ways in which the two differ are generally clearly
noticed in the numerous logistical distinctions, but few reflect at the time upon the fact
that these are required because of the arbitrary boundness of their nation. For example, a
flight from Toronto to Windsor, Ontario is treated completely differently than a flight
from Toronto to Detroit, despite the two airports being only 34km apart. The notion that
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some flights have one set of characteristics because they are “domestic”, and others
should have another because they are “international” is accepted without question,
demonstrating the internalisation of the idea of the nation.
Given the division of flights into domestic and international, we would expect that
nations would have flight divisions that reflect their national status. Flights within the
nation's borders should always be treated as domestic, and flights outside its borders
would be treated as international without further distinction. This is the case for Niue, the
Cook Islands and Fiji, reinforcing their sovereignty and identity as a nation. Hawaiʻi,
however, provides an unusual case.
As is to be expected, flights from Auckland to Niue and the Cook Islands operate
out of Auckland Airport’s international terminal. Like all other international flights,
travellers to Niue and the Cook Islands must complete a New Zealand departure card and
clear outbound immigration on departure. As is typical for independent countries,
travellers to these islands are treated as would any international passenger departing
Auckland without any regard to the special status of Niue and the Cook Islands.
Niue International Airport currently has flights only to Auckland, and due to the
small size of the country will never have domestic flights (perhaps with the exception of
sightseeing circle tours). As such, all flights out of the Niue International Airport are
international and are treated that way operationally. Rarotonga International Airport in
the Cook Islands, however, has both domestic and international flights. The airport is
split into a domestic gate area and an international area. International flights require
travellers to go through exit immigration. Flights to Auckland and Christchurch are
treated no differently than non-New Zealand international flights.
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Fiji has two international airports: Nadi International Airport and Nausori Airport
near Suva, the capital. Nadi has separate international and domestic terminals. All flights
within Fiji leave from the domestic terminal. All international flights, including flights to
neighbouring island-states, leave from the international terminal. Due to its very small
size, Nausori Airport has only one terminal. They, however, do divide the terminal into a
domestic section and an international section. Scheduled air service within Fiji is
operated exclusively by Northern Air and Fiji Link. The national flag carrier, Fiji
Airways, operates no domestic flights. Fiji Link, however, operates flights to five
international destinations in Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa and Vanuatu. Though unusual for
what is otherwise a small regional carrier, this model has been used in other parts of the
world to serve neighbouring countries on routes where larger planes are not economically
sound. For example, the Canadian carrier Jazz Aviation serves over twenty secondary
U.S. destinations from Canada under the brand Air Canada Express, along with its
extensive domestic route network.
Honolulu International Airport, Hawaii’s main airport, has three terminals.
Dividing flights into “overseas”, “inter-island” and “commuter” (inter-island flights
operated by prop planes). U.S mainland domestic and international flights are operated
out of the same gates of the overseas terminal without any differentiation. This division is
fairly unique as no other major U.S. airport separates intra-state flights from other flights.
This separation creates the impression of the typical split between domestic and
international as if flights within Hawaiʻi are domestic and flights to everywhere else are
international. Flights to Hawaiʻi also share this unusual division. Though not universal,
many flights to Hawaiʻi from mainland U.S. airports are operated out of dedicated gates
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or gates shared only with international flights, often in terminals or concourses separate
from most other domestic flights for a combination of logistical and marketing reasons.
Flights to the U.S. mainland are referred to as “domestic” flights, but there is a
sense that they are not really domestic flights. Though there are a handful of longer
domestic flights within the continental U.S., the flight to Hawaii is still significantly
longer than the majority of domestic flights and spends more time over water than any
other U.S. domestic flight. Hawaiʻi is almost twice the distance from the mainland United
States than is the furthest point in the U.S. from any other country. Flights to Hawaiʻi are
frequently over twice the cost from the U.S. mainland compared with international flights
to Canada, Mexico or the Caribbean. Even flights from Hawaiʻi to other countries (such
as Japan or Australia) are often cheaper than domestic flights to the U.S. mainland.
Furthermore, many airlines operate service to Hawaiʻi using a hybrid of their domestic
and international service models. For crew scheduling purposes on most airlines,
Hawaiʻi-U.S. flights are considered international and flights are typically catered
differently with meals specially marketed for the route. Additionally, a handful of
Hawaiʻi routes still have complimentary meal service long after it was discontinued on
other domestic routes. These differences all serve as reminders to travellers at every step
of the process that they are not on a typical domestic flight.
The division between domestic and international flights is largely arbitrary. Air
France’s Paris to Papeete flight takes over 22 hours, flys 15,715km and crosses two
oceans, but is a domestic flight. However, their Paris to London flight takes less than an
hour to fly 348 km yet is considered an international flight. Though both flights cross the
ocean, the difference is solely within how the nations are conceptualised. Fiji, Cook
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Islands and Niue use a domestic/international split that is fully in line with what is
expected of them as sovereign nations. Hawaii’s situation is unusual in that not treated
fully as a domestic nor an international destination. This sort of ambiguity can help to
establish a national identity that is unique from the rest of the United States.

6.3

Shipping

How mail is expected to be addressed, though typically seen to be of minimal
importance in daily life, like many areas of banal nationalism can actually serve as a
reminder of the nation. One aspect is the designation of mail as foreign or domestic with
changes in shipping cost and process. Another aspect is how the mail is addressed, which
differs based on its status as domestic or international. Fiji, Niue and the Cook Islands all
have their names listed in the country field of an address (i.e., PO Box 42, Alofi, Niue
Island for the Niue Tourism Office). This is to be expected of an independent nation that
is a member of the Universal Postal Union. In contrast, non-sovereign territories will
generally include the host country’s name (i.e., PO Box 1030, Cocos Keeling Islands,
Indian Ocean WA, Australia 6799). Hawaiʻi, since statehood, has been considered a
domestic shipping destination for mail from mainland U.S. Mail from other countries
should include U.S.A in the address field. Although considered a domestic destination by
the U.S. Postal Service, many merchants choose to treat Hawaii differently. It is not
uncommon for companies to advertise free shipping within mainland U.S., but then
charge to ship to Hawaiʻi (often without any disclaimer of this fact). Although this
decision is generally based on practical cost or logistical reasons, the fact that merchants
see it as acceptable indicates that they do not fully consider Hawaiʻi a U.S. destination.
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Again, Fiji, Niue and the Cook Islands operations are congruent with their status, and
Hawaiʻi operates in a hybrid position.

6.4

Sense of Foreignness

Many visitors to the islands of this dissertation note a strong sense of foreignness.
One guidebook suggests that you should “approach Hawaii like you would another
country”, and another notes that “it’s not outside the United States yet seems like another
country”. “Do I need my passport to get to Hawaiʻi?” is a common question across the
travel websites for Hawaiʻi. Various campaigns and travel guides have described the
Cook Islands, Fiji and Niue as being “like another world”, “totally unique” and other
similar representations that visitors are going to experience something different than their
home nation. This sense of foreignness is extremely difficult to quantify but seems very
present in each of these nations.
Like much of banal nationalism, the sense of foreignness that these nations have
is very much a self-reinforcing concept. An initial impression of foreignness or historical
difference sets visitors onto a mindset of foreignness in which each example of it (no
matter how small) is perceived as significant evidence of such. Furthermore, given the
utility of marketing exoticism in tourism, this sense of foreignness is often used to
establish a specific pro-tourism impression of the islands. This can be seen within many
tourist-audience oriented practice of mixing in of traditional language (such as the
frequent seemingly random context-less incorporation of Hawaiian words in tourism
materials), statements along the lines of “here in the islands we do X” and other highprofile expressions of mildly “exotic” culture. Though it is often a blurred line, this sort
of cultural usage generally has the feel of cultural appropriation rather than genuine
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attempts to incorporate local culture. Rather what is presented is a version of the culture
built to fit tourist’s preconceived notions of the islands, rather than the island's culture
would be otherwise. Tiki bars and the like are clear examples of this sort of model.
Regardless of the authenticity and motivations for the sense of foreignness, it could help
strengthen the nation in defining mental borders. The feeling of foreignness helps to
internalise the idea that it may actually be another nation.

6.5

Remoteness

All of the subject nations are a considerable geographic distance from other
nations. As small island states, none share land borders with any other state. Further,
whilst all have navigable waters, their distance from other states means there is no
scheduled passenger service by sea to any of them. Air travel is the only viable option to
travel to these states. Niue is a 3.5-hour 2,484 km flight from Auckland, and the Cook
Islands are a 3,014 km and almost four-hour flight from Auckland. Fiji, though having
flights to many of its smaller island neighbours, is still over 2,000 km and three hours
away from Auckland, the nearest of Fiji’s larger neighbours. Hawaiʻi is an over five-hour
flight from San Francisco, almost 4,000km away (the nearest major city). All of these
island nations are quite geographically remote with Hawaiʻi being described as the most
remote population centre in the world. As such, regardless of the islands' actual status,
travellers to each will feel that they have completed a long journey to a remote place. The
rituals of travel associated with a journey of this type create a gravitas that is not felt on
shorter journeys. Travel to any of these nations is not something that can be done lightly.
The trip is not a short hop across the border, but rather a meaningful, typically well
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planned, journey. As such, travel to these nations fully feels as if you have in-fact entered
another nation.

6.6

Language

Language has long been one of the major battlegrounds of nationalism. It
provides a way in which diverse populations can be artificially united around a common
identity. This can be seen quite clearly in the Soviet Union's Russification policy.
Although not overly successfully, use of the Cyrillic alphabet and imposed learning of
Russian was a key part of forming a larger Soviet nation. Though the nations of this
dissertation have historically discouraged native language usage (including an outright
ban in Hawaiʻi), today, language is a key battleground of banal nationalism. All the
nations of this dissertation have a native language as an official language, but English
continues to dominate public life. Having already obtained official language status, the
focus for pro-Native nationalists must then be to encourage the language’s acceptance
and usage in everyday life. The goal for them will be to shape the expressions of banal
nationalism. Using the native language should become unconscious and normalised
wherein every usage further strengthens the nation’s identity in reminding people that it
is a distinct nation.
Despite Hawaiian being one of the two official languages of Hawaiʻi (along with
English), there is only minimal visible use of it. Hawaiʻi lacks any sort of language policy
on the level of Canada's Official Languages Act (in which services must be delivered in
both languages) or Québec’s Charter of the French Language (requiring French in
commerce and other areas of daily life). Rather, Hawaiʻi has a much weaker standard in
which, per the state constitution, “Hawaiian shall be required for public acts and
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transactions only as provided by law”. The state government has virtually no obligation
to provide services in Hawaiian, and private entities have no obligation at all. As a result,
beyond limited services specifically targeting Hawaiian populations, Hawaiian is not
used for most areas of daily life for actual conversations. Many Hawaiian phrases,
however, have become a normal part of daily life in Hawaiʻi. “Aloha” and “Mahalo” is
likely used more commonly across Hawaiʻi than “hello” and “thank you”. Similarly, puka
(hole), keiki (child), and kuleana (responsibility), amongst others, are used quite
frequently within conversations that are otherwise in English.
Despite the commonality of incorporating short Hawaiian phrases or emblematic
statements within state-sponsored or official activities, Hawaiian sees only minimal and
often symbolic usage. For example, airport arrival announcements are pre-recorded in
both Hawaiian and English, and a bilingual video is available for airlines to play to
welcome travellers to Hawaiʻi. Flight boarding announcements, however, are typically
entirely in English (and sometimes in the destination country’s language) with minimal
Hawaiian mixed in (often little more than aloha, mahalo or other phrases of greeting or
thanks). Across the websites of the University of Hawaiʻi, virtually no content is
available in Hawaiian. Even the Hawai‘inuiākea School of Hawaiian Knowledge at UH
Mānoa switches to English after its introductory paragraph. UH Hilo’s College of
Hawaiian Language website is the only part of UH’s online presence that is fully
bilingual. The State of Hawaii’s website has virtually no Hawaiian language content,
offering only the option to translate the site using the automated Google Translate tool.
Similarly, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, though making heavy use of Hawaiian phrases,
is entirely in English. The Department of Education has only a single page, “Hawaiian
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Education”, available in Hawaiian. Even within those actively promoting the Hawaiian
language, English remains the primary language for communications. Of the twenty-one
Hawaiian language immersion schools listed by the Hawaii State Department of
Education, only one has a website that is fully available in Hawaiian (and English).
Additionally, the website of ‘Aha Pūnana Leo, a state-wide set of preschools focused on
Hawaiian language and cultural support is largely available in both Hawaiian and
English, but it defaults to English and has several gaps in its translations.
Despite the limited public usage of Hawaiian, there has been a concerted effort to
promote Hawaiian as the language of daily life. The most significant of these would be
Hawaiian immersion schools. Though Hawaiian has been taught in schools for some
time, it has been limited to language and cultural education courses (often only one to
two hours of instruction per week). Most students learn only basic phrases and have
limited ability to converse in Hawaiian. Hawaiian immersion programs, in contrast, aim
to provide instruction fully (or primarily) in Hawaiian, allowing students to gain a
mastery of the language. There are currently twenty-one public Hawaiian immersion
schools and a handful of private ones. These programs aim to restore the Hawaiian
language and culture. There are also a number of churches that offer services fully in
Hawaiian, as well as a small number of health clinics that provide service in Hawaiian
(often along with traditional/blended Hawaiian health care). Despite these services, it
remains difficult for a Hawaiian speaker to use only Hawaiian in daily life, as for
example, store clerks, wait staff, utility workers and most government employees would
be unable to assist in Hawaiian. Though most Hawaiian usage is symbolic and minimal, it
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does still serve an important function in building national identity. This function is
reinforced as intentional efforts to improve daily Hawaiian usage increase.
Niue’s constitution grants equal legal status for Niuean and English for legislative
business. Proceedings of the assembly are to be translated on request, and all bills are to
be in both English and Niuean with no preference given to either language. However,
there does not appear to be any statutory requirement for other government functions or
services to be provided in either language.
Though many speak Niuean, English remains widely used. The website of the
government of Niue is almost exclusively in English, with a few Niuean phrases
incorporated. Tāoga Niue (the agency tasked with promoting Niuean culture, language
and tradition) has significant portions of its website in Niuean, but it falls far short of a
full translation. Throughout Niue, a small amount of signage is printed bilingually, with
the English text dominant. The vast majority is, however, in English only. A notable
exception is the “Welcome to Niue” sign at the airport, which has the Niuean statement
“Fakaalofa Lahi Atu” first.
Niue’s migration patterns, with frequent immigration and travel between New
Zealand and Niue, have necessitated strong English-language skills. English remains the
primary language in schools. Given the lack of higher education options on the island, all
higher education would be received overseas, likely in English-speaking New Zealand
universities. Niuean is, however, frequently used at home and socially. Both within Niue
and abroad there have been efforts to promote and preserve its language. The New
Zealand government, through its Pacific Language Weeks program, has coordinated Niue
Language Week with events designed to celebrate and promote Niuean culture and
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language in New Zealand. A resource book is also supplied for teachers and students to
build language skills. As these efforts are largely funded by the New Zealand
government’s Ministry for Pacific Peoples, they share the same contradictions of the New
Zealand government’s other cultural identity promotion in strengthening a non-New
Zealand national identity.
In the Cook Islands, the official languages are English and Cook Islands Maori.
The Te Reo Maori Act 2003, which established Māori as an official language, tasks the
Ministry of Cultural Development with raising Maori to equal status with English.
Beyond that, the act adds no obligation to the government or others to offer services or
publications in Māori. English is the most typically used language in Rarotonga, with
casual Māori usage declining. Similar linguistic shifts appear to be occurring in the other
islands as well.
Most web pages of the Cook Islands' government are exclusively in English. The
Ministry of Justice translates some of the content, but the majority is available only in
English. Tauranga Vananga (Ministry of Cultural Development) mostly uses English on
its site with Maori headings. Select notices of the Ministry of Health are published in
both languages. Physical signage across the islands is mostly in English, though some
government-printed signs are in Māori as well. A few protest signs (such as those
opposed to Sunday flights) are written only in Māori.
Cook Islands Māori is a compulsory school subject up to Year Eleven, with full
bilingualism as the stated goal. In practice, however, Māori language learning is seriously
limited by the lack of teachers, instructional materials and other needed resources. There
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have been a number of efforts to improve Māori language learning and reverse the harm
done by previous Māori bans in schools, but results have been slow.
As is the case with Niuean, the New Zealand government sponsors a Cook Islands
Language Week. Additionally, New Zealand Māori has a special legal status in New
Zealand, allowing it to be used for official business within the country. This is of limited
assistance because Cook Islands Māori, while closely related to New Zealand Māori, is a
distinct language. Like other Pacific languages, its usage is frequently accommodated in
New Zealand, but there is no legal obligation to support it.
English serves as the de facto lingua franca in Fiji. The vast majority of Fijians
speak English as either a first or second language. Fijian is spoken by most iTaukei, and
Hindi is spoken by most Indo-Fijians as either a first or second language, with English as
the other language. It is extremely common to hear Hindi or Fijian spoken in public, with
speakers frequently switching between English and Fijian. Business is frequently
conducted in any of these languages. Though there is an increasing number of IndoFijians who speak Fijian and iTaukei who speak Hindi, it is not expected. English
competency (or at least confidence in English competency) varies greatly. Many prefer to
communicate when possible in their other language, despite their bilingualism.
Particularly in rural areas, it is entirely possible for a Fijian to communicate solely in
Fijian or Hindi without any need to switch to English. Although English dominates
signage, Fijian or Hindi is frequently used, with many signs written in all three
languages. All three are taught in government primary schools as compulsory subjects.
The Constitution of Fiji recognises English, Fijian and Hindi as Fiji’s official
languages (since the 1997 Constitution). The 2013 Constitution also mandates that it be
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translated into all three languages. The English edition is recognised as the legally
authoritative version, with the Fijian and Hindi editions considered translations. As part
of the Right to Education section, the 2013 Constitution added the mandate that
“Conversational and contemporary iTaukei and Fiji Hindi languages shall be taught as
compulsory subjects in all primary schools”.
Although standard Hindi is constitutionally recognised, there is a lack of clear,
official recognition of Fijian Hindi. Fijian Hindi, through derived from standard Hindi, is
linguistically distinct. The language blends several regional dialects of Hindi and
incorporates loan words from Fijian and English and is typically written with Roman
script. Though more commonly and widely spoken in Fiji than standard Hindi, Fijian
Hindi is often seen negatively as a “broken” or “corrupted” Hindi and inappropriate for
formal settings. Denial of the linguistic validity of Fijian Hindi, though typically done by
Indo-Fijians, is extremely useful to pro-iTaukei nationalists. Fijian Hindi remains one of
the most visible markers of difference between Indo-Fijians and other Indians. By
denying the language, pro-iTaukei nationalists can support the argument that Indo-Fijians
should be treated as guests in Fiji without any obligation towards cultural preservation.
Though the 2013 constitutional mandate seems to be fairly clear that Fijian Hindi should
be taught in school, in practice it appears that Standard Hindi is what is typically taught.
Despite constitutional guarantees of language equality, English is the primary
language of government services. The website of the Fijian government is nearly entirely
in English without any translations available. The constitution, however, is available from
the government site in Hindi and Fijian, in addition to English (though not Fijian Hindi).
The government also publishes a Fijian language news sheet entitled Noda Viti, which is
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paired with but is not a translation of, the English language Fiji Focus. The last edition of
both was in late 2015. There does not appear to be a Hindi edition. Individual interactions
with the government can and often will be in the citizen’s preferred language, but this
choice seems more a function of the individual government official’s personal language
competence than an official policy.
Languages policies vary greatly across states. They are frequently a target of
nationalists looking to use them to strengthen feelings of connectedness or as a boundary
marker. All four nations have policies that promote the indigenous language of the
nation. Only Fiji’s, however, seems to be particularly effective. The Cook Islands and
Niue have declining numbers of Māori and Niuean speakers, as practical limitations
overwhelm nationalistic and cultural preservation goals. Hawaiʻi has one of the most
active sets of language revitalisation efforts of any nation931. These efforts, though very
effective at strengthening the Hawaiian nation, are still in their infancy. Fiji, in contrast,
sees frequent use of all three of its official languages. Its official language policies, in
creating equal status for all three languages, seem to be fairly effective at promoting a
civic-nationalism agenda. Language policy, however, does remain an active battleground
for ethnonationalists fighting the government's position towards civic unity.
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6.7

Newspapers

Print media have traditionally been highly significant for nationalism. They have
historically been a key way in which nationalist agendas are spread to the masses (though
this role has increasingly been replaced by the Internet). As I noted earlier, Newspapers
are also one of the classic areas of study for banal nationalism. Beyond the overt
nationalistic agendas of many papers, is a much subtler reproduction of nationalism in the
way in which the paper is arranged. The common division of news into “local”,
“national” and “world” sections (typically with the paper’s resources placed in this order
as well) normalises this division of the world. It assumes that there is a natural reason
why news should be divided up in this way. News occurring within the nation is
presented as if it is more relevant than that which is occurring geographically closer but
on the other side of a national border. Each of the nations in this paper has newspapers
that have adopted various conventions on how they define local and national news.
The Fiji Sun and the Fiji Times are Fiji’s largest print newspapers. Both are
dailies published in Suva. They are widely available and read. Issues of the Fiji Sun are
typically divided into large “National News” and ”National Sports” sections; one page for
“International News” and “Australia/NZ updates”; and another page for “Bollywood
News”. The Fiji Times labels its national news section, which occupies the majority of
the paper, simply as “News”. Issues also include small sections labelled “Pacific News”
and “World”. The sports section, however, mixes both national and world sporting events
under the title “Sport”.
The Jet Newspaper claims to be Fiji’s first community paper and is published
monthly out of Nadi. The bulk of the paper features “Local News”. The national news
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and sports sections lack any section headings. No international or regional news is
included.
Hawaiʻi has five daily newspapers as well as a number of weekly and specialised
papers. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser is Hawaii’s largest paper. Issues are divided into a
“News” section that is primarily local news with high-profile national news incorporated;
a “National” section, including news from across the U.S.; a “World” section; and a
“Local” section covering news within Hawaiʻi. The Hawaii Tribune-Herald, which
serves the east side of the island of Hawaiʻi (the Big Island), focuses more heavily on
Hawaiʻi. Hawaiʻi news is presented without a section heading; non-Hawaiʻi news is
under “Nation and World” or “News”. This grouping suggests U.S. news and world news
are interchangeable and need only be distinguished from news occurring in Hawaiʻi. The
island of Hawaii’s other paper, the West Hawaii Today, uses an identical model. The
Garden Island, which serves the island of Kauai, uses a model in which issues are split
into “Hawaii News”; “Nation News” (covering U.S. News); and “World News”. The
Maui News, which serves the island of Maui, uses the headings “Local News” (covering
stories about Maui County); “Hawaii News”; “National News” (covering U.S. news); and
“International News”. All the newspapers in Hawaiʻi, except the Maui Time Weekly, are
owned by non-Hawaiʻi publishers. The Canadian company Black Press Ltd. owns The
Garden Island, the Hawaii Tribune-Herald, the Honolulu Star-Advertiser and the West
Hawaii Today. The Maui News is owned by Ogden Newspapers of West Virginia.
The Niue Star is Niue’s only newspaper. Though claiming to be a weekly, it
currently seems to publish an edition roughly once a month. It is published in Niuean
with an English translation. It is available exclusively in print at limited news-sellers in
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Niue and New Zealand. Since Cyclone Heta in 2004, the paper has been printed in New
Zealand by a Niuean living in New Zealand. According to its editor, Michael Jackson, the
paper is “the community newspaper”; “it's mainly information, village happenings,
community happenings, family interest stories like hair cuttings and ear piercing.” With
such a large portion of Niueans living abroad, the paper serves an important role in
connecting Niueans in diaspora with the island. Most issues are under twenty pages and
focus almost exclusively on Niuean news. A section labelled “Regional News” provides
events of interest to Niueans living elsewhere by reprinting selected New Zealand Herald
articles. No attempt is made to cover general-interest world news.
The Cook Islands News is published five days a week. It divides the news into
national and regional. National news is split into “local” (Rarotonga) and “other islands”.
Regional news appears to cover the other Pacific Island nations and New Zealand. The
Cook Islands Herald is a weekly paper. The issues published in February 2016932 average
twenty-two pages. With the exception of foreign lottery numbers on the cover, the entire
paper is about domestic topics and foreign news solely as they relate to the Cook Islands;
only a single article per paper covers general world news. Even the world news articles
cover only Pacific island topics of direct interest and relevance to the Cook Islands, such
as “Concern over dead fish in Fiji and Vanuatu” and “Zika virus monitoring continues in
Pacific”. The paper is mostly in English, but the “Te Kave Korero” section has quotations
in Maori, with an English translation sometimes provided.
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The newspapers of these nations share the typical divide noted within studies of
banal nationalism globally. They split newsworthy events into national and international
news with a greater emphasis on national news. Of interest in Hawaiʻi is the trend of
frequently grouping news about the United States with the international news. This
division seems to feel natural to readers even though it does not reflect current political
borders.

6.8

National Anthems

National anthems are in a hybrid position between hot and everyday nationalism.
Though undeniably a highly visible part of displays of hot nationalism, most renditions of
a state’s anthem are banal; and, barring significant secondary politicisation (such as that
which occurred recently within U.S. sports), they are not often examined.
“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, the official state song of Hawaii, was also the final national
anthem of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. It was written in 1874 by King David Kalākaua with
music by the king's royal bandmaster, Captain Henri Berger. The song is similar in spirit
to many other national anthems. With the title translating to “Hawaii’s Own”, the song
calls on the people of Hawaiʻi (“Hawaii’s own true sons”) to be loyal to their king and
respect their duty. It praises King Kamehameha I and has an implied message of unity
and protection in this praise.
As part of the ceremonial marking of the annexation, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was
played by the Hawaiian band as the flag was lowered over the Iolani Palace.933 The
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American flag was then raised, and the military band of the U.S.S Philadelphia played
the “Star Spangled Banner”.934 Nineteen members of the Hawaiian band refused to play
because they saw it as the “funeral hymn of their dying country”.935 A Hawaiʻi
newspaper, The Independent, described the ceremony as “more like a funeral than a feast
day”, with many, including supporters of the annexation, described as openly crying
during the event.936 One person present for the ceremony noted that it marked a
welcoming into a new nation, “but the history of Hawaii as a nation was, nevertheless,
ended forever; its annals for the future are to be blended with those of the great republic
over the sea. Never again, except as an echo of the past, will [“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”] be sung
as the national hymn of Hawaii”.937 This prediction, fortunately, proved to be false.
“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” regained popularity and eventually became the state anthem. “Hawaiʻi
Ponoʻī” has traditionally been used to close music performances. Although this tradition
faded following the overthrow, by 1902 it had been revived.938 “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” became
the de facto song of the territory of Hawaiʻi (typically played with the “Star Spangled
Banner”) and became the official state song by an act of the Hawaiʻi State Legislature in
1967. This decision is interesting, considering the lyrics and politicisation of the song.

1/#date1=1789&sort=relevance&rows=20&words=Hawaii+Ponoi&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index
=6&state=&date2=1922&proxtext=hawaii+ponoi&y=9&x=17&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=2.
934

William A. Mowry, The Territorial Growth of the United States (New York: Silver, Burdett and

Company, 1902), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100121976.
935

“The Passing of Hawaii.”

936

Ibid.

937

Mowry, The Territorial Growth of the United States.

938

“Concert for Lepers,” The Pacific Commercial Advertiser., January 13, 1902.

286

A post-overthrow column in an 1894 issue of The Pacific Commercial Advertiser
suggested that “If Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī is to be retained as the national anthem until it is
exchanged for America, it is at any rate high time to adopt some words which will not be
a standing invitation to insurrection”939 They suggest a “Patriotic version with the royalist
sentiments elided”, noting that “Hawaii Ponoʻī is a good old song, but it contains too
much feudal sentiment to suit these progressive days. Here is a version which strikes out
the too effusive references to the Alii, etc.”940 The proposed version replaces references
to the monarchy and chiefs with vague sentiments about the nation. The same year an
ultrapatriotic version of “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was published by the stridently pro-Hawaiian
monarchy newspaper Hawaii Holomua, possibly in response to the proposal in The
Pacific Commercial Advertiser. This song, entitled “a Mele for Liliuokalani”,941 called on
“Hawaii’s Own” to “Look to your Sovereign Liliuokalani” with a chorus of “Queen
Lolokulani For Hawaiʻi nei942 Prevail”. It is unclear if either version gained any sort of
meaningful traction, as neither paper mentioned its version again.
With “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” becoming the official state song in 1967, an unusual
situation has arisen. One of the officially endorsed symbols of the government is itself
anti-government. When “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is played it covertly undermines the very state
it is meant to promote. This situation is different from past historical examples of the
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absorption of state symbols by successor governments because no attempt is made to
adapt the symbol. “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is left completely intact, despite its extremely promonarchy message (and thus anti-state of Hawaii message). This sort of countergovernment usage can be seen in the hearings over federal recognition of Hawaiians. In a
public hearing conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior, several attendees started
singing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, emphasising the line Nānā i kou moʻī (Be loyal to your
king).943
Since independence in 1970, “God Bless Fiji” has been Fiji's national anthem.
This song asks God to bless Fiji while its people “stand united under noble banner blue”
and “honour and defend the cause of freedom ever”. The national anthem does not appear
to have been codified at any point, although the People's Charter for Change, Peace and
Progress (a nonbinding precursor to the recently adopted constitution) did state that the
national anthem should be in the country's three main languages: Fijian, Hindi and
English. “God Bless Fiji” is typically sung in English. When Fiji competes in World
Rugby events, “God Bless Fiji” is sung (in English) even though the team is entirely
iTaukei. “Meda Dau Doka” (a Fijian language song) is often also sung. Though
commonly reported as the Fijian version of the national anthem, it remains unclear what
the actual official status of “Meda Dau Doka” is. The Fijian Embassy to Brussels lists the
lyrics to “Meda Dau Doka” as the “Fijian Lyrics” to the national anthem,944 and the CIA
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World Factbook vaguely notes that “the anthem is known in Fijian as "Meda Dau Doka".
It is not, however, a translation and has not been codified as an anthem for the country. A
Hindi version of either song, or any other national anthem like song, does not appear to
have ever been created. The anthem “God Bless Fiji” is routinely played at Fijian
sporting events and often at other civic functions. “Meda Dau Doka” is less frequently
played at sporting events.
Niue has used "Ko e Iki he Lagi" (The Lord in Heaven), as its national anthem
since 1974 when it became a self-governing state. The song recognises that the “Lord in
Heaven, Who loves Niue … rules completely over Niue”. “God Save the Queen” is also
retained as the anthem for the monarchy. "Ko e Iki he Lagi" was a popular song in Niue
and seen as representative of Niue even prior to self-governance. Before independence,
however, there were few occasions that needed the song. One of those times was during
the 1963 South Pacific Games in which the organisers asked countries to select
"identifying tunes" to represent them, rather than only their national anthem (many of
which shared "God Defend New Zealand" or "God Save the Queen"). Niue elected to use
"Ko e Iki he Lagi”, though it still competed using the flag of New Zealand. However,
Niue failed to win any events, so there was no occasion on which to play it. With Niue’s
limited participation in multinational sports and other occasions of public anthem
performance, there is still little opportunity for the anthem to be played outside limited
state functions.
The Cook Islands national anthem is defined in the constitution as "Te Atua mou
e" (“ To God Almighty”, though the song is typically titled “God is Truth” in English).
The song is a prayer “To God Almighty” to “protect and guide us; and give us your
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crown of truth; so we can be successful; and so that love and peace will rule forever over
our beloved country.” The song was composed by Sir Tom Davis, then prime minister of
the Cook Islands, with the lyrics by his wife, Pa Tepaeru Terito Ariki. It was adopted in
1982 to replace the no-longer-relevant New Zealand anthem, "God Defend New
Zealand"945. “Te Atua mou e” reflects the Cook Islands' strong religious identity. A 1994
referendum to change the anthem was overwhelmingly defeated with 80 per cent of the
voters opposed to the change.
National anthems serve as very noticeable nationalist symbols. They are used to
evoke feelings of pride in the nation and often to energise the audience’s connection to
their team. Though its usage is clearly nationalistic, listeners often don’t feel this way.
The anthem blends into the background as just another part of the ritual of the event. In
this way, the lyrics of the anthem can be ignored, but they are nevertheless serving a role
in promoting the nation.
Hawaii’s anthem is highly unusual. It is a clearly nationalistic song, but the
nationalist message run contrary to the State’s own existence. The other nations have
national anthems that are mostly in-line with what would be expected, given the other
ways in which they imagine their nation. Their anthems recognise the religiosity of the
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nation, but in contrast to many others where there was a struggle for independence, they
do not tell of victory or otherwise promote specific nationalistic messages.

6.9

Flags

Flags share a hybridity similar to that of national anthems. They can be a highly
visible component of hot nationalism (and are virtually required to be so) when
nationalists loudly and proudly wave the flag as they rally. However, most of the time
flying the flag is a quieter more everyday occurrence more characteristic of banal
nationalism. Studies of nationalism have traditionally focused on the waved flag when we
see it being shown off and the remainder of nationhood is explicit. The unwaved flag,
Billig argues, is actually more significant in the reinforcement of nationhood. When it
appears on shoulder patches, products and other subtle everyday depictions that we see
constantly rather than the occasional overt patriotic display that reminds us of our nation.
The flag of the State of Hawaii is essentially the same flag as that which was used
by the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, and later the protectorate, republic, and territory of Hawaii.
Unique among U.S. states, the flag features a British Union Jack in the top left corner.
According to a popular, though somewhat historically dubious, story, the flag was
designed to be a hybrid of the British and U.S. flags. King Kamehameha I flew a British
flag for much of his reign to honour the gift of the flag from King George III. During the
War of 1812, he raised a U.S. flag to placate American concerns. British members of his
court objected, and the new flag was said to be commissioned to honour both allies as the
new flag of the Kingdom. Kamehameha also had a personal flag known as the Kanaka
Maoli. It features a shield at the centre and green, red and yellow stripes. Though the flag
stopped being officially used after the five months of British occupation in 1843, it has
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re-emerged in the last few decades as a protest flag. Given that the Kingdom flag was coopted by the State of Hawaii, those advocating for sovereignty would be unable to use it
as a meaningful symbol of protest. However, even among many supporters of
sovereignty, the flying of the Kanaka Maoli often produces negative responses. It has
become increasingly associated with fringe activists who deny the practical existence of
the state of Hawaii (such as by driving without state license plates or occupying statecontrolled beach parks946).
Flying either the U.S. or the State of Hawaii flag is much less common in Hawaiʻi
than it is in the rest of the United States. Few private residences or businesses routinely
fly either flag. The Kanaka Maoli is often seen, but it is less frequent than the already
infrequent flags of the State or the U.S.
The patch and badge of the Honolulu Police Department and the Honolulu Fire
Department feature two Hawaiian flags and a Kanaka Maoli coat of arms. The uniform,
however, does not include a flag patch or pin (either of the Hawaiʻi flag or the U.S. flag).
Some turnout gear worn by HFD does have a U.S. flag947. Maui, Kauai and Hawaiʻi (Big
Island) police and fire personnel also lack flag patches on their uniforms, but it can be
seen on some turnout gear of each fire department. Whilst it is not unique (the NYPD and
NYFD for example do not wear flag patches), it has become increasingly uncommon for
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emergency workers uniforms in the U.S. to lack flag patches or pins. Hawaiʻi Emergency
Medical Services wear a state of Hawaii flag patch, as do many private security guards.
Unlike many “made in” campaigns, none of the “made in” campaigns for Hawaiʻi
features the state flag. Rather, other symbols are used, such as the hibiscus, taro leaf and
monstera leaf948. The “Made in Hawaii with Aloha” program, administered by the Hawaii
Department of Agriculture in its statutorily protected mark, uses a Hibiscus brackenridgei
(a native plant and the official state flower), along with the tagline “Made in Hawaii with
Aloha”.
The Niuean flag is yellow with a modified Union Jack in the top left corner. As
noted in the Niue Flag Act of 1975, the yellow represents sunshine and “the warm
feelings of the Niuean people towards New Zealand and her people”. The Union Jack
symbolises the protection Great Britain gave Niue as British Protectorate. The four stars
are for the New Zealand historical administration and “the continuing close relationship
between Niue and New Zealand”. Finally, the largest star and blue circle “represents the
self-governing status of Niue, standing alone within the deep blue sea.” The symbolism
of the flag, codified in the Flag Act, sends a strong message about how Niue would like
to be represented. Niue has a strong connection to its past administrators but is today
sovereign and alone. This message is reinforced every time the flag is displayed both in
waved and unwaved contexts.
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Niue's government building flies the Niuean flag out front, but it seems that not
many others choose to fly it. The flag does still adorn a number of government-connected
items like driver's licenses and vehicles. The Niue police uniform includes a small
Niuean flag pin over the right breast pocket. Niue appears to lack a formal “made in”
campaign, and though the Niuean origin is clearly branded on the products exported from
Niue, the flag does not appear.
The flag of the Cook Islands features the Union Jack in the top left corner and a
ring of fifteen stars. The Union Jack represents the historic ties to Great Britain. The
fifteen stars stand for the fifteen major islands of the Cook Islands. The current flag was
adopted in 1979 and replaced a green ring with a yellow ring of fifteen stars. The green
represented growth and life, with the yellow stars symbolising faith and the unity of the
islands. Following the collapse of the Henry government, the green flag was replaced,
owing to its connection to Henry-style nationalism. Cook Islands nationalists would, soon
after, adopt the green flag to represent their movement. A referendum held in 1994 to
change the flag failed with slightly under half supporting the current flag.
Though designs featuring the Cook Islands circle of stars are common, actually
flying the flag seems infrequent. The “Buy Cook Islands, Made in Cook Islands”
campaign uses the flag of the Cook Islands encircled by a traditional pattern. The
uniforms of the Cook Islands Police and Fire Service do not include a flag. Given that
their uniforms are virtually identical to their New Zealand counterparts, which are also
flagless, this is unsurprising.
Fiji’s flag, only slightly modified from the colonial Fiji flag, contains the British
Union Jack in the upper left corner and a shield featuring a lion holding cocoa pod, sugar
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cane, a coconut palm, a bunch of bananas and a peace dove. The light blue background
symbolises the Pacific Ocean, and the Union Jack represents the historic connection to
Great Britain. The shield is formed of symbolically significant elements of Fijian life.
The first raising of the flag at Albert Park on October 10, 1970, differed
significantly from the typical independence ceremony. The British flag was lowered the
previous night, leaving a bare flagpole on which to raise the Fijian flag. Ratu Mara (the
first and longest-serving prime minister of Fiji) notes that he "had seen films of
independence ceremonies elsewhere, where the British flag had been lowered at midnight
and the new independence flag raised, both to frenzied cheering. I did not think this
appropriate to our relationship with the British Crown. We decided to have a final beating
of retreat before independence when the Union flag would be lowered with the quiet
dignity and respect our long association warranted."949 Fiji’s transition was neither the
jubilant occasion of victory over oppressors nor one of solemn loss like Hawaii's. It was a
happy and optimistic event that marked a hopeful new era for Fiji.
As part of his New Year's Day address in 2013, Bainimarama announced plans to
change the flag as part of his overall reforms with the intention "to reflect a sense of
national renewal, to reinforce a new Fijian identity and a new confidence in being Fijian
on the global stage". A competition to pick the new flag was established with a final
shortlist of twenty-three designs submitted to the cabinet. After several delays and a
reopening of the competition, Bainimarama announced in August 2016 that he no longer
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intended to change the flag. "While I remain convinced personally that we need to
replace some of the flag’s colonial symbols with a genuinely indigenous expression of
our present and our future, it has been apparent to the Government since February that the
flag should not be changed for the foreseeable future".950 Though the competition for the
new design generated considerable enthusiasm and over 200 proposals, support for the
change was very mixed.
The Fijian flag is very present throughout Fijian daily life. Many businesses and,
increasingly, a number of private residences routinely fly the flag. Fiji’s government-run
“Fijian Made” campaign, though choosing to include a stylised map of the islands in its
mark, uses the Fijian flag heavily in its promotional materials. A digitally added Fijian
flag serves as the backdrop for all the photos on the official site, and in-person events are
blanketed with dozens of small flags. The flag is also featured as part of many
government functions. Several uniform styles of the Fiji police feature a Fijian flag patch
on the left shoulder. The introduction of the flag patch appears to have come as part of
the post-coup police reforms and professionalisation efforts.

6.10

Currency

Currency provides a visible representation of a state’s power. The ability to issue
currency and have this currency accepted has traditionally been viewed as one of the key
practical metrics of statehood. Further, as a highly valued item, currency’s depiction of
national symbols creates a feeling of value tied to the symbol. Currency typically will
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depict the heads of state and former heads of state along with other valued symbols of the
nation. It serves as a way for the state to say that these items are so treasured, we will
depict them on literal treasure allowing them to become a part of it.
The power of the state to control its currency is known as monetary sovereignty.
It is often closely associated with ideas of national political sovereignty.951 It “refers to a
State's undeniable power, recognised by international law, to regulate its own
currency”.952 The state's ability to issue currency and have it accepted is, along with
passport acceptance, forms one of the most common practical representations of
statehood a citizen encounters. Ultimately, a state in which its citizens are unable to use
its money is likely to become a failed state. Similarly, the replacement of a national
central bank is often presented as naturally reducing the state’s sovereignty in an
undesirable way.953 Further, monetary sovereignty is assumed to belong to the nationallevel government, rather than any government or body below or above this level.954
Countries can issue currency, but it is expected that other types of government entities
will not.
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National currencies supposedly support national pride and serve as a symbol of
national identity.955 They are said to provide an expression of the state’s power and
economic fortitude. Though this argument may be true for a small number of nationstates, Schuler argues that national currency has not, in fact, been generally successful in
improving national pride.956 He notes that, across the world, many people distrust their
national currency, preferring instead to hold foreign currency.957 For example, 70 per cent
of U.S. dollar banknotes (and similar numbers for other desirable currencies) are
estimated to be held outside the U.S.958
In recognising the suboptimal position of many national currencies, states have
increasingly embraced a cooperative common currency (such as the euro) or completely
adopted another country’s currency. This process of dollarisation (where a country adopts
a foreign currency), in theory, does not eliminate a state’s monetary sovereignty. The
state maintains the ability to reintroduce its own national currency and often has
negotiated arrangements for additional limited control of currency issuance.959 However,
in both of these models, and in many states with their own weaker national currency,
states always have significant limitations on their actual ability to make use of monetary
sovereignty, owing to external political and economic factors.960 Most limiting is that
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they are unable to increase inflation strategically by printing more currency or otherwise
control how their currency trades against others. Nevertheless, many countries share a
currency. In addition to common currency zones such as with the euro (shared by 19 of
the 28 member states of the European Union) and CFA franc (used by fourteen African
countries), there are several countries that have adopted the currency of another including
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland use of the South African rand or Panama’s and TimorLeste’s use of the U.S. dollar.
Reflecting one of the common tourist questions, the Hawaii Tourism Authority
prominently notes on its website that “Hawaii's currency is the U.S. dollar”.961 This
should be an unnecessary statement given Hawaii’s status as a part of the United States.
The frequency with which this misguided question occurs is a sign that an impression of
monetary sovereignty still exists in Hawaiʻi. Though even then using the U.S. dollar,
Hawaii briefly had its own series of banknotes during World War II.962 These notes were
typical U.S. notes, with the word Hawaii overprinted on one side.963 They were used to
replace U.S. currency in the islands so that, if Japanese forces were able to capture
Hawaii, the U.S. government would be able to void all currency that had been
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captured.964 Although the notes only lasted slightly past the end of World War II965, they
provided a visible reminder that Hawaii's status was not the same as in the rest of the
United States. Though the U.S. government responded to a credible fear, the fact that this
solution was acceptable and still seems reasonable, even when it was not used in other atrisk parts of the U.S., shows an acceptance of the notion of Hawaii's difference.
Developing a separate Hawaiian currency has been proposed a number of times
by people connected to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. One advocate for a
Hawaiian dollar, Laurence J. Brahm, notes that “aside from a standing army, I can think
of only one other thing which gives a people both sovereignty and authority, … is having
your own currency”.966 He advocates it as a local currency backed by geothermal energy,
though the actual mechanism by which this would work is unexplained.967
Cryptocurrencies have also been created, but have failed to gain any meaningful
attention. Another proposal suggests reissuing the dala (the currency of the Hawaiian
kingdom) as a local/complementary currency.968 Complementary currencies are designed
to supplement rather than replace national currencies and are not considered legal tender,
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thus avoiding many potential legal issues.969 This proposal suggests that re-establishing a
Hawaiian currency “would stimulate curiosity and provide an opportunity to educate
people about and win support for the Hawaiian kingdom; and it would be evidence of the
de facto Hawaiian kingdom government effectively providing a government service to
it’s[sic] citizens/residents, which is an important step in eventually restoring recognition
internationally”.970 It is questionable how useful this would actually be for the cause, but
it is likely that it would help gain attention and is thus highly compatible with the general
strategy of the sovereignty movement.
Niue officially uses both the New Zealand dollar and the Niue dollar. The Niue
dollar is an interesting example of Niue exerting its sovereignty for a clear economic
benefit. Niue mints several series of coins that feature popular characters, such as those
from Star Wars and Disney on one side and the Queen on the other.971 Though
technically legal tender, the coins are noncirculating and frequently made of precious
metals.972 Except perhaps as a tourist novelty, these coins would never actually be used
for transactions in Niue. They are minted strictly as legal tender because commemorative
coins that are legal tender are generally valued more highly by collectors. By lending its
sovereign right to mint coins to commercial activities, Niue is able to generate income at
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very little cost. It also serves as a reminder of Niuean sovereignty to a set of people who
would likely otherwise never have any interaction with or even knowledge of Niue.
The Cook Islands uses the New Zealand dollar, along with the now-limited Cook
Islands dollar. The Cook Islands issued its own currency starting in 1987.973 It was
officially pegged to the New Zealand dollar with strict requirements for 100 per cent
backing in foreign exchange reserve.974 This requirement was later reduced dramatically,
with some denominations requiring only a 5 per cent backing.975 By the early 1990s,
inflation and fears of a currency devaluation pushed the two major banks to no longer
convert Cook Islands dollars to New Zealand dollars.976 Facing this crisis, the
government passed the Currency Amendment Act of 1994–95, which declared the New
Zealand dollar the sole monetary unit for banknotes above $3.977 The Cook Islands
continue to circulate Cook Islands dollar coinage (including a $5 coin). Of the notes, only
the $3 banknote remains in circulation. Cook Islands coinage features the queen on the
obverse and traditional symbols, including local plants, Tangaroa (the sea god), and a
vaka on the reverse. The $3 banknote, unlike the rest of the Cook Islands currency, does
not feature the queen, but rather has a church congregation on the obverse and a series of
traditional imagery representing the island of Aitutaki on the reverse. The now-
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discontinued $10, $20 and $50 banknotes followed this same pattern, with other islands'
symbols on the reverse.
The Cook Islands' continued use of its own currency is significant as a statement
about its nationhood. The practical reasons for a state choosing to have its own currency,
particularly functions such as money creation, largely do not apply when it is limited to
small denominations. The Cook Islands dollar is a reminder of the existence of a
sovereign Cook Islands nation, rather than a practical economic policy.
Unique among the nations of this study, Fiji exclusively uses its own currency.
Though it has been a republic since 1987, Queen Elizabeth II has been featured on the
obverse of Fijian banknotes and coins until recently. 978 The removal of the queen from
Fijian currency has been very unpopular with many of Fiji's tribal chiefs (and much of the
public), as it reflects a visible symbol of the diminishing of their power through the
removal of the traditional governance.979 The change in Fijian currency design marks a
significant shift in the ways national symbols are used. Rather than continuing to pair a
foreign symbol with domestic symbols, the new bills and coins feature only symbols of
the Fijian nation. “Important and iconic flora and fauna of Fiji has been selected to
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replace her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II's portrait”, said Bainimarama.980 These changes
allow Fiji to both practically express its sovereignty and further reemphasise what
symbols are of the highest importance to the Fijian nation.
The Cook Islands and Niue’s use of currency can be seen as primarily symbolic
expressions of their nation. Neither has any significant practical reason for issuing its
own currency yet chooses to do so. Fiji, though having operational needs for it, has
placed an unusually high amount of attention on the symbolic messages the currency
expresses. Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has no meaningful ability to issue its own currency and
attempts to do so have not been even slightly viable.

6.11

Street Names

Street names serve significant symbolic value despite being highly mundane.
They are often an expression of everyday nationalism in a space that, while occasionally
recognised as political, is typically unexamined and banal. These names, however, are of
significant importance to nationalists.981 They provide a symbolically powerful way to
construct a national identity.982 Also of particular salience is the fact that street names are
generally administratively controlled and are thus easy for officials to change as
desired.983 Giving streets commemorative names allows administrators to introduce an
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authorised version of the historical identity of the area.984 They can establish who and
what is worthy of official recognition as a symbol of the nation.
Some governments have made renaming streets a highly visible symbolic
representation of their regime change.985 For example, East Germany saw mass renaming
of streets with the rise of the German Democratic Republic, as had also occurred under
several previous governments.986 Streets named for people with Nazi connections, as well
as those named for people who fought in the First World War, were quickly replaced by
those of Communist significance.987 After German unification, many of these roads were
again renamed to reflect anti-Nazi heroes and deemphasise Communist figures.988 Iraq
and Iran have seen similar mass renamings.
Though street naming is occasionally a part of large-scale propaganda (or
counter-propaganda) campaigns, commemorative naming is often the result of more
localised, less consciously nationalistic, efforts. It has long been a favourite tool of
politicians looking to gain easy political support at minimal cost. People selected for
memorialisation in street names are typically well-liked, no longer controversial
historical figures. One of the most popular for street naming in the United States is
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Martin Luther King, Jr.989 Naming a street for him is politically well received, with
controversy usually limited to which street to rename, rather than opposition to
renaming.990 Similarly, naming roads for locally significant figures provides officials
with an easy way to show the community that they understand the area and its history.
Hawaiʻi has fully embraced the significance of commemorative naming. Roads
have been named after Hawaiian royalty, such as Kamehameha Highway and Kapiʻolani
Boulevard; prominent historic Hawaiʻi families like Dole and McCully; and even
mythical figures like Lehua and ʻŌhiʻa. However, unlike many other U.S. states, there are
very few streets named after U.S. presidents or other historically important Americans.
The vast majority of those that appear to be named after important Americans are actually
named for locally important people with the same name.991 Hawaiʻi is also one of a small
number of U.S. states that does not have a road named for Martin Luther King, Jr.
In Niue, limited new road construction and a habit of naming roads after the
villages they connect has left Niuean politicians with few opportunities for
commemorative naming. The most significant of these is Sir Robert Rex Wharf, named
after the first premier of Niue. As the island’s only wharf, it is one of the most important
pieces of infrastructure on the island.
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Many of Fiji’s roads have been named to commemorate important people in its
history. For example, in Suva there is MacGregor Road (after Sir William MacGregor,
the first chief medical and health officer); Ratu Sukuna Road (in honour of Ratu Sir Lala
Sukuna, a Fijian chief and architect of Fijian self-governance); Queen Elizabeth Road;
and Vishnu Deo Road (after Pandit Vishnu Deo, a powerful Indo-Fijian political leader).
Fiji’s two most important motorways are Kings Road and Queens Road, generically
named for the British royalty.
In the Cook Islands, though their nation itself is named after the British explorer
Captain James Cook, there does not seem to be much other commemorative naming.
Even outside of commemorative naming, street names can serve the construction
of national identity. All four nations of this paper have, either by policy or practice,
adopted conventions of naming streets with historically connected names. Hawaiʻi (at
least for Honolulu) has the clearest policy in this regard. Under the Revised Ordinances
of Honolulu 22-8.2, highways and freeways should “whenever practicable” be “named
after Hawaiian royalty”. ROH 22-8.3 requires that street names in Honolulu “shall consist
of Hawaiian names, words or phrases and shall be selected with a view to the
appropriateness of the name to historic, cultural, scenic and topographical features of the
area”. It also requires that appropriate diacritical marks be used on any new or
replacement signage. The other counties of Hawaiʻi largely follow this policy, despite
limited or no statutory requirements to do so.
The road names across the Cook Islands are mostly Maori, with the notable
exception of “Airport Road”. There does not appear to be any legislation that governs
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how roads are named. Similarly, all roads in Niue have Niuean names, but not because of
any statutory requirement.
Fiji seems to have the most variety in its street names and seems to lack any
statutory requirements related to road naming. Yet, it appears as a matter, of course, that
new roads will receive non-English names (mostly Fijian or Hindi) or be named after
people significant to Fiji.
Within each of these nations, the obstinately practical choice of what a street
should be called serves as a highly visible way to reinforce stories of a nation. The
traditional name choice functions as a frequent reminder to everyone who uses the street
of the connection between place and history. Though the person driving along looking at
street signs might not consciously consider the full political and nationalistic implication
of the street name, it is likely (and in the case of Hawaiʻi certain) that the person who
named the street was fully immersed in its significance.

6.12

Music

Music typically draws strong, often subconscious, emotional responses. As such,
it is ideal for orchestrating and manipulating nationalist sentiments.
Hawaiʻi has been credited with many contributions to music that are remarkable
for its size.992 Musicians from Hawaiʻi popularised the slack key guitar and the ‘ukulēlē;
they also invented the steel guitar. Hawaiian music has been described as a “unifying
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factor in the development of modern Pacific musics”.993 Though sharing many of its radio
stations and music distributors with the United States, much of Hawaii’s music is distinct.
Hawaiian music gained widespread popularity in the early twentieth century. The
1912 Broadway show Bird of Paradise exposed Hawaiian music to many who had never
heard it before. In the 1920s, Hawaiian music became a key part of Hawaii’s tourism
efforts. Particularly when paired with hula, Hawaiian music, through attractions like the
Kodak Hula Show, became a defining part of the Hawaiʻi tourist identity. Today, it
remains a key part of how Hawaiʻi is presented to tourists. Virtually every tourist-focused
hotel in Hawaiʻi will have nightly Hawaiian music, and many tourists describe it as an
integral part of their Hawaiʻi vacation experience. Even for locally focused events,
Hawaiian music plays a big role. It is a popular and non-controversial choice.
A distinct Hawaiian identity is reinforced by the playing of Hawaiian music. Its
uniqueness serves as a reminder that Hawaiʻi is different from the United States. More
directly, notions of Hawaiian sovereignty and nationhood are often also presented
through music. Much of the popular Hawaiian music contains themes of monarchy,
nation, sovereignty and place. Music is a common way in which ideas of sovereignty are
reinforced, even when the listener does not realise how strong a message the song sends.
Music in Hawaii seems to be a way in which a subtle popular support for nationhood has
developed even amongst those who would baulk at the political versions.
As discussed previously in this chapter, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, the state song and
former national anthem of Hawaiʻi, provides a strong pro-monarchy message. Many
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other iconic songs of Hawaiʻi are explicitly pro-sovereignty. Most notable is “Living in a
Sovereign Land”, written by Israel Kamakawiwo'ole, the most famous Hawaiian singer
(and one of the most famous modern Hawaiians). The song is extremely popular in
Hawaiʻi and has been covered by many other bands. It calls for a recognition of the
wrong that was done (“Our Children Deserve To Know; What Went Down A Hundred
Years Ago; You Can Pay The Man, You Can Take The Land; But You Can't Take The
Truth Away!”). It also calls upon everyone to restore the nation (“Brothers And Sisters,
Brown, Yellow and White; Its Time To Do What You Know Is Right; Whats Been Taken
Must Be Returned; Give Our Children What They Deserve”).
Another very popular song by Israel Kamakawiwo`ole advocating for justice for
the Hawaiian Nation is “E Ala E”. This song, in Hawaiian and English, calls for the
people of Hawaiʻi to stand for justice (“Rise for justice the day has come; For all our
people to stand as one”) and (“Defend our birthright to be free; Give our children
liberty”). Other popular songs such as “Hawai’i ‘78” —sung by Makaha Sons of
Ni`ihau—mourns the desecration of sacred grounds and loss of the Hawaiian nation. The
song asks how the monarchy would feel if they were to witness the state that Hawaiʻi is
in today (“Could you just imagine if they were around; And saw highways on their sacred
grounds; How would they feel about this modern city life; Tears would come from each
other's eyes … All the fighting that the king had done; To conquer all these islands now
these condominiums”). The song has been well used by those opposing the
overdevelopment of the islands. “I Ka La `Apopo” provides a more active call to action.
(“Rise up Hawaiians, rise up descendants; claim your rightful things”) and mourns the
many losses of the overthrow (“The people cry for their queen; They cry because of the
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overthrow … The native cries for his important thing; He cries for the thing which was
lost. He cries for the hurts of the land; the hurts of today remain”). It concludes with the
optimistic verse that “Sovereignty will return tomorrow”. These well-known songs are
routinely played throughout Hawaiʻi. Although other explicit pro-sovereignty nationalism
efforts routinely fail in Hawaiʻi, music is a way in which the message has been well
received and incorporated.
Music is extremely important to the Cook Islands' identity. It has been said that
“if there is one outstanding ability which appears to be shared by all Cook Islanders it is
music and song”.994 Music is an integral part of Cook Islands social life.995 The popular
contemporary Cook Islands music, known as “island music”, is widely performed at
nightclubs, bars, and community events such as weddings. It is also played as a key part
of community fundraising.996
Cook Islands music is largely characterised by Christian music and drumming,
though many other contemporary styles are popular as well. Drumming is the “backbone
of music and dance in the Cook Islands”.997 The Cook Islands style of drumming is
widely recognised but is commonly thought to be Tahitian.998 This misattribution has
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been described by former Cook Islands Minister of Culture Jonassen as “a blatant
plagiarisation of cultural images and sounds too often being misappropriated by
commercial institutions”.999 The Polynesian Cultural Center, a popular tourist attraction
in Hawaiʻi, has been described as one of the significant sources of this confusion.1000 It
bundles the Cook Islands drumming into the Tahitian village.1001 Though initial tour
guide scripts in the 1970s did correctly note that the drums were not of Tahitian origin,
this is no longer mentioned.1002 This situation has become particularly problematic
because the Polynesian Cultural Center serves a dual role: it provides cultural education
to tourists and also supports cultural revitalisation amongst Polynesian people.1003 Thus,
Cook Islands style “Tahitian drumming” has been absorbed into Tahitian culture as a
traditional practice, displacing actual traditional Tahitian drumming.
Cook Islands songs were traditionally done as chants.1004 The Cook Islands
Christian Church banned the ute (celebratory song) style of chant for twenty years, which
has caused it to fall out of daily use.1005 Today this style is typically performed only as
part of constitution celebrations or at community functions.1006 'Imene pure (church
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songs) are among the most popular types of music in the Cook Islands. These songs are
typical hymns performed in a harmonised manner. 'Imene tuki feature similar messages
but are done in a traditional chant style.
Cook Islands contemporary music is extremely popular in the Cook Islands;
among Cook Islanders in the diaspora; and among other Polynesians.1007 Radio Cook
Islands plays primarily this style to widespread listenership.1008 Songs are typically
composed about life-stage events, relationships and community events.1009 Contemporary
Western or Pacific songs are also commonly reworked to localise their lyrics.1010 With
significant numbers in diaspora, songs often feature a theme of longing for the islands.1011
The very popular song “Sea Breeze” describes this longing with the lyrics “Sea Breeze,
so peaceful; Back in Aitutaki; I yearn to see you; I would love to be there this night”. 1012
Many Cook Islanders have expressed concern that globalisation is leading to the
absorption of their traditional music. 1013 The contemporary music has been called a
“‘bastardisation’ of ‘traditional’ expressive forms and an indicator of ‘global’
corruption”. “Local music is seen as ‘swamped’ by Western popular music”.1014 As a
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small island nation, the Cook Islands has limited abilities to combat the spread of cultural
absorption that is commonly paired with globalisation. Though producing a
disproportionate amount of music for their size, the multitude of other musical options
and growing popularity of Western popular music options limit their ability to directly
combat globalisation.
Music is a key part of traditional Fijian culture and modern daily life. It is rare to
find a shop or office that does not have the radio playing in the background. Even the
buses will typically have music playing. There is also a multitude of shops and street
vendors selling music across Fijian cities and towns.
While iTaukei are ethnically and geographically Melanesian, Fijian music is more
Polynesian in character. Historically, music played a significant role in iTaukei ceremony
and warfare. The lali drums were heavily used for communications in order to call people
together and to announce births, deaths, call to battle and other events of significance.
Modern iTaukei music adds the guitar, ukulele and mandolin, as well as other percussion
instruments. Church music is among the most popular genres. A style known as “vude”
has also emerged in Fiji to great popularity. This genre mixes traditional Fijian songs
with modern R&B, jazz and disco. Though not well known outside of Fiji and the
growing Fijian diaspora, it provides a uniquely Fijian style that is widely played.
Indo-Fijian music has developed several distinct styles that have become popular
globally. Bhajans are the most commonly exported. This style of music pairs devotional
music with the harmonium and dholak (drums). A style of Qawaali (a type of Sufi
devotional music) has also developed in Fiji; it uses the dholak rather than the traditional
tabla because of a lack of trained tabla players in Fiji as a result of colonial immigration

314

patterns. Imported Indian music, particularly Bollywood soundtracks, are also extremely
popular in Fiji.
Music is a significant part of tourism in Fiji. Most tourist hotels have live
musicians regularly playing Polynesian-style music. Many hotel restaurants will use the
lali drums to announce the start of dinner. Shops selling tourist goods play this kind of
music to set a mood of authenticity and island life. Even the airport has Fijian musicians
playing in the arrivals area. Like most tourist-focused representations of Fiji, this music is
almost entirely of a Polynesian style, thus ignoring the music of Indo-Fijians and other
Fijian groups. Similarly, it will also typically be pan-Polynesian music rather than Fijian
specific styles.
Nevertheless, music in Fiji is an area in which Fiji’s unique identity can clearly be
seen. Whilst Western music is undeniably popular, Fijian music has developed several
unique styles that are becoming increasingly widespread globally. Though public music
listening habits are influenced strongly by ethnicity, it remains very common to see
people listening to music that is not associated with their ethnic group. iTaukei artists will
cover Indo-Fijian songs, and vice-versa and nightclubs will play music from both groups
within the same setlist.
Niuean music remains a seriously understudied subject. Information on it is based
primarily on two studies, one from 1926 and the other from 1984.1015 They suggest that
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Niuean music existed primarily to support dance.1016 Non-traditional music appears to be
very Samoan influenced, with some other more recent Polynesian influences. Tourist
presentations of Niuean music seem largely indistinguishable from those of other
Polynesian islands. Arrivals at the airport are met with government-sponsored musicians
playing Polynesian music. Though this immediately reminds visitors and residents that
they are entering island culture, there is little about it that would seem to be uniquely
Niuean.
A number of Niuean-language music albums have been produced, particularly by
Niueans in diaspora and by church choirs. Several Niueans in New Zealand have gained
attention performing non-traditional music there and globally, creating great pride in
Niue. Most notable among these is Pauly Fuemana of Otara's Millionaires Club with the
hit song “How Bizarre”. Given the limited data on Niuean music, it remains hard to fully
assess its impact on Niuean national identity and nationalism. Based on the studies
available and interviews I conducted, music is not having anywhere near the same
significance as it does for other nations. This could be a result of the small population's
lack of venue, audience and sufficient talent. What remains surprising, though, is a
seemingly complete lack of diasporic “longing” music. With the vast majority of the
Niuean population living in diaspora and the widely shared sentiments of connection to
the Niuean homeland, we would expect to see some musical representation of nostalgia
for island life. This absence suggests a need for future studies on the Niuean community
in diaspora.
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6.13

Sport

Sport has long been one of the ways in which nationalism is expressed
symbolically. It is often an area in which nations are able to compete against one another
in a way that reflects national conflict without the consequences of real conflict. They can
become united around their national teams as they compete against rival nations. This
signalling of nationhood represents one of the classic focuses of banal nationalism.
Sport also provides a way for underrecognised nations to assert their identity
through sports rivalry. For example, the Montreal Canadians symbolic representation of
Francophone Quebecers and their rivalry with Anglophone teams can be seen to represent
more general conflicts of national identity. The Spanish football team Athletic Bilbao
exclusive selection of Basque players and its rivalry with Catalan dominated FC
Barcelona similarly reflects the team's strong identification with Basque and Catalan
nationalism.
In addition to the obvious nationalistic implications of having a national team,
sports also provide numerous opportunities for more subtle presentations of national
symbols. National flags are typical components of sporting events, as are national
anthems and other national songs. Even the food that is available at a game can be
representative of the nation. The hyper-American hot dog is a regular part of American
sports. Meat pies and lamb sausages are common at games in Australia. Roti wraps are a
fixture of Fijian sports. These symbols, though not unique to sporting presentations, are
so thoroughly ingrained into the events that their presence is rarely even questioned.
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6.13.1

Olympics

The Olympics provide one of the most obvious visible displays of nationalism.
Nationalistic symbolism is proudly and prominently displayed throughout. States
compete against one another for national pride, and when they win, their flag and anthem
are highlighted. Though of course having no legal effect upon a state’s independence, the
Olympics are an extremely emblematic expression of statehood and serve as a popular
barometer for sovereignty. A nation’s presence or absence at the Olympics can be highly
symbolic for nationhood and sovereignty.
The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had already been overthrown prior to the first modern
Olympic games in 1896. As such, Hawaiʻi has never competed independently in the
Olympics. Hawaii’s first Olympic athlete was Duke1017 Kahanamoku. Duke was born
shortly before the overthrow to a prominent Hawaiian family, whose members were
considered lower-ranking nobles. He was a five-time Olympic medallist in swimming
and is considered responsible for re-establishing and spreading the sport of surfing across
the world. Competing as part of the U.S. Olympic swimming team at the 1912 Summer
Olympics in Stockholm, he won a gold medal in the 100-meter freestyle and a silver
medal in the 4×200-meter freestyle relay. He represented the United States in four
Olympic Games and won a total of three gold and two silver medals.1018 His
accomplishments are widely celebrated in Hawaiʻi and across the world. His statue in
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Waikiki is one of the most visited and iconic in Hawaiʻi. Duke represents the challenge
that many athletes from Hawaiʻi face (along with other Native athletes in similar
conditions). He is quite clearly Hawaiian, but as a result of political and practical
concerns, competed under the flag of the occupying United States. Since Kahanamoku, a
number of athletes born in Hawaiʻi have competed on behalf of the United States and
other countries.
Hawaiʻi does not have its own National Olympic Committee (NOC), typically a
requirement to compete as a country in Olympics. Though American Samoa, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands (all of which are administratively part
of the U.S.) have their own NOCs, these committees predate a 1996 rule change, which
requires international recognition of the state as independent. The International Olympic
Committee has allowed a number of athletes to compete as “independent athletes” under
the Olympic flag (a potentially ideological acceptable option for Hawaiian athletes). But
this relaxing of the rule has largely been used for exceptional cases relating to recent
major political developments, rather than a viable option for athletes unwilling to
compete for their country of legal citizenship. As such, until Hawaii’s sovereignty is
internationally recognised, or the IOC changes its rules, Hawaiʻi athletes must compete
under another country’s flag.
Fijian athletes first competed in the 1956 Summer Olympic Games whilst still a
colony of Great Britain. They have competed in fourteen Summer Games and three
Winter Games in a variety of sports. At the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio, Fiji won its
first medal, placing first in Men's Rugby Sevens. Rugby has long been one of Fiji’s
strongest sports, but it had not been played in the Olympics since the 1924 Summer
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Olympics. The reintroduction of the sport to the 2016 Olympics gave Fiji a chance to
compete in its strongest sport against other nations and show the world the power of a
small island nation. Prior to this victory, only two Fijian athletes had competed in the
Olympics based on the standards to qualify rather than as wild cards. The two were
Makelesi Bulikiobo, who competed in the women's 400-metre sprint at the 2008 Games
in Beijing, and Leslie Copeland in the men's javelin event at the 2012 Games in London.
Both placed in the middle of their events. With the reintroduction of golf to the 2016
Games, Vijay Singh would have also qualified on merit had he not chosen to skip the
Games owing to Zika concerns.1019
Fiji’s sevens victory was an extremely important moment for Fijian nationalism.
In a globally televised match, Fiji beat its former colonial overseer, Great Britain, 43-7.
This score represents both the highest score and the largest margin of victory of any
sevens team in a world championship game. In Fiji, the game was nearly universally
watched, with PM Bainimarama noting that “our productivity has been nil for the last
couple of days".1020 After the victory, he declared the following day to be a public
holiday.
Niue has never sent athletes to the Olympics. Its NOC is an associate member of
the Oceania National Olympic Committees but is not a member of the Association of
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National Olympic Committees. Reflecting a 2012 decision by the Niue NOC to limit its
focus, Niue can currently only participate in regional events (including commonwealth
events) rather than the Olympics itself. As an associate member, however, it is recognised
as meeting the fundamental requirements to qualify for full Olympic participation. Niue’s
physical environment, however (particularly its lack of shallow navigable waters and
limited beaches), does not allow many Olympic events favoured by small island states to
be played there (such as volleyball or kayak events). Further, its small population,
remoteness, the absence of specialised facilities, and lack of enough skilled
athletes/trainers prevent competition in most sports. The sole stadium in Niue is the Niue
High School Oval, which can accommodate 1,000 people. There are no facilities that
would allow any other specialised events on the island. Attempts at building competitive
mountain biking teams have been limited by the fact that the bikes are rented from a local
car hire agency.1021 Despite these limitations, Niue has competed in a small number of
sports at the Commonwealth Games, including the 2014 games, in which they placed
either last or in the bottom three of each event. Niue’s strongest sports are likely netball
(for which their national team placed twelfth of twenty-four in the 2003 World
Championships) and Rugby Sevens (placing twenty-three of twenty-eight at the 2011–12
IRB Sevens World Series). Though very respectable positions in these sports for a
country of their size and limitations, the strength of other countries in the region prevents
Olympic chances (as does the fact that netball is not currently an Olympic sport). Niue’s
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nonparticipation in the Olympics seems most representative of their uncompetitiveness,
rather than any sense that they could not participate. Despite this, their absence in the
Olympics, even if their performance was abysmal, does very much work against Niue’s
image of statehood in the world’s eye.
The Cook Islands has competed in six Summer Olympic Games, though it has
never competed in the Winter Games and has won no medals. The Cook Islands first
participated in the 1988 Seoul Games and has competed in each Summer Games since.
The Cook Islands has exclusively competed in individual sports and has never sent more
than nine athletes. It has entered into sailing, canoeing, swimming, weightlifting and
boxing. Qualification has been nearly exclusively through regional inclusion policies
rather than competitive placement. Though much larger than Niue, the Cook Islands
remains a small country with limited resources. The abundance of lagoons and beaches
does allow athletes for some sports to train. However, the islands lack meaningful
specialised facilities for many other sports. Although performances have been credible,
no Cook Islands athlete has managed to move beyond the bottom places of any event.
Participation in the Olympics does nevertheless serve a powerfully symbolic role. It
reminds the world and the people of the Cook Islands that no matter how small they are,
they are still able to compete as a nation on a global stage against much larger states.

6.13.2

Multinational Competitions

Each nation in this study has competed in multinational competitions. These
competitions provide a lower-key representation of the same values that form the
Olympics. They provide a way for countries that would be uncompetitive at larger events
an opportunity to compete as a nation.
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The Cook Islands has competed in ten Commonwealth Games to date and has
never won a medal. They are also a member of FIFA (International Federation of
Association Football), though they have never made it past the first round. In netball,
they have ranked as high as tenth, but are not currently especially competitive.
Niue has competed four times in the Commonwealth Games without any medal
wins. They are an associate member of the OFC (Oceania Football Confederation), but
not FIFA, making them eligible only for regional football competition. However, they
have not competed in football since 1983. Rugby and netball have been the only sports in
which Niue has seriously competed.
Both Niue and the Cook Islands compete in the Oceania Cup (a rugby union
competition for countries and territories from Oceania) with developmental band national
teams (the lowest level of national rugby). In addition to Niue and the Cook Islands,
teams competing include four independent countries (Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Tahiti and Vanuatu); as well as U.S. territory American Samoa and French
special collectivity New Caledonia. Niue and the Cook Islands both do fairly well in this
league. Niue won the 2008 FORU Oceania Cup and was the 2007 runner-up. The Cook
Islands won in 1996, 2005 and 2013, placing second in 2002 and 2009. Though
successful regionally with a few surprise victories against tier-one teams (such as Niue’s
48-4 defeat of highly ranked South Africa), neither team has done especially well
internationally. Niue is currently ranked 85th in men's World Rugby rankings, and the
Cook Islands is ranked 45th of 102. Neither state has a national women’s team.
Fiji, in addition to successfully competing in the Olympics, has been fairly
competitive in regional sporting competitions. Fiji is ranked thirty-two in Women’s
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World Rugby rankings and tenth in Men’s. Fijian athletes have also been a member of the
International Cricket Council since before independence and have regularly competed in
ICC Trophy tournaments. Cricket was introduced during the colonial period by the
British governor of Fiji. It has found a considerable local following and seen a number of
successes and high-profile players, including eventual PM and President Ratu Kamisese
Mara. Unlike iTaukei-dominated rugby, Fijian cricket has seen many Indo-Fijian players.
Both sports are widely followed across Fiji, with fans of every ethnic group united in
their support of the national team.
Many teams across the region are formed of Pacific Islanders in diaspora. There
are several prominent players on the national rugby teams of New Zealand and Australia
who are a part of these diasporas. Only three of the twelve players on Japan's men's rugby
sevens squad are foreign born (two Fijians and a Tongan). Still, the popular impression
among many island fans is that Japan’s recent success is because they have brought in
Pacific Islanders. Most of the players who compete on Niue and the Cook Islands
national teams are actually residents of New Zealand. For example, in 2014 it was highly
significant when Niue welcomed its first Niue-resident player to its modern rugby team;
previously, none of the players actually resided in Niue.1022
Hawaiʻi frequently competes in several sports against other national teams.
Though often geographically farther away than other U.S. teams, many Hawaiʻi-based
teams will compete against national teams representing Asian and Pacific nations in
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addition to or instead of competing against American teams. Whilst this decision is often
made for logistical, marketing, or skill-based reasons, for the purposes of banal
nationalism the message it sends can be quite mixed.
Even when teams are competing along with other American teams, it is not
uncommon for Hawaiʻi to be presented as a separate entity. This can be seen in the
Associated Press article “Title Game Set at Series: Hawaii vs. Japan” and the New York
Times reprinting of the article under the title “Hawaii and Japan Will Play for Little
League Crown”.1023 The headlines suggest that the two entities competing are equivalent.
More accurate headlines could have been “U.S.A. vs. Japan” (country vs. country);
“Tokyo Prefecture vs. Hawaiʻi” (internal administrative unit vs. internal administrative
unit); or the most accurate, “Waipahu vs. Tokyo” (town vs. city). Despite the headlines,
the article does note that the Hawaiʻi fans were chanting “U.S.A.! U.S.A.!” and waving
Hawaiʻi “flags and tea leaves for good luck”.1024
Sports also provides an opportunity to play the state’s national anthem. In this
regard, the trend toward playing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, even though it is not typical to play
the anthem of non-countries, is significant. This pattern can be seen clearly at the ‘Ohana
Cup. The 2016 Ohana Cup Rugby League Festival in Hawaiʻi featured New South Wales
Police vs. the Hawaii Chiefs; Fiji vs. Canada; and Tonga vs. Samoa. As is traditional in
rugby, the national anthems of Fiji, Canada, Tonga and Samoa were played prior to the
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match. To represent the Hawaii Chiefs, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was sung. For New South
Wales Police “Advance Australia Fair” (the national anthem of Australia) was performed.

6.14

Food

Food is closely interwoven with "social relations, including those of power,
inclusion and exclusion, as well as with cultural ideas about classification (including food
and non-food, the edible and the inedible)".1025 It is inseparably tied to notions of who we
are, both as individuals and as a nation. As Fischler argues, "Food and cuisine are a
central component of the sense of collective belonging and the symbolic value of food is
central to our sense of identity, at both [the] individual and group level".1026 Food
establishes an identity. It can be used to establish who we are as individuals, but also who
we are as a nation.1027 Though rarely formally defined as a national cuisine, a particular
set of foodstuffs often becomes associated with a nation. The presentation and
consumption of these dishes serve to remind residents of the nation. Food remains
arguably the most influential representation of banal nationalism. This section highlights
a selection of the foodstuffs that are most iconic for each of the nations. Given the
diversity of foodstuffs available within each, it should by no means be seen as
comprehensive.

1025

Patricia Caplan, “Approaches to the Study of Food, Health and Identity.,” in Food, Health, and

Identity (London: Routledge, 1997), 1–31.
1026

Claude Fischler, “Learned versus ‘Spontaneous’ Dietetics: French Mothers’ Views of What

Children Should Eat,” Social Science Information 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1986): 945–65,
https://doi.org/10.1177/053901886025004009.
1027

Bob Ashley et al., Food and Cultural Studies (Routledge, 2004).

326

6.14.1

National Cuisine

Coconuts are used extensively in Pacific cooking and have significant symbolism
associated with them. Coconut trees are "the universal symbol of the tropics in the
popular imagination".1028 They are used as a symbol of a tropical island paradise,
representing "hot weather, sea and vacation time".1029 The coconut tree is also known as
the "tree of life" or "divine tree" in the South Pacific, owing to its use as food; building
material (wood and leaves); material for weaving; and oil. Coconuts are of critical dietary
importance for many islanders.
Taro is similarly iconic. It was by far the most important and commonly eaten
starch in pre-colonial Pacific. Its consumption has declined as other starches have gained
in popularity. It remains a status food for many islands and is often seen as essential for
an authentic traditional meal. Its high cost limits its consumption largely to special
occasions and meals for tourists.
Across the Pacific, traditional feasting is typically accompanied by music and
dance becoming a key part of the tourist representation of the islands. Hawaiʻi calls it a
luau; Fiji calls it a lovo1030. Both the Cook Islands and Niue have their own versions,
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where they are known for tourists as island nights1031. The imagery and meanings of food
are often manipulated for a variety of reasons to serve a multitude of goals. This
manipulation is very evident in these presentations. These meals rarely include the scope
of the island's cuisine, nor what is typically consumed. They are generally designed to
fulfil tourists' desires for an exotic and pseudo-authentic meal. Though often
incorporating symbolic traditional dishes and popular conceptions of what people eat in
the islands (such as absurd amounts of pineapple), these meals are typically catered to the
perceived desires of tourists for food that is familiar to them, but at the same time is
suitably exotic.
Each of the nations in this dissertation, as well as sharing these general patterns,
also has national cuisine trends that can be seen to reflect their national identity. Hawaii’s
popular cuisine well reflects its identity. It is distinctly Hawaiian, but fully incorporates
the cuisines of the many cultures that form Hawaiʻi. The food that could be said to
represent Hawaii’s national cuisine is a blend of Hawaiian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino,
American and other culture's dishes.
Rice is one of Hawaii's most significant foods. With Chinese immigration, rice
quickly replaced taro as the primary starch and was consumed by nearly every ethnic
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group in Hawaiʻi.1032 Today, it is not uncommon for people in Hawaiʻi to consume rice
daily or multiple times a day. In preparing for natural disasters such as hurricanes,
grocery stores will see runs on rice and Spam, similar to how stores elsewhere may have
shortages of milk, eggs and bread. Even for those currently incarcerated, rice is
significant. For example, a prison riot occurred in Arizona, where prisoners from Hawaiʻi
were housed in a correctional facility. Their complaints about the type and quality of the
rice provided were credited as the reason for the hour-and-a-half-long riot, during which
they caused damage and injured a guard.1033 In Hawaiʻi, the general reaction to the riot,
although disapproving, was one of understanding.
Spam and Spam musubi are amongst the best-loved foods in Hawaiʻi, where
consumers of Spam eat over 7 million cans a year. This meat product was introduced to
the islands after World War II.1034 It has been jokingly called “Hawaiian steak” and is
celebrated with a large annual street festival in Waikiki called the Spam Jam. Spam is
eaten in a variety of ways, including fried as a breakfast food, as a sandwich, or most
popularly, as a musubi. Musubis are a type of fusion sushi wherein meat (typically a slice
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of Spam) is pressed with rice and wrapped in nori (a type of Japanese seaweed). They are
commonly eaten as a snack or a light meal and are sold at virtually every convenience
store in Hawaiʻi. It is also typically seen at children’s sports games, brought by a team
parent as a post-game snack for them. Similarly, many parents will send a musubi for a
child's lunch on field trips. Both McDonald's and Burger King in Hawaiʻi serve Spam as
part of their breakfast menu and have offered burgers with Spam as well.
A number of other Hawaiian dishes remain popular and iconic. Poi is a traditional
staple. It is a thick paste made from taro and is often served lightly fermented. Though
highly iconic, its daily consumption varies widely. Poke is another popular traditional
food in Hawaii and, recently, across the rest of the U.S. and Canada. In its most common
form, it is raw fish (typically ahi tuna) and seasoned with salt, onion, shoyu and often
limu seaweed. It can be eaten on its own or on top of rice (known as a poke bowl). Lomilomi salmon is another common raw fish dish. Raw salmon is cured with salt and diced
with tomatoes and onions. Pork was traditionally highly valued in the Pacific, and pork
dishes remain popular today, particularly kalua pig and laulau. Kalua pig is pork slowroasted in an earth oven. Laulau is pork, chicken or fish wrapped in layers of taro leaves
and cooked until soft. Chicken long rice, though not actually a traditional dish, has
become adopted as one. It features clear mung bean noodles cooked in chicken broth with
chunks of chicken and ginger. These dishes all remain widely consumed both as part of
tourist presentations and by residents of Hawaiʻi.
Plate lunch, though not a food in itself, is a quintessential Hawaiian meal. The
representative plate lunch consists of two scoops of white rice, macaroni salad, and an
entree. Typical entrees include chicken katsu (Japanese-style fried boneless chicken);
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beef teriyaki (known as teri beef); Korean kalbi; char siu pork; kalua pork; hamburger
steak; and Filipino chicken adobo. Likely derived from the Japanese bento, plate lunch is
a popular meal. Given the quantity of food offered by a plate lunch, the price, and the
way in which it is classically served (in a white unbranded Styrofoam container), it is
often seen as a “working man's” meal, though it is eaten by all. In many ways, plate
lunches are seen as symbolic of the modern nation of Hawaiʻi. They represent a distinct
fusion of cuisines that are accessible to all.
In addition to the foodstuffs mentioned above, there are also a number of foods
that have become associated with Hawaiʻi that lack the same historic significance or
actual connection. Hawaiian pizza is an excellent example of this. It is topped with ham
or bacon and pineapple. Invented by a Greek immigrant in Chatham, Ontario, it has no
natural connection to Hawaiʻi. Though available at most pizza places in Hawaiʻi (as is the
case for much of the U.S.), it enjoys no greater popularity in Hawaiʻi than anywhere else.
This trend of adding pineapple to dishes and branding them “Hawaiian” occurs frequently
both in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere. For example, Hardees (an American fast food chain) has
offered a “Hawaiian Chicken Sandwich”, which featured teriyaki sauce and a slice of
grilled pineapple. Similarly, McDonald's in Waikiki (Oahu’s main tourist area) bundles
pineapple with all of its combo meals.
Cook Islands’ national cuisine would likely be considered traditional Polynesian.
Though there are food options in the Cook Islands that span a wide range of cuisines
(including continental, Indian, Chinese and Italian), they do not seem to be incorporated
into national cuisine in the same way as in Hawaiʻi or Fiji.
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The Cook Islands are reasonably agriculturally diverse, with a variety of tropical
fruits and vegetables available. Seafood, including fish, clams and octopus, is also
common. Food cooked in an umu (earth oven) is most commonly described as Cook
Islands cuisine. However, this process is labour-intensive and does not actually represent
a commonly consumed set of foodstuffs. Other iconic dishes include ika mata (raw fish
with coconut milk and finely chopped vegetables marinated in citrus); curried eke
(octopus in coconut curry); rukau (taro leaves with coconut cream); and poke (banana or
pawpaw pudding made with coconut milk).
Unlike in much of the Pacific, which views fruit as low-status snacks, the Cook
Islands does not seem to have the same social stigmas for fresh fruits. This could possibly
be seen as a sign of tourism promotion’s success in breaking the traditional stigma to
support the paradise imagery of fruit.
Tourism is extremely significant for the Cook Islands, and food is well
represented in the tourism promotional materials. Various travel writers have described
Cook Islands food in glowing terms including calling it a “food lover’s paradise” and in
the “Top Ten List of International Food Destinations.”1035 This promotion is likely a
significant part of the reason why conceptions of Cook Islands cuisine are so focused
upon traditional-esque Polynesian cuisine. Cook Islands tourist focused marketing
materials sell the islands as traditional paradises playing up the tropes of the exotic
island. Thus, whilst many other cuisines are more widely available, and some can
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arguably be more important for daily life, there is a vested interest in maintaining
traditional Polynesian cuisine as representative of the Cook Islands’ national cuisine.
Seafood is the most significant part of the Niuean cuisine. Fish, uga (coconut
crabs), or crayfish are a key feature of most Niuean recipes. Ahi tuna, mahi-mahi,
barracuda, and parrotfish are the most typically consumed. Uga is both highly iconic for
Niue and widely desired but has become somewhat scarce and thus no longer eaten
frequently. Interestingly, given the emphasis on seafood and despite a variety of edible
seaweeds being present in Niue, they have apparently never been meaningfully
consumed. Taro, papaya, coconut, banana, yam, cassava and breadfruit are also widely
consumed as part of traditional style meals.
What seems to most define Niuean cuisine is the source of the key ingredients.
Though dishes like cream of crab soup and fish and chips are not traditional Niuean food,
they have become a part of the national cuisine because they proudly feature Niuean
seafood. Even restaurants like Kaiika Sushi & Gourmet Cuisine, which advertises
“authentic Japanese cuisine”, are seen as Niuean in their focus on using premium locally
caught fish.
Taro, as in most of the Pacific, is seen as the highest status and most desirable
starch. Yams and cassava, being much easier to grow, form a significant, but less desired
portion of daily traditional style starch consumption. Papaya and bananas are very lowstatus foods and are mostly consumed raw by tourists and children. However, a cooked
papaya, coconut and taro casserole, Takihi, form what can be described as Niue’s
national dish. As one of the few uniquely Niuean foods, Takihi is very iconic. It blends
together several classic island flavours in a distinct way.
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Much of Niue’s food is imported. Canned beef and frozen chicken will be
frequently incorporated into meals of otherwise largely traditional ingredients. Most fresh
produce is imported, though local production can inconsistently supplement demand.
Soda, chips and other high-calorie sugary foods are extremely common and widely
consumed, though not seen as part of the Niuean cuisine.
Food has not played a significant role in Niue tourism promotion, with a few
recent exceptions of food festivals. There has been a notable lack of linkages between the
tourism and agricultural sectors.1036 In fact, many guidebooks focus more on reassuring
visitors that they will find something they want to eat rather than emphasising the quality
or uniqueness of Niuean cuisine. This approach is beginning to shift. KaiNiue, a food
festival started by the premier in 2014, is an event featuring prominent New Zealand
chefs, designed to showcase the quality of Niuean foods.1037
Fiji has considerable diversity in food consumption. Meals will regularly
incorporate ingredients that span a number of cultures and have non-traditional origins.
Even traditional Fijian diets were extremely diverse. What is likely most iconic of Fijian
cuisine is its variety and the incorporation of ingredients from across the cultures of
modern Fiji. Food provides a point of similarity within a national narrative full of
differences. Through foods such as rice, cassava, coconut and curry, a culinary
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experience is shared by all peoples of Fiji. These foods, despite their origins, are
consumed by everyone. Food in Fiji has become an area of the national identity in which
it is possible for all people to be represented.
Curries are perhaps the best example of incorporation within Fijian cuisine. In
Fiji, a curry is essentially any meat or vegetable cooked in a spiced sauce. Curries are
seen as Indian; however, everyone in Fiji eats them. Curries will incorporate a variety of
local ingredients, with many variations. Curries can be either vegetarian or contain a
protein. Chicken appears to be the most common; mutton and beef (by non-Hindus) are
also popular. The curry may also contain coconut, mango and bananas. Coconut milk is a
common ingredient for Fijian Indians who identify themselves as South Indian, as well as
for native Fijians. Like most other meals, curries are generally served with a starch such
as roti, rice or cassava.
Each of the nations has established a de facto national cuisine. They incorporate
the values of the nation in what they emphasise, and every time they are consumed they
strengthen the nation’s identity This occurs even if when they are consumed, the person
is not consciously aware of the meanings behind the food. Fiji and Hawaiʻi feature
cuisines that are distinctive to the islands but incorporate the multitude of cultures that
form the nation. Similarly, the Cook Islands and Niue have found a way to identify food
as theirs, despite much of it being imported.

6.14.2

Food Branding

Food packages are frequently “flagged” with national symbols. This can include
direct flagging with the nation’s flag, but also other representations of the nation such as
stylised maps of the nation and prominent symbols. They are present with somewhat
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different goals, both in products intended for domestic consumption and in products for
export. For products intended for domestic consumption, this flagging can be used to
signal authenticity and connection. In products intended for export markets, the
symbolism may be intended as part of the marketing of the exoticness or otherwise
desirability of the source nation. Increasingly, though, the symbolism is used to connect
the product to the “homeland” for those living in diaspora.
Niue does not have any significant locally manufactured food products.
Harrington's Brewery in New Zealand does, however, brew a pale ale specifically for the
Niuean market under the brand Kalaga (shout). A locally brewed Fiafia Lager was
previously available in Niue. Government-owned Noni Niue has also been experimenting
with bottled water for the export market. These products do not seem to have gained any
meaningful market penetration in Niue with imports continuing to dominate shelf space.
Niue does export a handful of small-scale agricultural commodities, most notably, taro.
Niuean pink taro is considered one of the highest quality taros. Though it is known in
Samoa as taro Niue and sold in New Zealand as Niuean pink taro, it is sold without any
particular branding or marketing that would connect it to Niue beyond its species name.
Niue also has small-scale vanilla, honey and noni production intended for export. These
products have such limited market reach that they mostly function as souvenirs for
tourists rather than being meaningful in serving the domestic market or appealing to
Niueans in diaspora.
In Hawaiʻi, a large number of food products are manufactured for both the local
and export markets. Though these products are heavily branded with symbols of Hawaiʻi,
the flag and the outline of the islands (both common national symbols on food elsewhere)
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are largely absent. The hibiscus (the state flower) is heavily used. For example, Kauai
Kookie, the most prominent Hawaiʻi cookie manufacturer, uses the hibiscus as its logo
and decorates its boxes with it. Plumerias are also used in the branding of other Hawaiʻi
food products. Aloha Shoyu, Hawaii’s largest and most iconic seller of sauces and
vinegars, has a ring of plumerias around the label on each bottle. Many prominent brands
use other iconic flowers and plants to decorate their packaging. These brands include
Hawaiian Sun (a major beverage and syrup manufacturer); Hawaiian Springs (a
significant water bottler); Mountain Apple Brands (a local grocery store brand); and
Hawaiian Host (the most popular chocolate-covered macadamia brand).
An exception to these styles is Noh Foods of Hawaii's export-focused products.
Noh is Hawaii’s primary seasoning company. Its products such as char siu powder and
Hawaiian Iced Tea mix are widely exported. Along with Hawaiian Host macadamia nuts,
they probably have the best global availability of any Hawaiʻi food product. Interestingly,
Noh uses two logo variations. On its larger packages, sold almost exclusively in Hawaiʻi,
they use their logo without the outline of the Hawaiian Islands. The rest of their product
line includes the logo with the island outline.
The Cook Islands has virtually no locally manufactured food products outside of
the beverage sector. The Cook Islands owned Pacific Springs sells bottled water and
carbonated soft drinks under the Vaima and Vaiora brands. Though the Vaima bottled
water brand dominates the Cook Islands market, Vaiora soft drinks are hard to find and
do not appear to be widely consumed. Both products, though, are strongly branded with
symbols of the Cook Islands. The Vaiora bottle even has the slogan “the peoples [sic]
drink”. Low sales numbers for Vaiora soft drinks have been attributed to higher

337

production costs than Coca-Cola products, because of a long-running improper
application of tariffs to Coca-Cola products.1038 Matutu Brewery brews Mai-branded
lager. The packaging bears a tapa-style pattern with the tagline “proudly brewed in the
Cook Islands”. These beverages do seem to support everyday nationalism by subtly
reminding consumers of where they are, though they have not yet reached the level of
production needed for their effects to be fully felt.
The Cook Islands exports some fruits and vegetables. However, despite some
attempts at marketing a premium frozen fruit product, nearly all of the Cook Islands
agricultural exports are sold as commodities without any meaningful island branding. The
situation with fish in the Cook Islands is similar. The waters of the Cook Islands are
home to some of the world’s most significant albacore tuna populations. Despite massive
commercial fishing operations, the tuna is almost exclusively fished by foreign operators,
processed in American Samoa, and exported without any Cook Islands branding. Until
recently, the Cook Islands imported NZ$500,000 of fish, even though much of it was
caught in Cook Islands waters.1039 The Minister for Marine Resources arranged with
Starkist, the largest processor of Cook Islands fish, to establish a brand called Golden
Tuna, which, in addition to serving the domestic market, would also be branded with
Cook Islands labelling to help build a premium export market.1040 The packaging for
Golden Tuna includes the Cook Islands ring of stars and is labelled “Cook Island Golden
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Tuna”. It appears that the brand has never managed to gain a meaningful domestic or
export market share.
Fiji has fairly significant domestic production of a variety of foods. These
products often make heavy use of their “Fijianess” to sell the product. This can be seen
most clearly in the ways in which soda is sold in Fiji, though it is present across many
sectors and products.
Three main brands (Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Sprint) are available in Fiji. Sprint is
locally owned, and all three have local bottling plants. Coca-Cola has been available in
Fiji since 1944. In 1972, Coca-Cola Amatil began local production. Coca-Cola for
consumption within Fiji and Tonga is manufactured on the outskirts of Suva. Coca-Cola
is often marketed in Fiji through the use of local imagery. The current can design for
Coke features the word “bula” (used similarly to Hawaii's “aloha”) on the side.
Advertisements often include scenes of the beach or iconic Fijian sites. Coca-Cola also
markets its products as natural accompaniments to Fijian foods. Many eateries are
decorated with posters advertising Coca-Cola products paired with popular local dishes,
such as lolo with dalo, chicken curry or chow mein. The Coca-Cola fridge is a regular site
at Fijian shops and eateries. Pepsi is bottled in Fiji by the Tappoo group. Despite
extensive advertising and sports sponsorship, Pepsi products are much less popular than
Coca-Cola products and are available only in a limited number of places. By their
numerous sports sponsorships, they are able to pitch the message that buying Pepsi is part
of supporting the national teams and, in turn, being Fijian. The Motibhai Group
manufactures soft drinks under the brand "Sprint". These soft drinks are significantly
cheaper than Coca-Cola or Pepsi products and are manufactured in Fiji by an Indo-Fijian
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owned company. As the owners of the PET bottle manufacturing plant and many retail
stores and restaurants, the Motibhai Group maintains a very high level of vertical
integration and trades heavily on the resulting Fijianess of this integration. Marketing
campaigns for Sprint reflect this uniqueness. Sprint soda marketing generally emphasises
its localness.
Food branding in the islands does not seem to be significantly focused on
promoting authenticity, outside of the beverage sector. Though there may be considerable
pride in local production, locally made products are not generally seen as preferable.
Within the diasporas, however, there seems to be an increasing market for food made in
the home nation. Nationalism in the Pasifika diaspora, however, remains a seriously
understudied topic.

6.14.3

Import Limitations

As islands, all four nations face significant limitations and challenges related to
food supply, particularly domestic production limitations and high import needs. These
limitations create a situation in which dependency on other states is required. Though Fiji
and possibly Hawaiʻi could theoretically increase domestic production such that they
become no longer dependant on imports, market forces and consumer preferences render
it unlikely. Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ small size and agricultural limitations would
require fairly dramatic shifts in food consumption (essentially reverting back food choice
by several decades) in order to obtain food independence and is thus similarly unlikely to
occur.
All food imported into Niue must come either via infrequent container ship or by
twice-weekly flights from New Zealand. A container ship sails from New Zealand to
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Niue via Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands, taking about three weeks to reach
Niue. Any fresh goods must be sent by air. Theoretically, packaged food could be sent
from any of the countries at which the ship stops. But beyond a few speciality items from
Fiji, New Zealand is effectively the only food source for imported goods.
Though the Cook Islands has more selection for food imports, minimal
competition means limited imported food choice. Cook Islands Trading Corporation
(CITC) largely dominates the food import market. As the operator of both of the major
supermarkets in Rarotonga and the primary restaurant/catering supplier, they largely
determine what food products are going to be available in the Cook Islands.
In addition to reasonable local production, both Fiji and Hawaiʻi import
significant amounts of food from a variety of countries. Hawaiʻi receives several hundred
cargo ships a year and Fiji similar numbers. There is also a large amount of air cargo
transported to the islands. Fiji has direct cargo routes from the U.S., Asia, Australia and
New Zealand. Thus, food will be imported from a variety of countries. As is typical with
developing countries, a significant amount of the food is imported based upon current
market conditions and shipping schedules rather than any sort of typical logistical pattern.
It is not uncommon to see food coming from a variety of atypical countries. During my
previous research, I found sodas imported from Papua New Guinea, jarred fruit salad
from Sri Lanka and ketchup from Indonesia sold alongside products imported from
typical Fijian suppliers, Australia, India, New Zealand and the U.S.
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The vast majority of the food in Hawaiʻi is shipped from the U.S. West Coast,
including food originating in Asia. Restrictions under the federal Jones Act1041 prevent
foreign cargo vessels from profitably operating service directly to Hawaiʻi from Asia. 1042
Though there is significant cargo transported between Hawaiʻi and the rest of the South
Pacific, food cargo does not appear to form a meaningful component. South Pacific
brands are available only in speciality shops in Hawaiʻi, and Hawaiʻi-manufactured food
has little presence in the shops of many South Pacific islands.

6.14.4

Health Promotion Efforts

Many of the world’s most obese and overweight populations are in Oceania. The
Cook Islands and Niue currently have the second-highest mean body mass index (BMI)
(neighbouring Nauru is slightly higher).1043 In the Cook Islands, 81 per cent of the
population is overweight, with over half considered obese, giving it the highest obesity
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are still extremely high.
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rate in the world.1044 Similarly, almost three-quarters of Niue’s population is overweight,
and over 40 per cent is obese. Fiji has a lower obesity rate of 36.4%, but 78.2% of the
population is overweight.1045 Hawaiʻi has rather low overweight and obesity percentages
for the U.S. (56.4 and 22.7 per cent, respectively).1046 Nevertheless, there is considerable
variation across ethnic groups. Many groups (particularly Hawaiians and other
Polynesians) have high overweight and obesity rates comparable to the rest of the
Pacific.1047 The obesity rate has also climbed dramatically over the past few decades. In
addition to the other health concerns of obesity, diabetes related to diet has been
described as one of the top concerns for health officials in each nation.
Many of these health problems are directly connected to globalisation and
colonialism. Imported food has replaced many of the traditional foodstuffs with highercalorie, highly processed items. These foods have become socially desirable, particularly
amongst children. Similarly, in some Pacific islands cultural values favour larger body
types as a symbol of power and wealth; an outlook slow to change. There are also
traditions of celebratory feasting for many life events. Desirable unhealthy foods have
become accessible to wider populations, shifting them from occasionally consumed to
regularly consumed. Changes in job functions have further reduced exercise that used to
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balance traditionally high-carbohydrate meals. These factors, along with several other
locally specific issues, have created a significant problem for most of the region.
Though approached as a public health problem, the solutions have significant
implications for nationalism. A major trend favours local traditional foods in an attempt
to combat obesity. Local food can serve as an “identity marker”.1048 Consuming it helps
promote a sense of cultural identity and self-sufficiency, and with it build the nation.
Although some, particularly in Hawaiʻi, have intentionally tried to shape it for
nationalistic goals, much of it is seemingly unintentional under public health efforts.
Niue’s Ministry of Health has been implementing a multipart strategy to target
obesity and diabetes. This plan aims to encourage people to limit their consumption of
imported foods and refocus on eating traditional foods. The ministry operates educational
campaigns to promote these goals in the schools and for the general public, including a
community cookbook of healthy Niuean recipes. Given a lack of other cookbooks, this
could easily become the defining representation of Niuean national cuisine. There is also
a push to encourage Niueans to eat more fruit. Though fruit is reasonably plentiful, there
are social stigmas related to its consumption; many fruits are seen as a food of last resort.
Eating a raw papaya would be something done only by children or with shame by the
poor. Tourist consumption has somewhat increased its acceptability, but it still remains a
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source of amusement for many that tourists find them desirable. Coconut water sees a
similar pattern.
The efforts by the Ministry of Health in Niue are interesting in light of the fact
that they are primarily funded by the New Zealand government. In effect, the New
Zealand government is paying for efforts to reduce the consumption of New Zealand
made imported foods and also attempts to further define Niue’s identity as distinct.
The Cook Islands Ministry of Health has for some time attempted to encourage
healthier eating to combat obesity. However, it does not appear to have any significant
current campaigns.
Fiji’s Ministry of Health’s recommendations for food and health strongly promote
eating locally and avoiding food “sold in brightly coloured packets”.1049 Fairly unique
amongst nutrition guidelines, their guidelines also advocate growing food at home. All of
the food shown in the guidelines are foods that are strongly identified with Fiji. This
includes both foods that are traditionally associated with Fiji like taro and coconut, as
well as later additions like ghee and rices.
The guidelines for schools feature healthy meals representative of Fijian cuisine,
such as “fish and green leaves in lolo with cassava”; “chicken curry with rice and
cucumber”; and “chicken or egg fried rice with vegetables”.1050 Notably absent from their
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recommendations are any of the meals thought of as Western (fish and chips, sandwiches,
etc.). Beef and pork are also absent both for health reasons and to be applicable across
Fiji’s population.1051
The Ministry of Health’s guidelines are clearly built with Fiji in mind, rather than
being simply an adaptation of another nation’s or FAO/WHO recommendations. As such
they promote foods that strengthen the Fijian identity and national cuisine in a way that
many Pacific island states have only recently started to do.
The Hawaiʻi governmental structure has meant a different style of approach to
nutrition policy. The Hawaiʻi Department of Health has focused on general healthy eating
and exercise advice through its “Healthy Hawaii Initiative”. The campaign, though
featuring some photos that are clearly in Hawaiʻi, has virtually nothing that is Hawaiʻi
specific. Its food suggestions show no awareness of Hawaii’s cuisine or food options and
could be unnoticeably interchanged with any other U.S. state’s. School lunches for staterun schools in Hawaii follow the federal U.S.DA school lunch guidelines, limiting the
ability to adapt them to Hawaii’s foodways. Nevertheless, school lunches often do reflect
local taste. Rice is served in some form most days. Most schools serve it daily for either
breakfast, lunch or alternate lunch. Further, Hawaiʻi entrees such as kalua pork, chicken
katsu, teriyaki beef, Portuguese sausage (for breakfast), and shoyu chicken/turkey are
regularly appearing. Pineapple also appears more frequently than in non-Hawaiʻi schools.
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The Hawaii Department of Education’s School Food Services Branch manages food
services for all public schools in Hawai‘i and does all purchasing as a single entity.1052
This model means that with demand for local food exceeding supply, despite public
support, little food for Hawaiʻi schools is locally grown or produced.1053
Nongovernmental efforts to encourage Hawaiʻi-specific dietary change saw some
highly significant early successes but have since lost much of their momentum. One of
the most meaningful of these efforts was a study in Waianae conducted in 1991.1054 In
this study, Hawaiians were provided with a diet of foods that were available pre-Western
contact.1055 They were encouraged to eat as much as they wished, as the food was low in
fat and calories.1056 Adherence to the diet was extremely high; feelings of cultural pride
were credited with this success.1057 Across the initial three weeks, participants lost an
average of 1.6 kg (3.5 lbs).1058 A follow-up study in 1999 found a sustained weight loss
average of 6.8 kg (15.1 lbs).1059 Despite this success, since then most efforts have been
smaller, targeting eating local.
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The message of a return to more traditional foods has become a part of the
undercurrent of sovereignty activism and cultural revitalisation in Hawaiʻi. Food is used
as a symbol of resistance to the occupiers and as a part of the formation of the identity of
the sovereign nation. Food has a historical role in Hawaii as a “cultural symbol of
alliance-building and loyalty, celebration and spiritual reverence”.1060 It is because of this
role that food has become a tool of resistance within the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement. Sovereignty activists have described the Hawaiian nation as a “people who
make their livelihood from the land and the sea”.1061 A return to Hawaiian food and an
escape from the oppression of a supermarket-oriented food distribution system have
become key parts of the goals of rebuilding the Hawaiian nation. Direct action, however,
has been typically treated as a low-priority item. Small-scale attempts at promoting
traditional foodways serve as the major representation.

6.14.5

Biodiversity

There have been some attempts at promoting traditional edible plants in the region
as a way to ensure continuing biodiversity. These efforts typically focus on encouraging
education regarding traditional practices in growing and harvesting culturally significant
plants. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community has organised a number of these
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programs for the region including their fairly successful root crops program.1062 Though
these programs are not explicitly designed to have a nationalist message, like with
nutrition policy, they will often serve to support nationalist causes. Within Hawaiʻi,
working on the taro crops have become integrated within other cultural promotion efforts
and sovereignty activism. A moral component has emerged wherein by supporting
traditional local plants, you are supporting local cultural values and fighting the
devaluation of local foods.1063

6.15

Conclusions

Hawai‘i, as expressed through everyday nationalism, creates an unusual situation.
Across a wide variety of areas of daily life, it is treated as distinct from the United States.
Simultaneously, it is not operating as a sovereign nation. It is an undeniable reality that
the U.S. continues to maintain control of the islands and the world remains largely
content with this status despite the efforts of activists.
Fiji is one of a growing number of nations in which everyday nationalism is being
intentionally shaped to promote a desired vision of the nation. The government’s efforts
to promote a unified Fijian nation are highly significant. Interestingly, these now
intentional efforts actually fit the way in which everyday nationalism was expressed prior
to government's attempt reasonably well. Furthermore, their multi-part efforts to
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eliminate areas that are contrary to a message of unity seem to be occurring with
moderate success.
Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ expressions of national identity seem to largely
reinforce the idea that they are in fact independent nations. There is little within the
everyday life in the islands that would indicate otherwise. Though both face struggles
similar to that of other very small island states, they are prospering with distinct
identities.
Across a number of areas of daily life, these four nations see their identities
reproduced. Little thought about mundane areas, such as that of customs and
immigration, air travel, and shipping, all clearly reflect and reinforce the nation. Even the
vague sense of foreignness and the distance travelled can strengthen this idea. The effects
of everyday nationalism on the nation’s identity are, however, most clearly felt within
sport, music, and food.
Sport provides a clear way in which nations can compete with each other where
simply the fact that they are competing as a nation against another nation reinforces their
identity. Though only the Cook Islands and Fiji participate in the Olympics, all four
nations compete under their own banner as a nation regularly. They are able to repeatedly
show who they are and what they represent.
Music is another area in which the nation is built, often without conscious
thought. Music has played a big role in sharing what the nation represents. It is a fairly
inoffensive way to express ideas that might be rejected in other settings. The casual
acceptance and incorporation of other ethnic group’s music in Fiji or the widespreadness
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listenership to Hawaiian protest music has done more to shape the nation's identity than
what any nationalist could achieve through traditional approaches.
Food is increasingly an area of nationalistic concern. Throughout the four nations,
the efforts toward returning to a traditional diet are nutritionally sound, but largely
unrealistic unless it can be strongly paired with nationalistic identity efforts. Traditional
foods lack the variety to which Pacific Islanders have become accustomed. They are
generally low fat and low sugar (though relatively salt heavy) but rely on limited flavours
for seasoning. Many traditional foodstuffs are also fairly labour intensive to produce and
are poorly suited to factory farming methods. Should people manage to actually return to
a traditional diet, we would likely see massive improvements in the obesity rates.
However, given human’s biological urges for salt, sugar and fat, it is hard to convince
people to abandon the cheap and plentiful world of unhealthy manufactured food. By
incorporating nationalistic messages, health promotion efforts call upon powerful forces
of nation and belonging in an attempt to defeat the biological urges. These efforts also
simultaneously strengthen the nation by establishing a pro-nation officially endorsed
representation of everyday nationalism. The health promotion efforts are still, relatively
speaking, in their infancy. We need much more time and data to determine if it is, in fact,
possible for nationalism to be used with success in such a way as is being tried.
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusions
There are a number of surprising absences within the four nations’ expressions of

nationalism, particularly when looked at using a traditional hot nationalism model. This
approach to nationalism would expect to see Hawaiʻi, the Cook Islands and Niue engaged
in a fiercely contested struggle for full independence, whilst Fiji would be in the midst of
ethnic conflict and unrest. This is not, however, the case. Further, through all four are
small island nations in the same region, there is considerable diversity in the ways in
which nationalism is actually expressed.
Hawaii’s sovereignty movement, though fairly active, is surprisingly disorganised
in tactics and desired outcomes. Few of the hallmarks of sovereignty struggles, at least as
exists in the popular imagination, can be seen in Hawaiʻi. There is no militant wing, no
mass protests, nor even any particularly notable icons of the struggle. The symbols of
resistance are few and subtle. There has not been a politically viable pro-independence
political party in decades, and the last referendum on its status was held over fifty years
ago. Nevertheless, there is a very active movement with widespread support.
The movement, though united on the core issue that the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was wrong, agrees on little else. There have been several models for
handling the wrong of the overthrow proposed, but most contradict each other. Further,
while each group has tried a variety of methods, iconic tools of hot nationalism such as
armed resistance and mass nationalist protests are largely absent. Armed resistance was
last meaningfully tried in 1895 and protests whilst common, are almost never directly
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about core nationalist topics, but rather indirect issues such as land usage or
environmental impact.
The lack of a meaningful counter-sovereignty movement in Hawaiʻi is also
significant. Given the activity level of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, it would be
expected that we would see meaningful opposition or, if there is not actually any
opposition, sovereignty would be expected.
For Niue and the Cook Islands, the minimalism of hot nationalism is remarkable.
Though many nations like to believe that they have evolved beyond hot nationalism with
hot nationalism being a thing that happens in other less developed nations, an actual
absence of hot nationalism is rare. Today, neither nation has seen much that is typically
expected in terms of nationalistic sentiment. Though both have well defined national
identities and a widespread undeniable pride in their nation, symbols of the nation are
typically understated.
Fiji is surprising in the relative peacefulness its nationalist driven displays have
had. It seems in many ways to be completely set up for serious nationalistic conflict. It
has a large politically weak minority population who wields disproportionate economic
dominance. Its military is fairly large for its population and has had limited oversight and
control by civilian leadership. Though there have been four coups in the last few decades,
no shots were fired in overthrowing the government, and the three military coups saw no
fatalities. Even within the civilian-led coup in 2000, the coup proper saw only a handful
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of fatalities1064. During the two 1987 coups and the 2000 coup, there was also serious,
though brief, rioting mostly targeting Indo-Fijians and their property. Though clearly
present, violence has been minimal, and displays of divisive hot nationalism have been
fairly brief. When compared to other nations, Fiji’s coups have been remarkably low in
violence. Additionally, despite the coups and discriminatory policies, there is a surprising
lack of Indo-Fijian nationalism.
There is also a seemingly strange pattern within several of these nations in which
efforts to promote sovereignty and independence is being funded by the party that they
are working against. Most directly this can be observed within the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is a semi-autonomous state agency which has
actively worked to promote Hawaiian sovereignty. If it were to accomplish its goals, it
would result in the dissolution of itself and the government of which it is a part.
Similarly, the University of Hawaiʻi typically takes a rather pro-sovereignty position
whilst again being primarily state and federally funded. Within Niue and the Cook
Islands, a large percentage of government funds are coming from New Zealand foreign
aid. As a result, government efforts to strengthen their national identity and distance
themselves from New Zealand are being funded by New Zealand.
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7.1

Nationalism in Small States

Nevertheless, and despite their small size, nationalism is present in each of the
four nations. Even in the extreme example of Niue, there still is a pride in the nation and
a sense of comradery and nationhood that is at its core indistinguishable from larger
nations.

7.1.1 Effect of Small Numbers
One of the characteristics of nationalism in small states most directly connected to
its small size is the disproportionate effect a handful of people can have. The difference
in many small island states between an active nationalist movement and a minimal one
can be as small as the time availability and motivation of a couple of people. For
example, within Niue, the fact that a newspaper exists is because of the work of one
person. Particularly in the case of hot nationalism, we must be careful to not over
attribute importance to its absence or presence. The appearance or absence in a small
state could be the work of an extremely tiny number of people and cannot be said to truly
represent the nation’s sentiments. At the same time, though, care must also be taken to
recognise the effect a few persuasive individuals can have. In general, though, for small
states, everyday nationalism seems to be much more representative of the nation’s
identity.
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7.1.2 Economic Development
All of the nations in this dissertation are somewhere in the middle of most
development indexes. Hawaiʻi1065 is the most developed economically in the region and
does acceptably on most human development metrics. The Cook Islands is set to move to
developed country status in late 2018 under the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) listing methodology. This places it with most of Western
Europe. Though it is set to graduate, many remain very concerned because it is right on
the edge. Niue and Fiji remain in the upper-middle-income list. Though there are some
development challenges due to geographic factors1066, they have reasonable average
incomes and standards of living in much of the nation.
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It seems likely that the development levels of each nation may be having a
moderating effect on the ways in which nationalism is expressed. For most people living
within these nations, despite the challenges, the status quo is working fairly well for
them. They lack the motivation for radical change. Many past independence movements
were largely motivated by a frustration with the administration and a belief that daily life
could be much better as an independent state. When there is little to lose and much to
gain, it becomes easier to back hot nationalism. In contrast, nationalists within the nations
of this paper have much less to promise. Improvements that changing statuses can
provide are fairly minimal and would likely cause considerable turmoil. The Cook
Islands and Niue gain considerably from their relationship with New Zealand and would
face a much more difficult economic situation if they were to end the free association.
For Hawaiʻi, there is a considerable lack of popular support for meaningful changes to
the situation. The time since the overthrow has meant significant changes to
demographics, a near complete loss of the pre-overthrow governance infrastructure and
the development of an economy that heavily utilises its connection to the U.S. Despite
popular support for addressing the wrongs of the overthrow, disruptions to the status quo
are largely unwelcome.

7.1.3 Tourism
The value of tourism to these small island nations provides a powerful motivator
to maintain a specific public image of the nation. Traditional models suggest that within
the types of tourism island nations typically see, tourists demand a nation that is suitably
exotic, but also simultaneously familiar and unintimidating. Particularly for the “standard
island” tourist, they want a relaxing, peaceful place with the complexities of conflicting
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national identities hidden. They don’t want to see protests or other displays of hot
nationalism. They view their trip as an escape from the cares of the world, not a time to
contemplate colonial legacies. This creates a very powerful economic motivator to push
aside any exhibitions of nationalism that do not meet these values. As a result, the
colonial legacy issues in Fiji and the sovereignty struggle of Hawaiʻi rarely receive the
attention of other similar concerns do in other less tourism-dependent locales.
These fears of lost tourism income are not without merit. The coups in Fiji have
seen direct costs in the millions from tourism declines in the immediate aftermath of each
coup. The indirect costs are staggering with most estimates showing that Fiji has still not
regained its tourism momentum from the losses caused by the 1987 coups.
The importance of tourism could, at least in part, explain the minimalism of hot
nationalism in these nations. On a number of occasions, primarily in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, the
government has worked to hide issues from world attention if they would be harmful to
the tourism image.

7.2

Academia and the Legal System in Modern

Nationalism
There has been a noticeable refocusing within nationalism on the academic and
legal spheres. Unlike in many past nationalist movements where academia was seen as
out of touch or the enemy, they are increasingly recognising the utility of academia in
promoting the cause.
Several Hawaiian sovereignty activists have earned graduate degrees for with a
dissertation that serves as a treatise on their subject of activism. Though their works are
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primarily legal arguments, the vast majority are earning their degrees in disciplines other
than law and often present arguments that are at best fringe interpretations of legal
theory. Nevertheless, it has been an extremely effective strategy for gaining legitimacy
and support for their causes. A number of them have also been able to utilise their
degrees to gain positions within the colleges from which they can promote their prosovereignty message to a receptive audience.
In Fiji, many nationalists have used global academic discussions on indigenous
rights and postcolonialism to justify pro-iTaukei positions. Even when inapplicable, the
ability to connect their cause to a larger generally well-received body of scholarship has
been very useful. Niue and the Cook Islands occasionally see similar, though often less
well received (given the benefits of the free association), connections between local
discussions and the larger academic focus.
There is also growing attention on gaining formal skills and developing local academic
materials that strengthen the culture and the nation (primarily through areas of everyday
nationalism).
Nationalists have increasingly been paying close attention to discussions of
sovereignty and independence from an international law perspective. An increasingly
common nationalist tool is to present an argument of why their nation should be
considered a legally sovereign nation, despite practical realities. No longer content with
vague arguments of the illegality of past conquest, nationalists today will often argue that
their nation continues to exist today as an occupied state. Convoluted arguments
regarding flaws in the instrument of annexation or conquest will be paired with selective
application of international law and misunderstandings (intentional or otherwise) of legal

359

technicalities to build an argument for sovereignty. Though many of the arguments have
some legal basis, they typically ignore all contrary facts, issues of jurisdiction, basic legal
theory and often common sense. They are also often exceptionally self-serving in
requiring fairly large leaps to explain why they (and usually they alone) are the rightful
successor to the past state. Despite the deficiencies of the legal approaches, they are
amazingly popular at gaining popular support. Within nations that feature reasonably
functional legal systems people typically expect justice to prevail. Nationalists sell their
approaches as clear-cut legal arguments in which they could only lose if the law is
ignored. They conveniently neglect issues of political will, the fact that most of what they
are asking for is either logically impossible or not a legal question, and subtleties of law
and procedure. In this way, even in their losses, they are able to present it as an example
of continued oppression and when they have their minor legal successes, as full
vindication of their approach. The effect of this approach thus lies more within its ability
to shift the popular opinion then it does the law.

7.3

Everyday Nationalism

The prevalence of everyday nationalism appears to be the most significant feature
of the ways in which nationalism is expressed in these small island nations. Traditional
hot nationalism, for a variety of nation-specific reasons, does not seem to gain much of a
foothold in these nations. Even the expanded form of hot nationalism described in chapter
five largely lack the intensity typically expected. In contrast, everyday nationalism seems
to be an ever-present part of life in these four nations.
Everyday nationalism provides a way to explain the clear presence of the nation
and its symbols in many small nations, despite fairly minimal hot nationalist
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presentations. Across a variety of spaces, everyday nationalism is a clear part of daily life
in these nations. Even many banal practical decisions such as naming streets or arranging
airports can serve to strengthen an image of the nation. Though it has traditionally been
thought to be the result of mostly unconscious decisions, areas of everyday nationalism
are increasingly being shaped by activists with clear nationalist agendas. Even in areas
which are not directly being targeted by activists, there is an overall sense of the nation
that is often intentionally shaped by activists.
Nutrition policy provides one of the strongest examples of the increasingly
conscious, though sometimes indirect shaping of everyday nationalism. Whilst the
projects are typically presented as a way to address the alarmingly high obesity rates
found across the islands, the proposed solution has been a nation affirming return to
traditional foodways. It allows for a stronger nation through an improved sense of
cultural identity and self-sufficiency. Despite its powerful, but subtle, effect on
nationalism, food is often treated as a minor concern for nationalists.
Other areas of everyday nationalism can be clearly observed within the four
nations. Sport and music have long been favourites for looking at everyday nationalism.
The ways in which sporting competitions are set up, as well as how music is performed,
can be very indicative of the popular conceptions of their nation. Similarly, there are a
number of extremely banal areas that have powerful impacts on the identity of the nation.
Airport layouts, customs and immigration procedures and even currency can show the
ways in which a nation’s citizen accept their nation.
In looking across the nations of this study, it becomes very evident that the ways
in which nationalism are expressed have clearly changed, particularly within small more

361

developed countries. Though they have not faded away completely, traditional hot
nationalism is becoming uncommon for these nations. As Billig notes, the fiery, in-yourface style nationalism will turn into much subtler forms of nationalism within established
nations. However, it's not just established nations that have seen this transition. Even
within nations like Hawaiʻi, which have an active sovereignty movement, classic hot
nationalism has faded away to more subtle forms. Further, as these expressions of
nationalism disappear, and everyday nationalism comes to dominate, we see that it is no
longer the extremists promoting a nationalist agenda, but rather a commonplace part of
daily life.

7.4

Factors that Affect the Type and Intensity of

Nationalism
In looking at the four nations, a number of factors have emerged that can in-part
explain the variance in nationalism seen across the four nations. Unlike hot nationalism,
everyday nationalism does not lend itself well to measures of amounts of nationalism or
intensity. As a tool for describing what is arguably ever present within a nation, it is
nearly impossible to compare levels of everyday nationalism between nations. Where the
differences seem to emerge is within the levels of visibility of it and the clarity of the
message it promotes. Similarly, the level of awareness of it and the organised attempts to
affect it seem to vary as well in a somewhat measurable way. Hot nationalism has been
most noticeable in Hawaiʻi and Fiji, whilst its presence in the Cook Islands has been
limited and is mostly historic. Beyond a minimal amount of nationalistic energy
surrounding independence, Niue seems to have virtually no hot nationalism. Everyday
nationalism is present and significant in all four nations. Within Hawaiʻi its role in
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shaping and reinforcing Hawaii’s unique identity is clear, and it is often consciously
manipulated by a variety of activists. Fiji has seen everyday nationalism become a core
component of the government's agenda. The expressions of everyday nationalism are less
explicit in the Cook Islands and Niue but have a noticeable effect on the nations’ identity.
Whilst there is no clear single cause for the differences in nationalism between the
nations, the following eight factors seem to have a meaningful effect.

7.4.1 Population Size
One of the largest differences in nationalism between the four nations seems to be
an effect of population size. The two larger nations see much greater expressions of hot
nationalism and even more visible displays everyday nationalism, then do the two smaller
nations. Globally, larger nations will generally be the sites of intense hot nationalism with
examples in smaller nations much rarer.
As previously mentioned, population size may also serve as a proxy for capacity
to enact nationalist agendas. Small nations will often lack the resources (both economic
and personnel) to devote too much focus to any single cause. The members of the nation
may share a similar bond with their nation and feel as much passion as a larger nation,
but simply be unable to recruit enough people to get their movement going.
Whilst there is a lack of systematic research exploring the effects of nation size on
types of nationalism, it seems, that even outside the region, small nations do not typically
display much hot nationalism. With the exception of a handful of nations with disputed
territory (such as Gibraltar, New Caledonia and Western Sahara), hot nationalism has
been very rare in small nations. This may indicate a lack of capacity (hot nationalism
requires organisation and resources that may be problematic for small nations), external
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pressures, or a lack of public acceptance for the methods of hot nationalism. Members of
smaller nations will generally have more bonds that extend beyond just the nation, which
can inhibit hot nationalism. Further, the othering that often accompanies hot nationalism
is less necessary and less possible given the small numbers and frequently the high levels
of cultural and racial homogeneity. There is likewise a lack of anonymity in small
nations. Unpopular radicalism is hard to sustain when the actors are known to one
another and are subject to familiar and community pressures.

7.4.2 Political Structure
All four nations are essentially democracies. Whilst each has had some issues,
they all currently have representative governments featuring inclusive free and fair
elections and have had so for some time1067. Though there are notable exceptions, hot
nationalism seems to be most intense either as a precursor to or during authoritarian rule.
Whilst democratic societies are by no means immune from hot nationalism, intense hot
nationalism does seem to be less common.
The inclusion of nationalist parties within the governance process seems also to
have an effect. The Cook Islands’ and Niue’s1068 ruling parties are nationalistic, allowing

1067

Though Fiji has not reliably respected the democratic process, its elections have been largely

without issue and a democratic government has been maintained as the ideal with variances minimal.
1068

Niue’s only party was dissolved in 2003, but prior to its dissolution, it was nationalistic. Though

all officially independent, Niue’s elected officials still commonly run on values similar to that of the
previous party.
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the energy of nationalism to find a space within the government. In Fiji, whilst civic
nationalism is embraced by the ruling FijiFirst party, other forms of nationalism have not
been accepted. Hawaiʻi currently lacks any politically viable nationalistic party. It
functions as a two-party system1069 with neither party taking much of a stance on
nationalism. The last significant nationalist political party, the Hawaiian Independent
Party (later renamed the Independent Home Rule Party) dissolved in 19141070. The
intensity of hot nationalism within these four nations may be correlated with the
opportunity for nationalists to participate in the political process. The lack of political
inclusion for Hawaiian nationalism could be part of the reason Hawaiian nationalists have
embraced other approaches, including the occasional expression of traditional hot
nationalism.
It seems that the incorporation of nationalistic political values can potentially
allow other expressions of hot nationalism to fade. Following the argument Billig
described as common for more developed nations, hot nationalism is merely a tool to
deploy in the fight for the nation’s identity whilst it is being formed. Once the battle is
over, and a government that allows nationalists to have political power is formed, they
have no need to keep employing the intensity of hot nationalism. People often perceive

1069

Though both the Hawaii Republican Party and Democratic Party of Hawaii field candidates in

most races, Republican candidates are rarely elected effectively creating a one-party system. Currently,
only five of the 51 representatives in the Hawaii House of Representatives are Republicans. Democrats
have dominated state government since 1962.
1070

The Aloha ʻĀina Party was established in 2015 as a Hawaiʻi nationalist party. Though the most

viable Hawaiʻi developed third party, it has repeatedly failed to secure the required 750 verified signatures
to be considered an official political party in Hawai'i.
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nationalism to be the domain of radicals but will accept it as a necessary part of the
construction of their nation. Whilst we can clearly see that nationalism does not go away,
the intensity does seem to fade.

7.4.3 Civil Society
With allotments made for their size, all four nations have fairly strong civil
societies and reasonably free presses. There are a number of non-governmental
organisations in each nation that work to serve the interests of the public and operate
largely independent of the government. Whilst none of the four nations have especially
great track records towards human rights, most citizens in these nations can expect to
have their rights respected in daily life. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly
are generally possible1071, and political participation is common. News media is closely
interwoven into daily life and is generally respected. As such, any expressions of hot
nationalism must be seen as a disruption to daily life. Nevertheless, the people are free to
express their conception of the nation with minimal governmental restriction. Nationalists
have limited ability to justify nationalistic resistance, and similarly, the government has
no need to use nationalism to support otherwise unpopular actions.

1071

Fiji in particularly has a somewhat spotty record in regards to respecting these rights. Since the

lifting of the 2009 Public Emergency Regulations, there has been considerable improvement. The 2010
Media Industry Development Decree still, however, remains in effect which allows for penalties for
reporting that is against the “public interest or public order”. Though occasionally threatened, under the
current administration, rights to political speech including criticising the government is generally respected.
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7.4.4 Perceived Threats
Nationalism can often be seen quite strongly in response to a situation that is
perceived as a threat to the nation. Nationalists will often frame issues as needing
extreme action in order to protect the nation from threats outside the nation or from those
who do not represent the values of the nation. To sustain or justify the extreme action, the
rhetoric of the nation under attack must be continuously deployed. Whilst the threat is
often overstated or occasionally completely fabricated, the threat has to seem plausible.
None of the nations of this dissertation has much that can be spun by nationalists
into a significant threat to the nation. Classic nationalist targets such as immigration are
not useful, as each of the nations has a recognised need for immigrants. Ethnic or cultural
threats are largely unusable for the Cook Islands and Niue given the still exceptionally
high levels of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Hawaiʻi and Fiji, at the other extreme, are
so diverse that radical ethnic nationalism demands unrealistic goals. All four nations have
good relations with their neighbours limiting the utility of claiming external threats. Even
the colonial powers provided an acceptable experience rendering call-backs to
persecution or brutality under colonialism unusable. Even for Hawaiʻi, enough time has
passed, and demographics have shifted such that the U.S. occupation cannot be
meaningfully used to justify extreme nationalistic action. With the lack of plausible
threats to the nation, it is unsurprising that hot nationalism has been short-lived or nonexistent in these nations.
Across Europe and the Americas, many radical nationalists have used perceived
threats from labour migrants and refugees to rally support for nationalistic policies. These
migrants are presented as direct threats to jobs, general welfare, and lifestyle. Though the
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actual threat is absurdly overblown by most nationalists, some component of the concern
is clearly gaining traction within many nations. Immigration, however, presents little
threat to the nations of this dissertation. All four nations have low unemployment and a
serious need for more workers. Further, the migration patterns to these islands have had
only minimal numbers of people coming from unfamiliar states around which radical
nationalists could create fear.

7.4.5 Lack of Anti-Nationalist or Counter-Sovereignty Movements
There are only very minimal anti-nationalist or counter-sovereignty movements in
the four nations. This could explain why hot nationalism has been so minimal and
everyday nationalism so visible. Typically, hot nationalist movements will have some
group that they oppose, allowing an us-vs-them battle that can sustain the movement. It is
hard to establish or maintain the energy required for hot nationalism when there is no one
meaningfully objecting to your message. Whilst it is impossible to say if the lack of
counter-movements is a result of a lack sustained of hot nationalism or the cause of it, its
absence seems significant.

7.4.6 Kinship Models
South Pacific culture places a high value on family ties. Kinship models are often
extremely inclusive and would include a number of people as fictive kin greatly beyond
most Western models. It is possible that this expanded model of kinship can take on some
of the role the imagined community takes. Within Anderson’s conception of the imagined
community, its members are tied together by little more than a sense of commonality in
being a part of a nation. In many nations of the South Pacific, small populations and
expansive family ties mean that the members of the nation will have more than just the
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bonds of the nation to connect them. This reduced need for national bonds could be a
part of the reduced presence of hot nationalism in the region.

7.4.7 Ethnic Homogeneity
The Cook Islands and Niue have exceptionally high levels of racial and ethnic
homogeneity. Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has one of the most ethnically diverse population in
the world. Fiji similarly has unusually high diversity for a small island nation. Given the
classic conception of the nation being formed on the basis of a shared cultural and ethnic
experience, Niue and the Cook Islands are able to establish political legitimacy for their
nation on this basis. In contrast, ethnic nationalist claims, though employed, are
fundamentally unworkable in Hawaiʻi and Fiji.
The nations in this dissertation represent both extremes of ethnic diversity.
Niue and the Cook Islands have such limited ethnic diversity that a focus on it by
nationalists would be pointless, as shared cultural values can be assumed without a
connection to the nation. A politician or activist trying to make promoting a Niuean or
Cook Islander ethnic identity a serious part of their campaign would likely get a poor
response because this identity can already be assumed. Fiji and Hawaiʻi are at the other
end of the spectrum with very high levels of ethnic diversity. Ethnonationalist initiatives
are naturally poorly received, given the limited audience that can be included. Even the
few attempts at ethno-nationalistic campaigns typically are forced to obfuscate
themselves by framing it as a non-ethnic issue and appealing to other principles, such as
native rights and (often misleading) notions of inclusiveness.
There does not seem to be a specific ratio of ethnic homogeneity at either end of
the spectrum that triggers these effects. Ethnically homogeneous countries can still see
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ethnonationalism emerge, particularly if there is a perceived threat in shifting
demographics. Likewise, ethnically diverse countries can still turn to exclusionary
ethnonationalism, even if that ethnic group is a minority. Nevertheless, as in these four
nations, civic nationalism does seem to be the most viable nationalistic expression in the
long-term and ethnonationalism hard to maintain.

7.4.8 Communications Infrastructure
Anderson argues that the modern nation emerges through a common language and
discourse made possible through the printing press and print capitalism. It provides a
mechanism for establishing commonality and sharing the ideas that form the nation’s
identity. The internet has largely replaced this function in most nations including those of
this dissertation. Fiji and Hawaiʻi have reasonable-quality affordable high-speed internet
across most of the islands. Niue has nationwide free wifi, and the Cook Islands has 4G
and DSL widely available. The internet in each nation is heavily used for news and
political debate. Interestingly, newspapers maintain higher readership in these nations
than they do in much of the rest of the world. A healthy communications infrastructure
does not seem to favour any particular type of nationalism with both hot and everyday
nationalism possibly strengthened by it. It does however potentially explain the
seemingly slow historic rise in nationalism across some of the more remote islands.
Communications infrastructure does not emerge as a major factor anymore in
cross-nation comparisons. Even the poorest or most remote of nations will now have
reasonable cell phone and radio access. Areas without television are likewise fairly
uncommon today. Nationalistic movements are able to quickly spread in a way that
would have previously been inaccessible. It creates an extremely low barrier to entry and
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the possibility of very large audiences. Nationalist movements in Fiji and Hawaiʻi have
made heavy use of the internet and are generally extremely media savvy. Whilst not all
nationalists groups globally have utilised their full range of communication options, even
radical nationalistic organisations are increasingly seeing their battles for acceptance
fought on social media.

7.4.9 Colonial Past
One of the most noticeable ways in which Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Niue differ
from many other small post-colonial states is the way in which nationalists view their
colonial experience. Though colonialism is not loved anywhere, many people in these
three states (and some of the others in the region) have adopted a nostalgic fondness for
the colonial period. There even exists a popular narrative within Fiji, that it only became
a British colony because the Fijian people wanted it to become one and the British were
too impressed or afraid of the Fijian warriors to try to take the islands without consent.
For Niue and the Cook Islands, becoming a colony is often seen as a rational choice to
protect the nation.
All three nations were ceded more-or-less voluntarily, and the colonial experience
was comparatively positive. Great Britain and New Zealand interfered minimally with
existing governance structures and typically avoided exploiting native labour or
resources. The most common complaint of the colonial era is that of neglect and
indifference from the colonial power. The colonial period is locally often presented
neither positively nor negatively, but merely as part of the formation of the nation.
Independence also came differently for these three nations than is typically seen.
Much of Fiji was reluctant to advocate for independence and many Native Fijians were
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actually opposed to the idea. Niue and the Cook Islands obtained independence more
because New Zealand did not want to have colonies than as a result of their own wishes.
The transition for the three states was fairly seamless without the struggle that is often
expected to accompany a path to independence.
Nationalists in other nations have frequently made the struggle for independence a
core part of their national symbols. Independence days are celebrated as victories over
their former colonial oppressors with national anthems that describe the struggle. For
example, the Algerian national anthem has a verse that states “We are soldiers in revolt
for truth / And we have fought for our independence. / When we spoke, nobody listened
to us, / So we have taken the noise of gunpowder as our rhythm / And the sound of
machine guns as our melody.” and the Argentine national anthem celebrates its
independence with “Hear, mortals, the sacred cry: "Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"/ Hear
the sound of broken chains/ See noble equality enthroned”. Many nationalists will use the
struggles of independence to unite or lend legitimacy to their movements.
Fiji, in contrast, had a changeover ceremony when they received independence
that was designed intentionally with a positive stance towards Great Britain. Niue and the
Cook Islands similarly had fairly muted celebrations with a focus on the future of the new
nation rather than victory over a colonial power. Without an energising story of struggle,
it is much harder for nationalists to create an identity around a shared sense of victory or
sacrifice for the nation.

7.4.10

Dependency on Other Nations

In some nations, the level of dependency has become a crucial part of their
nationalist efforts. For many Latin American nationalist movements, the need for the
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nation to free itself from its colonial legacy of dependency and oppression were familiar
rallying cries for nationalists. Nationalism served to galvanise anti-colonial struggles
where it would be hard to otherwise unite people against the economic interests of postcolonial dependency. It provides a justification for actions that may not otherwise gain
support.
Within the context of everyday nationalism, reducing dependency on imported
goods can also strengthen the nation. Seeing goods made within the nation, particularly
when clearly branded as such, reminds people every time they see it that they are a part of
that nation. When store shelves are filled with imported products and services are
provided by foreign firms, it becomes hard to gain a sense of nationhood in daily life.
Many of the nations of Oceania remain highly dependent for goods, services and
general logistics on other larger states. This dependency exceeds that of most other
regions. Indeed, several island nations of Oceania are so highly dependent on larger
nations that they would be nearly unable to function without them. Fiji and Hawaiʻi, with
significant decreases in the standard of living, could conceivably become completely selfsustaining. For both, however, it would require significant efforts to refocus industry and
would still require noticeable sacrifice. Niue and the Cook Islands, in contrast, lack the
resources to meaningfully maintain modern living standards without assistance from
other states. Further, the lack of any adversarial relationship with the former colonial
powers on which they are dependent greatly limits the popular appeal of any message
calling for self-sufficiency.
For larger nations, reducing dependency is a viable goal that nationalism could
enable. However for many small island states, particularly those in Oceania, there are
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clear limits to these efforts. Foreign aid and imported goods are so necessary for many of
the islands and the caveats that accompany these so insignificant that nationalists in the
region have made minimal direct mention of reducing dependency. Where we have seen
some efforts towards reducing dependency, is indirectly through nutrition and energy
policy.

7.4.11

Global Political Power

As nations express themselves on a global stage, their legitimacy and sense of
nationhood are strengthened. The perceived threat of other states not taking them
seriously or otherwise losing its global political power is often presented by nationalists
as a serious danger to the nation.
There are clear differences amongst the four nations in their political power.
Hawaiʻi commands a reasonable amount of attention on the world stage. Fiji similarly
can get attention as the common spokesperson for the region, though their voice is still
limited. Niue and the Cook Islands receive almost no attention globally.
Though useful, Hawaii’s power is, however, very much a double-edged sword.
Whilst their position as a US state automatically affords them global attention, it also
prevents discussions of recognising sovereignty from occurring. Further, from an
everyday nationalism perspective, it shares the muddled position many expressions of
Hawaiian nationhood share in the hybrid role of the State of Hawaii.
Niue and the Cook Islands lack any meaningful global political power. Lacking
any strategic geographic importance, usable natural resources (except tuna for the Cook
Islands), or even a UN seat, they provide little reason for larger states to give them any
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attention. This lack of global political power seems very much to fuel those who express
doubt over the islands' sovereignty and nationhood.

7.4.12

Logistics
In looking at other successful sovereignty movements, one of the factors

in their success seems to be logistical. Movements that have clear pathways towards
operating as a sovereign state seem to be the most likely actually to obtain sovereignty.
Nationalists can be very persuasive in building a justification for sovereignty. However,
people are much more wary of supporting specific action rather than general principles
when there is no clear vision of what the future will look like.
For Hawaii, there is a lack of any sort of viable government (or plan for
one) that supporters of sovereignty can back. There is no de facto government or
government in exile that other nations could recognise. Unlike other efforts in places like
Palestine or Abkhazia that have de facto governments or Tibet with a government in exile
that could gain global recognition, Hawaii’s path to sovereignty would require
establishing an entirely new government. Hawaiian nationalists to-date have not been
able to agree upon any shared vision of what a sovereign Hawaiʻi should look like.
Furthermore, none of the groups active today could possibly serve as or even provide a
meaningful framework for a successor government. This lack of a viable pathway has
further limited the ways in which recognition of Hawaiian nation can occur and with it
the acceptance of Hawaiian nationalism
Though Fiji had some reluctance with respect to independence, they were
able to follow a model that had been applied a number of times within the decolonisation
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movement. Niue and the Cook Islands had a slower path to sovereignty largely due to the
need to establish an effectively new style of government1072.

7.4.13

Challenges Shared with Other Small States
Small states across the world often encounter similar problems within their

nationalist efforts. Their relationship with larger states frequently fluctuates between
apathy and being bullied, with foreign pressures often moderating their nationalistic
desires. As nations express their identity, larger states may completely ignore it, or if it
does not fit their interests, they may directly interfere. The small states, however, remain
forced to continue to participate in arenas that are dominated by larger states, as
withdrawing would often be disproportionately devastating.
Small nations will generally be economically or logistically dependent on
neighbouring larger nations who will typically wish to quell any potential instability
causing nationalistic energy. Whilst the larger nations may have few concerns about the
issues composing the nationalistic values, a desire to ensure continued market access and
to prevent refugee or humanitarian needs is common. Though these concerns are typical
across most nations, small nations will generally have limited ability to ignore the
pressures of the larger nation.

1072
Whilst true free association had not existed previously, there were a handful of other
states that had theoretically similar relationships. These states, however, existed primarily as
transition stages as they worked towards full independence or puppet states of the larger state.
The Cook Islands was the first state to both have it be considered a permanent status and have
full independence.
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The apathy of larger states can, however, be quite useful to smaller states.
Their lack of geopolitical power can make them appealing for friendship agreements
between states and allow them to serve as testbeds for new initiatives. They are not seen
as a threat to anyone, so there is little harm in trying out new arrangements with them
(such as free association).

7.4.14

Islands

One of the most significant advantages nationalist in small island nations have is
the physical boundedness of the islands. There is a clear and discreet border that is
difficult to ignore. Whilst land-locked nations can and often do have borders that are
clearly arbitrary, islands have no ambiguity. Further, this clear border, especially when
there is some geographic distance, allows for arguments of difference from other peoples
to be easily supported. Whilst it is not a guaranteed winning argument (islands such as
Hispaniola and Ireland are still split), it does seem to be persuasive.

7.5

Areas of Future Study

This dissertation aimed to provide a broad overview of nationalism in four small
island nations. There are a number of trends I observed that had to be reserved for future
research. Most interesting amongst these are the effects of diaspora from these four
nations upon the expressions of everyday nationalism. Diaspora can create an extremely
powerful longing for the nation that was left behind. Within the geographic bounds of the
nation, everyday nationalism is typically an ignored force that occurs seemingly
naturally. For those in diaspora, though, there is more of a need to consciously reproduce
the nation. Elements of material culture have to be specially imported, and cultural
celebrations require coordination. Despite the extra effort required many of the
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communities in diaspora will actually devote more energy towards strengthening the
effects of everyday nationalism than will those still living within the nation’s borders.
There are even hot nationalist movements emerging within the diasporic communities,
sometimes for safety reasons (for those in exile, where the home state would be unsafe
for the movement), but also increasingly because they feel a stronger connection to that
nation than the one within which they reside.
All four nations have extremely large populations in diaspora. The diasporic
population of Cook Islanders and Niueans abroad is several times that of those living in
the islands. A third of Indo-Fijians live outside of Fiji, as do large numbers of other
Fijians. Hawaiʻi similarly has large numbers living outside its borders1073.
Though we are starting to see numerous effects of the diaspora on nationalism
with food and music being amongst the most noticeable, there has to-date been little
academic work within the diasporic communities of these four nations. Music (and for
Fiji, film as well) is increasingly being marketed to the large and in many cases more
affluent, communities in diaspora. Similarly, food provides a very visible way in which
communities in diaspora can strengthen their identity. It is no longer just restaurateurs
opening restaurants which serve an adapted menu targeted towards the people of their
new country. Increasingly, the target customer is those wanting a taste of home. Across
the United States, there has been a recent trend of new Hawaiian restaurants serving

1073

Because of the lack of border crossing and fuzziness on who should be included, it is hard to

determine how many people from Hawaiʻi are living outside of Hawaiʻi. Nearly half of Native Hawaiians
live outside of the islands, as do large numbers of people born in Hawaiʻi who belong to other ethnic
groups
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people from Hawaiʻi which typifies this. Though Hawaiian restaurants have been a part
of the mainland US landscape since the 1930s, namely as tiki bars, most had a menu that
would be barely recognisable to someone from Hawaiʻi and was developed by people
from outside Hawaiʻi to sell a romanticised version of the islands. In contrast, many of
the recently opened restaurants are opened by people from Hawaiʻi, have menus that are
indistinguishable from those in the islands and lack any of the inauthentic tiki decorations
that have long marked Hawaiian restaurants outside of Hawaiʻi. These diasporic
communities, though briefly explored throughout this dissertation, represent a meaningful
area in the ever-changing ways in which small island nationalism can be expressed.

7.6

Impact
In looking at these four nations, it is clear that nationalism is still present.

Though they are small states with unusual statuses, existing theories of nationalism
remain applicable. Further, whilst the small size and strong kinship ties would suggest
that there is less of a need for the bonds of the nation, the comradery and feeling of
connectedness described by the “imagined community” are as present within these small
nations as anywhere else. Despite the applicability of these theories, there are
nevertheless a number of differences in how these small nations express their nationhood.
Hot nationalism is significantly more muted than would be otherwise be expected, but
everyday nationalism is as everpresent as it is in larger nations. Similarly, the effects of
other nations on the ability of small nations to express their nationhood is greatly
magnified. By exploring nationalism far outside the areas it is typically tested, we can
expand our knowledge of nationalism in general, as we are able to probe the universality
of these concepts.
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